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Abstract 
This thesis is an attempt to understand few aspects of the initial public offerings 
(IPO) market using the data from the London Stock Exchange (LSE) for both the Main 
Market (MM) and the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) segments. I examined the 
cost of raising money for the IPOs. I found that IPO spread is in the range of 4% - 
6.43% and a median of 5%, which contrasts with previous US studies that report a 
spread of 7%. More interestingly, there is no clustering of fees at any level in the LSE. 
Economies of scale explain the spread charged in the AIM better than the MM, 
implying the spread decreases when the proceed increases. 
As the final product of the IPO preparation stage is the IPO prospectus, I 
conducted a textual analysis to measure the tones’ relationship with IPO short-run and 
long-run dynamics. I used a novel methodology of analysis the textual tone from the 
IPO prospectus utilising Loughrun and McDonald (2011) modified word list. I found 
that IPO tone is related to underpricing, spread and lockup length. However, I did not 
find any relationship with the volatility or idiosyncratic risk. That may be due to the 
fact that these are not useful measures of ex-ante uncertainty. 
I also examined some of the long-run anomalies in the IPO literature. The tone 
measures show a significant relationship with the survival of the firms and time till 
dead. I showed that the information disclosed at the time of IPO is still valid for 
predicting the survival of IPO firms. However, I do not find much correlation with the 
IPO tone measures and lockup expiration returns and long-run IPO performance. That 
might be a result of methodological controversies of measuring the long-run 
performance of the IPO. 
Keywords: AIM, Main market, London Stock Exchange, Underwriters spread, 
IPOs, lockup, underpricing, risk, Underpricing, spread, lockup length, volatility, 
idiosyncratic risk, Textual analysis, Lockup expiration returns, long-run IPO 
performance, survival analysis. 
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Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I give a brief introduction about the thesis and shade some light on the 
IPO literature. In the next section, I give a brief about the main findings and 
contribution of the thesis. 
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) are one of the most important events during the life 
cycle of a typical firm. There has been a sizable literature on numerous issues of IPOs 
including the first day returns, the cost of raising equity finance, underwriter price 
support, long-run IPO performance, survival of the newly listed firms, designs of the 
lockups, lockup expiration returns. Despite enormous research was done during the 
last 40 years there are few anomalies remain in the IPO literature: i) underpricing ii) 
long-run underperformance and iii) lockup expiration returns. The purpose of this 
thesis is to shed light on some of the unanswered questions in the IPO literature.  
Since IPO is a costly event for the growth firms, researchers examine the IPO 
gross spreads in detail and the determinants of IPO gross spread. One of the pioneering 
studies in IPO gross spread is Chen and Ritter (2000). They report an IPO gross spread 
of 7% for most of the US IPOs. They conjecture that charging exactly 7% may be the 
result of some collusive practice by the investment banks. A recent study by 
Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011) show that this is still the norm to charge 7%. 
Hansen (2001) reject that 7% is a result of collusive behaviour on the part of 
underwriters and it is the efficient contracting mechanism. Though Abrahamson et al. 
(2011) looked into the cost of raising equity in the Europe and UK (Main Market), 
there exists no study which examines the cost of raising money in the Alternative 
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Investment Market, which is the most popular second market in the world. I focus on 
the IPO gross spreads in the Alternative Investment Market in the United Kingdom.  
First-day return or IPO underpricing is one of the most researched areas in IPO 
literature. The empirical studies report the various level of underpricing for different 
countries. For example, the US studies report an average underpricing of 7.6% (Ritter, 
2016) and the UK studies report an underpricing of 16.7% (see Chambers and Dimson, 
2009). The reasons for underpricing includes winners curse (Benvenist and Spindt, 
1989), asymmetric information (Rock, 1986), IPOs as a marketing tool (Demers and 
Lewellen, 2003), information cascades (Welch, 1992), lawsuit avoidance (Hughes and 
Thakor, 1992; Tinic, 1988), behavioural biases (Welch, 1992, Loughran and Ritter, 
2002). Still, it is not clear the reasons for underpricing. This thesis is another effort to 
examine the underpricing by using the tone measures from the IPO prospectus. 
Lockups are voluntary contracts between the IPO underwriters and insiders of 
a company not to sell the shares before a stipulated period. It is to provide confidence 
for the investors in the IPOs where they are putting their money. Even lockups are 
voluntary agreements; they are present in almost all the IPOs. Why do lockups exist? 
Academic studies provide three explanations: i) asymmetric information ii) moral 
hazard and iii) agency problem (for a detailed discussion, please see Hoque (2011)). 
It is not clear why lockups exist and what determines their length. It is more puzzling 
than in the US where the lockup length is exactly 180 days for most of the IPOs. UK 
market provides a more interesting case where the lockup lengths are longer and 
diverse. I extend the information asymmetry explanation of lockups by extracting 
information from IPO prospectuses.  
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Hoque and Lasfer (2016) examine changes in director ownership during 
lockup periods. They find that these transactions are not additional signalling devices. 
Instead, they are contractual arrangements between directors and underwriters, as 
directors increase their holdings after a significant price decline, in line with the price 
support hypothesis, but they decrease their ownership after price run-up, consistent 
with the early lockup releases hypothesis. They also examine the rent-seeking 
hypotheses—whether underwriters gain from other transactions like seasoned equity 
offering, insider buys and sells. They find some evidence in line with this. 
Though lockup expiration is a known event and clearly mentioned in the IPO 
prospectus and some databases report the lockup expiration date (at least for the US 
companies), there should not be any market reaction around the lockup expiration day. 
However, there is -1.50% (-2.00%) drop in share price in the US (UK). It is quite 
puzzling. Field and Hanka (2001) examine a number of hypothesis including the 
downward sloping demand curve, worse than expected insider selling, an increase in 
number of trade at bid prices, price pressure, trading costs, change in ownership due 
to distribution of shares by venture capitalists to their partners around unlock day and 
180-day effect. Though they find partial support for several hypotheses that they test, 
their evidence is far from conclusive. 
Another remaining puzzle in the IPO literature is IPOs underperform as 
compared to some benchmarks over 3-5 year period. The underperformance persists 
after the seminal work by Ibbotson (1978), and it is persistent across countries. A 
number of explanations have been put forward to explain the long-run 
underperformance because short selling is not possible for small public floats (Miller 
(1977) and Morris (1996), heterogeneous expectations among the investors (Ritter 
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(1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995)), behavioural timing (Loughran and Ritter 
(2000)), and methodological problems what has been termed as “pseudo market 
timing” (Schultz (2003)). However, it remains a puzzle why IPOs underperform. This 
thesis sheds some light on underperformance using the tome measure from IPO 
prospectus.  
One of the important issue in the IPO literature is the survival of the IPOs. 
Hensler, Rutherford and Springer (1997) examine the effects of various firm and IPO 
characteristics on the survival of IPO firms by applying an accelerated failure time 
(AFT) model. They find that survival time decreases with the increases in some risk 
factors mentioned in the prospectus. Demers and Joos (2007) develop an IPO failure 
risk model by incorporating accounting and other deal specific characteristics. 
Espenlaub, Khurshed and Mohamed (2012) examine whether the IPOs that join the 
Alternative Investment Market with more prestigious underwriters survives longer and 
they find evidence in support of that. Joining the market with prestigious underwriter 
could mitigate the information asymmetry, or it might be possible that prestigious 
underwriters bring good quality IPOs. Ahmad and Jelic (2014) examine whether the 
lockup agreements have any impact on the survival of UK Initial Public Offerings 
(IPOs) between the time of 1990–2011. They find a positive association between the 
lockup length and IPO survival in the UK market. To the best of our knowledge, no 
previous study considers the information from IPO prospectus to relate to the survival 
of the IPOs. 
Recently, there is a growing number of contribution in accounting and finance 
literature which uses the tone and sentiment of various documents and announcements 
made by the company such as annual reports, news announcements, management 
19 
 
discussions and analysis (MD&A), articles in newspapers, and message boards for the 
investors. Examples include Antweiler and Frank (2004), Tetlock (2007), Engelberg 
(2008), Li (2008), and Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008). The findings 
of these studies may be summarised as negative words show a significant relationship 
with different company level financial measures. Kothari, Li, and Short (2008) relate 
the tone of daily paper articles with the cost of capital, the variability of return, and 
forecasts by analysts. Henry (2008), Engelberg (2008), and Demers and Vega (2008) 
relates news releases with company earnings, drift in earnings, or share price returns. 
Some papers relate the information content of IPO prospectus with the share returns, 
price variability and trading volume (e.g., Li (2008, 2009), Feldman, Govindaraj, 
Livnat and Segal (2008), Hanley and Hoberg (2010)). 
Previous studies are subject to numerous criticisms. Most of the previous 
studies use Harvard dictionary words to measure the tone of the IPO. However, 
Loughrun and Mcdonald (2010) criticise when a liability is not a liability as such. For 
example, the word “liability” is not a negative word but Harvard dictionary defines 
this as a negative word. This thesis use Loughrun and Mcdonald (2010) refined 
dictionary. Secondly, there is not much variation in the IPO gross spread and lockup 
length in the US, where most studies on IPOs are done. I used data from the UK where 
there is much variation in the IPO gross spread and lockup length.    
While I fully acknowledge the previous work on IPOs, I considered the 
existing gaps and unsolved puzzles in the IPO literature to take advantage of the 
existing gaps to further explore the information content in the IPO prospectus and 
relate it to the different IPO phenomenon in the short and long-run. The IPO tone 
measures using the prospectus in the UK can provide additional insights and help us 
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understand the massive growth of the Alternative Investment Market and thus may 
help answer some previously unanswered questions in the IPO literature. 
This thesis is such an initiative to examine the information content through 
textual tones and use this information to address some puzzles remain in IPO literature.  
For this purpose, I use a crucial corporate finance event in a firm’s life cycle, called 
initial public offerings to shed light on some of the puzzles in the IPO literature; this 
thesis uses the information provided by the “tone” of IPO prospectus. In particular, 
the study uses the tone measures using the Loughrun and Mcdonald (2010) dictionary 
measures. Specifically, this study uses positive, negative, superfluous tone measures 
of IPO prospectus to address the IPO gross spread, underpricing, lockup length, lockup 
expiration returns, the long-run performance of IPOs and survival of IPO.  
However, the objective of the theses is not to provide a closed form solution 
for the puzzles that remain in the IPO literature. The purpose of this thesis is to 
examine further and to shed additional light on these puzzles, which might help us in 
closing the gap between where I stand regarding the understanding of IPOs and the 
empirical puzzles that remain in the IPO literature. Specifically, this research 
empirically investigates what information is provided by the IPO prospectuses’ tone? 
What is the role of information provided by different types of words for newly listed 
companies?  
The issue of the information content of IPO prospectus is still debatable, and 
this study contributes to the literature by paying attention to the empirical debate of 
whether “tone” of IPO prospectus are informative by using more recent UK data. The 
first objective of the thesis is to examine whether IPO prospectuses contain significant 
information using an updated word lists from Loughrun and McDonald (2010). 
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Second, do the tone measures of IPO prospectus is related to short-run IPO dynamics 
like underpricing, gross spread and lockup length? Third, do the tone measures of IPO 
prospectus is linked to the long-run IPO dynamics such as lockup expiry returns, the 
long-run performance of IPOs and survival of IPOs? The empirical research questions 
in this study are motivated by the gaps and controversies in the literature that remains, 
the different nature of the UK market compared to the US where the IPO market is 
different in terms of IPO method, lockup length, quiet period, price support by the 
underwriters.1  
In Saudi Arabia, there has been a large number of family-owned businesses 
that have been operating for a range of 80 – 20 years. Some of those companies grew 
up and became of a size that is comparable to some of the public companies. On the 
other hand, just until about the year 2000, most of the listed companies in Saudi Arabia 
were from the banking and utility sectors. There have been some other companies in 
some other sectors such as retail and industry. Recently, many of the family-owned 
business and some of the newly incorporated companies started to seek the opportunity 
of going public. With the increasing number of companies going public in Saudi 
Arabia, I found it to be a good time to contribute to the literature of IPO. This is 
accompanied with new underwriters and investment banking coming to the market of 
IPO. Although almost all the IPOs that took place in Saudi Arabia were over-
subscribed, there were a few IPOs that failed to raise the required proceeds. In 
addition, there were a few companies that have bankrupted in just a few years after the 
                                               
1 In the UK the preferred method of IPO is open offer and placing, whereas in the US the usual method 
is book building. Lockup length in the US is almost standardised at 180 days whereas in the UK this is 
much longer and the average is 391 days. There is no quiet period in the UK, whereas there is quiet 
period of 40 days in the US. There is no price support in the UK, but there are price supports in the US.  
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IPO. This motivated me to look into the underwriters main public contribution to the 
IPO which is the prospectuses. I decided to study it in a more mature market such as 
London Stock Exchange where the transparency is high, and the data is available. 
Many studies that covered the IPO literature focus on results of the IPO. 
However, the process of IPO preparation and undertaking is less covered. I am trying 
to cover this part by examining the main public output from the underwriters and that 
is the IPO prospectuses. I look into the prospectuses from 2 main angles. First, I 
consider the cost associated with the process and cover the direct and indirect cost and 
their effect on the post-IPO performance. We also look into the tone of the 
prospectuses that is used by the underwriters in the IPO prospectuses. We measure it 
and then examine its effect on both the short and long run of the post-IPO performance. 
1.1 Main Findings and Contribution 
The results of the empirical tests conducted in this thesis show that IPO 
prospectuses convey information in the case of IPOs. The findings of this thesis are as 
follows. The first empirical paper (chapter four) finds that, in general, underwriters 
charge less in the London Stock Exchange as compared to the US market. I have found 
that the underwriters charge ranges between 4% - 6.43% with a median of 5% over 
the entire sample. That goes in line with Abrahamson et al. (2011) that the European 
underwriters charge less than their US counterparts. I also examined the cost of 
underpricing because underpricing is an indirect cost of raising finance. Our results 
show that for the AIM market, there is a tendency to underprice more. In comparison 
to the Main Market, this has been noticed more among smaller and new companies. 
However, this is more noticed in the first trading day as the discrepancy tends to ease 
where I can see a convergence towards the IPO issue price on the fifth trading day. It 
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is shown in this chapter that diseconomies of scale apply to the fees charged by the 
underwriters as it drops down when the size of the IPO increases. 
The second empirical paper (chapter five) focuses on the short-run IPO 
dynamics and value of textual analysis. Our results show a significant relationship 
with the dictionary words and IPO underpricing, lockup length and spread. I found 
that superfluous words and underpricing are significantly related. I also believe that 
positive words are significantly related to underpricing. My results show a positive 
relationship between most of the tone measures and IPO spread. Higher information 
disclosure in the UK increases the spread, which shows the underwriters can gauge 
the riskiness of the company and charge an appropriate fee for the services they 
provide. I also found a significant negative relationship between negative, litigious 
and uncertainty words and lockup length. The results show higher the risk related 
words the lower the lockup length. To the best of my knowledge, there is no study 
which relates IPO tone with lockup length. I find that certain words significantly 
related to the lockup length. 
Third empirical paper (Chapter six) focuses on long-run IPO dynamics and 
value of textual analysis. The finding that IPOs underperform in the long-run is 
analysed by using the information extracted from the prospectuses. I find a significant 
relationship with the IPO prospectus tone measure and survival of the UK IPOs. I use 
time till dead and dead dummy to relate it to the IPO prospectus tones. Our Tobit 
regression on time till dead and Logit and Cox hazard model on dead dummy show 
that IPO prospectus tone measures are significantly related to the survival of the firms. 
I also find that time till dead is negatively related to spread and multi-bookrunners. It 
shows that risky companies would have paid higher fees and hence they survive less 
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time and also risky companies would have come to the market with multiple 
bookrunners. The higher the lockup period, the higher the time companies survive. 
That is consistent with the previous paper by Ahmad and Jelic (2014). 
In summary, this research contributes to the current literature in eight ways. 
First, this thesis is one of the first efforts to understand the growing popularity of the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in the UK. I examined the cost of raising money 
in such a market that has not been addressed in the literature. The cost of raising money 
in the AIM is high as compared to the London Main Market. However, it is still 
growing and considered as one of the popular markets around the world. The higher 
cost is partly attributed to the size of the IPOs and riskiness of the companies that raise 
equity in the AIM. 
Second, the results help understands the role of textual tones of IPO prospectus 
in the context of going public process. All previous research uses the US data where 
the market is much different in comparison to the UK. The US market uses book 
building method whereas the UK uses open offer and placing. The underpricing is 
much higher in the UK as compared to the US. There is a quiet period after the IPO in 
the US, but not in the UK. The lockup lengths in the US is standardised and shorter, 
whereas the lockup lengths are much longer and diverse in the UK. I teased out the 
previous US findings using IPO tone measures and extend the evidence in the context 
of a different market setting in the UK. This research extends the previous findings by 
utilising a unique UK data set.  
Third, I used the tone measure to relate it to the higher gross spread in the UK. 
Our research shows a positive relationship between most of the tone measures and IPO 
spread. That is somehow consistent with Hanley and Hoberg (2010) who find a 
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positive relationship between standard content and informative content with the 
Spread in the US market. During the book building phase of IPO, much information 
is produced in the US. Higher information disclosure in the UK increases the spread, 
which shows the underwriters can measure the riskiness of the company and charge 
an appropriate fee for the services they provide. Thus bookrunners charge according 
to the risk of the companies as reflected by the IPO tones in the prospectuses. 
Fourth, I extended the previous evidence on underpricing that try to relate 
underpricing with the information asymmetry or risk factors. For instance, Beatty and 
Ritter (1986) provides evidence that more detail data in the prospectuses regarding the 
use of proceeds increases underpricing. On the other hand, Leone, Rock and 
Willenborg, (2007) and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) find that organisations that 
are more (less) particular in their disclosure of the utilizations of the funds have lower 
(higher) underpricing. I extended Beatty and Welch (1996) and Arnold, Fishe, and 
North (2010) evidence who analyse the risk factors segment of the prospectus and find 
that more prominent exposure in this area is connected with higher IPO first day 
returns. I provided an out of sample robustness by using the data from the UK. 
 Fifth, while previous research shows that lockup contracts originate from 
information asymmetry (Brav and Gompers, 2003; Brau, Lambson and McQueen, 
2005) I used the textual tone measures to relate it to the length of lockup. No previous 
research has done this, and I filled this gap in the literature. My research extends the 
previous evidence that the IPO tone information mitigates information asymmetry to 
some extent and it is related to the lockup lengths in the UK, where more information 
is produced and disclosed during the lockup period.   
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Six, this thesis sheds further light on the long-run underperformance of IPOs 
that remain as a puzzle in the literature.  Most previous studies show that IPOs 
underperform in the long-run using a number of different methodologies. I followed 
the literature in terms of methodologies. However, I do not find that most IPOs 
underperform. This study contributes to the literature by relating tone information 
from IPO prospectuses and long-run IPO performance. 
Seventh, survival of the IPOs is an important issue, and I provideed fresh 
evidence the IPO tone measures could be used to differentiate between the companies 
which are more likely to survive. While previous studies provide evidence using the 
accounting and Deal specific characteristics and number of risk factors mentioned in 
the IPO prospectuses to link it to the survival of IPOs (e.g., Deemers and Joos, 2007; 
Hensler et al., 1997), no previous studies use the tone measures to relate it to the 
survival of IPOs. I filled this gap in the literature. 
Finally, by constructing unique hand-collected dataset on the IPOs such as 
gross spread and the “tone” information extracted from the prospectus, this research 
revisits the empirical evidence on the puzzles reported in the IPO literature. Regarding 
the UK market, IPO gross spread and lockup lengths are not readily reported in any 
databases and hence need to be hand-collected. I constructed a database of the IPO 
gross spread and lockup lengths in the UK.  Also, the textual data used in this study is 
unique as no other studies have done any analysis in the UK, to the best of our 
knowledge.  For this theses, I collected data on all IPOs issued in the UK over the 
period 1999 to 2011. The findings from this research are therefore up to date and more 
generalizable as compared to previous studies.  As far as I know, no previous studies 
considered the IPO puzzles in a comprehensive way using the “tone” information from 
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IPO prospectus. As such, my results provide new insights and thought in terms of 
choosing the “tone” of IPOs. While some previous literature addresses some of the 
puzzles in the IPO literature, most are based on US data. Empirical results based on 
UK data using tone information from IPO prospectuses sheds further light on the 
empirical puzzles that have been documented in the IPO literature.   
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the 
related literature for this research. Chapter 3 describes the data and empirical 
methodology used throughout this thesis. Chapter 4 examines the gross spread in the 
United Kingdom. Chapter 5 focuses on short-run IPO dynamics and value of textual 
analysis. In Chapter 6, this thesis examines the long-run IPO dynamics and value of 
textual analysis. Chapter 7 summarises the findings, concludes the study, and 
discusses the limitations of this study and suggests some future research directions.  
In addition to that, I have noticed that the information presented in the 
prospectuses take different forms. The regulator in the UK requires the presentation 
of certain information in the prospectuses. However, they do not require them in a 
certain format. In addition to that, some of the information presented in the 
prospectuses are explicit while some are implicit and one has to go through the details 
to come up with basic information. It would be advisable if the regulator comes up 
with a regulation same to the rule by the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) to use plain English in the prospectuses. In addition to that, primary information 
that would affect the investors’ decisions should be presented in an implicit and clear 
way. Till then, investment community can come up with the same. Investment analysts 
can issue a press where they clearly state the primary information. 
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Chapter 2 
2. Literature review 
In this chapter I go through the literature of the IPO dynamics over the short 
and long run. In the first section, I focused on the short-run and go through some 
literature regarding dynamics of the gross spread, underpricing, lockup length and ex-
ante measure of risk. Then in the second section, I look into the long-run dynamics 
and discuss the literature of the event study and the return on the lockup expiration 
date, the long-run underperformance and the survival of the IPOs. Finally, in the third 
section, we discuss the literature of the IPO tone measures and discuss the textual 
anlysis. 
2.1 Short-run IPO dynamics  
2.2 IPO gross spread 
(Ritter, 1991) has identified in his paper three main anomalies in the IPO 
pricing. These are the short-run underpricing when the trading price at the first trading 
day is higher than the issuing prince, the ‘‘hot issue’’ market phenomenon when 
there’s a high demand for IPO and the third anomaly is the long-run 
Underperformance of IPOs. These three are the main puzzles of the IPO. 
Various studies have attempted to look at why bookrunners charge a fixed fee 
of 7% for the US IPOs. While Chen and Ritter (2000) asserted the 7% spread to be a 
sort of arrangement among the bookrunners, Hansen (2001) did not discover any 
confirmation of that; rather it is an efficient contracting of IPOs. Though that Hansen 
(2001) acknowledged that investment banks charge 7% for IPOs, yet, they rather 
compete on the basis of reputation, placement service, and underpricing.  
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A leading paper by (Carter and Manaster, 1990) examined 501 IPOs that took 
place in the US market between 1979 and 1983. In their paper, they looked into the 
underwriter reputation and the associated level of underpricing and hence the first-day 
return. They have constructed the underwriters ranking based on the tombstone 
announcements. Basically, in the tombstone announcements, the participating 
underwriters are divided into sections based on their reputability and prestigiousness 
starting from section B, then C, etc. where B is higher than C and so on. They went 
through all the tombstones of all the IPOs in their sample and kept shifting the 
underwriters up and down between the ranks according to their relative position in 
each tombstone announcement. They reported that underwriters underprice more to 
compensate for the level of information, and hence the risk associated. They showed 
that for the more prestigious underwriters, the return on the first-day trade after the 
IPO is less. That is a reflection of the level of risk associated with it. 
After establishing that more prestigious underwriters take less risky IPOs 
compared to their less prestigious counterpart underwriters, (Carter, 1992) examined 
if underwriters seek to get the less risky IPOs to increase their potential of getting 
more IPOs. The empirical results reported in this paper support this hypothesis. In 
addition, he tested if the subsequent offering is positively related to the reputation of 
the underwriter, if the subsequent offering is negatively related to the gross spread and 
if an issuing firm is likely to switch firms with less prestigious underwriter rather than 
higher prestigious underwriters. He reported that all the four hypotheses proved to be 
significant. 
(Carter, Dark, and Singh, 1998) used the same underwriters’ ranking method 
that was used by (Carter and Manaster, 1990). They have examined the effect of a 
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more prestigious underwriter over the long-run post-IPO performance. They tested a 
three-year holding period and reported that the underperformance of the IPOs with 
more prestigious underwriters is less severe than the others. They have tested their 
ranking method using the tombstone announcement replacement method to other 
methods such as (Logue, 1973), (Beaty and Ritter, 1986), (Johnson and Miller, 1988) 
and (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). They reported that (Carter and Manaster, 1990) 
ranking method showed a better significance compared to other ranking proxies. 
 
Torstilla (2003) inspect a global sample of IPOs and discover confirmation of 
grouping in IPO gross spreads extends beyond the US however at a lower level of a 
spread than the 7%. Moreover, the results do not show collusive practices by the 
bookrunners. Also, an examination of abnormal gross spreads following Hansen 
(2001) indicates that few groups contain unusual positive surpluses. 
Chen and Mohan (2002) examine bookrunner reputation, spread and IPO first-
day return. They conjecture that bookrunner spread is a direct cost for IPOs while 
underpricing is an implicit cost for IPOs. Henceforth, they examine spread and 
underpricing as simultaneous equation frameworks. Armitage (2000) analyse the 
direct expense of UK rights and open offer and find that the average is 5.78% and the 
median is 4.28% for the time of 1985-1996.  
Torstilla (2001) examine the European IPOs and observe that IPO gross spread 
is lower for the European IPOs when contrasted with the US IPOs. In a more recent 
study, Abrahamson et al. (2011) demonstrate that the spread charged by the 
bookrunners in the US business sector is approaching on settled at 7%. It is turning 
into the standard for IPO ascending to $250 million. They have contrasted US spread 
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with the European IPO sector where they have reported bookrunners charge around 
3% less than the US market. 
2.3 IPO underpricing 
Initial public offerings are described by high information asymmetry. 
Asymmetric information is one of the determinants of IPO underpricing. One such 
instrument to mitigate for information asymmetry is underpricing the issue. If the IPO 
sector is described by both educated and naive investors, then offer costs must be 
reduced to adjust for the naive investors (Rock, 1986) or to honestly revealing 
information (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989). Rock believed that a few investors, similar 
to the issuing firm, or its bookrunners are better informed over other investors. 
Informed investors offer just for good shares, while naive investors offer 
indiscriminately for every one of the IPOs. That results in a “winners curse” issue, as 
naive investors get all the demanded shares in a bad IPO, while informed investors get 
allotments in good IPOs. 
There exist other explanations for IPO underpricing in the literature. For 
example, prospect theory (Loughran and Ritter, 2002), corruption (Loughran and 
Ritter, 2003), informational cascades (Welch, 1992), lawsuit avoidance (Hughes and 
Thakor, 1992), signalling (Allen and Faulhaber, 1988) and IPO as a marketing event 
(Chemmanur, 1993) has been proposed in the literature as an explanation of IPO 
underpricing.  
To the best of my knowledge, no study has considered whether moral hazard 
problem can lead to underpricing. The survey evidence in Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 
(2001) and Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter, (1994) is in line with the idea that moral 
hazard does not lead to underpricing. Since underpricing is determined promptly after 
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the issue, it is hard to envision how underpricing can mitigate moral hazard. 
Nonetheless, Brennan and Franks (1997) contend that underpricing is a component 
through which managers can ensure their private advantages by allotting shares 
deliberately when raising money through IPOs. 
2.4 Lockup length 
Past studies contend that lockup contracts lessen the asymmetric information and 
alleviate agency issues between the managers who are insiders and the shareholders 
who are outsiders (Brau, Carter, Christophe and Key, 2004). Ibbotson and Ritter 
(1995) contend that investors are prepared to pay more for a firm with a lockup 
contract for two reasons: (i) Insider managers cannot take advantage of the any private 
information because they need to hold on to the IPO allocations until the lockup 
expiration day reducing the value of any negative private information, and (ii) if the 
managers as insiders retain large holding their incentives will be aligned with the 
outside shareowners objectives (Ibbotson and Ritter, 1995). A substantial number of 
studies give backing to these contentions as insiders abstain from selling shares before 
the lockup expiration date inspired by the fear of passing on negative signals to the 
investors (Brau and Fawcett (2006)). 
Brav and Gompers (2003) propose three extra contending hypothesis to clarify 
the presence and length of the lockup time (i) Lockups signal firms' quality, (ii) 
lockups are commitment device, and (iii) they are rent-seeking mechanisms by the 
underwriters. They find that lockups are driven by the commitment theory, however, 
dismiss the signalling and the rent-seeking theories. In any case, Brau et al. (2005) 
revisit these outcomes and give backing that lockups are commitment devices and they 
provide signals about firm quality. They demonstrate that Brav and Gompers (2003) 
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findings of an inverse relationship amongst transparency and lockup length support 
that the lockup is a signal as much as lockup is a commitment device. They 
additionally report that the length of the lockups is positively connected with high 
information asymmetries, low firm-specific risk and high potential for moral hazard. 
The lockup agreements are more homogenous in terms of length and types in 
the US as compared to the UK. Hoque (2011) analyses heterogeneous lockup 
agreements from the London Stock Market. As compared to the US studies (Field and 
Hanka, 2001), Hoque (2011) reports four types of lockup agreements in the UK which 
are unique: absolute-date lockups, relative- date lockups, single lockups and staggered 
lockups. In line with the previous papers on lockups using US data (e.g., Brava and 
Gompers, 2003; Brau and Fawcett, 2005), Hoque (2011) tests several potential 
explanations for the choice of lockup contracts: (1) lockups mitigate information 
asymmetry, (2) they are signalling devices, (3) lockups reduce agency problem, and 
(4) they are certification tools. The study finds strong evidence that lockups mitigate 
information asymmetry and are certification tools and partial support for agency 
explanation for the choice of lockups. The study further provides support through 
insider selling activity around lockup expiration and drop in share price around lockup 
expiration returns are also consistent with asymmetric information, certification and 
agency hypothesis.  
2.5 Ex-ante measures of risk of IPOs  
Ritter (1984) and Beatty and Ritter (1986) assert that underpricing of the IPO should 
increase as ex-ante uncertainty increases. Since then, various studies have used 
different proxies of measures of ex-ante uncertainty. Studies use company 
characteristics, offer characteristics, disclosure, certification and aftermarket variables 
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to measure the ex-ante risk of IPO. For example, age has been employed by Ritter 
(1984, 1991) and Megginson and Weiss (1991). The size of the offerings is measured 
by sales has been employed by Ritter (1984). Offer characteristics like inverse gross 
proceeds (e.g., Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Prabhala and Puri, 1998), percentage width of 
filling price range (e.g., Hanley, 1993; Prabhala and Puri, 1998), offer price (Tinic, 
1988; Prabhala and Puri, 1998; Brennan and Hughes, 1991; and Beatty and Welch, 
1996) has been used in the literature. Disclosure variables like the number of uses of 
proceeds (Beatty and Ritter, 1986) and the number of risk factors (Beatty and Welch, 
1996) has been used as well. Certification measures are utilised by a number of studies. 
Venture backing is used in Megginson and Weiss (1991), Barry, Muscarella, Peavy 
and Vetsuypens (1990), Lin and Smith (1998), Gompers and Lerner (1997) and 
Hamao, Packer and Ritter (2000). The reputation of underwriter has been used in 
Megginson and Weiss (1991), Carter and Manaster (1990), Habib and Ljungqvist 
(2001) and Beatty and Welch (1996). There has been a number of after-market 
variables that has been used as a proxy of ex-ante uncertainty. For example, the 
standard deviation of daily share price returns by Ritter (1984, 1987), Clarkson and 
Merkley (1994), Finn and Higham (1988), Prabhala and Puri (1998). Others use daily 
trade volume in early after-market (e.g., Miller and Reilly, 1987; Prabhala and Puri, 
1998). 
2.6 Long-run IPO dynamics 
2.7 Lockup expiration returns 
On the lockup expiry dates share price drops to a significant extent (e.g., Hoque 
(2011), Hoque (2014), Hoque and Lasfer (2016), Brau et al. (2004), Brav and Gompers 
(2000, 2003), Bradley, Jordan, Yi and Roten (2001), Ofek and Richardson (2000), 
Field and Hanka (2001)). A number of explanations have been put forward to explain 
36 
 
the share price drop of a known event. However, the empirical evidence is not 
anonymous (e.g., Ofek and Richardson (2000)). Brau et al. (2004) report a positive 
relationship between the insider ownership in the IPO, proxy for agency costs, and the 
cumulative abnormal returns over five days. Field and Hanka (2001) test a number of 
hypothesis including bid-ask spread, liquidity impacts and supply shocks, downward 
sloping demand curves, worse than expected insider selling. Field and Hanka (2001) 
find that higher trading volume is associated with the higher abnormal return, which 
lends support to the downward sloping demand curves.  They additionally conclude 
that the insiders selling is related to the larger drop in share prices, yet fail to support 
that the decrease is exclusively determined by more terrible than anticipated insider 
selling. However, Hoque and Lasfer (2016) did not find any evidence that insider 
selling leads to a higher drop in share price around the lockup expiration. These 
outcomes are not clear, and it is ambiguous whether the abnormal drop in share price 
around the lockup expiry dates is consistent with the signalling, downward sloping 
demand curves, agency problems or an artefact of bid-ask bounce. 
2.8 Long-run IPO underperformance 
Almost 40 years back, Ibbotson (1975) was first to report the underperformance of 
IPOs. However, the issue of underperformance gets momentum after Ritter’s (1991) 
work. Utilising a sample of 1,526 IPOs in the US over the ten- year period from 1975 
to 1984, Ritter (1991) find that in 3 years post-IPO, these organisations show poor 
performance when compared with matched firms by size and industry. The 3-year buy 
and hold abnormal return for the IPOs in comparison to the matching firms is - 
29.13%. Ritter (1991) also notice that the underperformance varies to a significant 
extent across years and is different across industries. The IPOs that join the market in 
hot issue market are the worst performers. Ritter (1991) asserted that the results are 
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consistent with the notion that suboptimal companies might issue equity in the hot 
markets where investors are sporadically overoptimistic about the young growth firms, 
suggesting that companies take advantage of these ‘windows of opportunity’.  
Loughran and Ritter (1995) later increase the sample size and coverage in 
comparison to Ritter (1991) and examine the long-run performance of 4,753 firms that 
went public in the US between the twenty-year period from 1970 to 1990. Loughran 
and Ritter (1995) find that the IPOs over that period underperform in comparison to 
the non-issuing firms subsequent to five years after IPO. In particular, the non-issuing 
firms average buy-and-hold-return is 12% per annum whereas the IPO firms buy and 
hold return is 7%, so they underperform by 5%.  
The US evidence of the long-run underperformance is examined in 
international settings, and it seems that IPOs underperform in other countries as well. 
For instance, an earlier study by Levis (1993) utilising data from the London Stock 
Exchange spanning a period of 1980-88. Contingent upon the benchmark utilised he 
reports a 3-year post-IPO underperformance of - 8.31% to - 22.96%. Aggarwal, Leal 
and Hernandez (1993) report that IPOs underperform in the long-run by - 47.0% for 
Brazil, Chile, Mexico. Keloharju (1993) examines 79 Finnish IPOs and find that IPOs 
underperform by - 21.1% after 3-years post-IPO period. Similarly, Cai and Wei (1997) 
in the context of Tokyo Stock Exchange provides evidence of that IPO underperform 
over the long-run by -26.0%. However, they only look a small number of IPOs issued 
on over the time of 1971-1992. 
The long-run underperformance stems from a mixture of heterogeneous 
expectations among the investors, and short selling is expensive if not impossible for 
the small issue size on many IPOs (Ritter and Welch (2002) for a review). The reasons 
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as explained in Hoque (2010): “Miller (1977) and Morris (1996) explore asset pricing 
by relaxing the standard assumption of homogeneous expectations. By 
accommodating the divergence in opinions about the future cash flows and growth 
potential of a company presents an element of reality that can explain long-run 
underperformance. As the disagreement in belief gets smaller and smaller, the 
marginal investor’s belief of the IPOs and thus the trading price are lowered. 
Obviously, these arguments are based on the proposition that the heterogeneity is at 
peak at floatation but gradually drops through time with the arrival of new information. 
Consequently, the number of once positive investors alter their beliefs about the value 
of the company, and drive the price down, even though the average investor’s belief 
might never have changed. It is worth noting that the new information does not have 
to be negative. Any piece of information that reduces the variation of opinion about a 
firm will lead to a lower price” (p..250).   
2.9 Survival of IPOs 
For the purpose of supporting event studies in the UK, Gregory, Tharyan and 
Christidis (2013) worked on constructing and testing alternative version of Fama-
French and Carhart models. In their paper, they have tested some versions of four-
factor models trying to explain the cross-section of returns in isolation of the effect of 
momentum. They find that their model is able to explain the cross-section return of 
large firms and portfolios more accurately than for the smaller firms. They have tested 
the basic Fama-French basic model which is basically the  CAPM model where they 
add to it the size and value factors. I used their 4-factor model where they included a 
winner and loser factor. For the size and value factors (SMB and HML), they formed 
six portfolios based on market capitalisation and boot to market value in October of 
each year. With respect to the winner and loser factor, they create another 6 portfolios 
based on their sizes and the level of momentum. They have also tested some other 
versions of the model such as the Value weighted factor components model and the 
Decomposed factor model with both 3 and 4 factors for each one of them. 
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Fama and French (2004) report a significant decline in the survival of IPOs for 
the first ten years after IPO from 61.0% for 1973 to only 37.0% for 1991. Likewise, 
the chances of seasoned firms surviving have declined from 60.6% down to 46.9% 
over the same period. Seguin and Smoller (1997) inspect the relationship between IPO 
issue price and firm survival. Schultz (1993) investigates whether unit IPOs survives 
higher with respect to non-unit IPOs. Neither one of the studies controls for firms’ 
characteristics like ownership characteristics or accounting-based fundamental 
measures of firm performance. Demers and Joos (2007) develop an IPO failure risk 
model by incorporating accounting and other deal specific characteristics. They 
document statistically different failure rates between tech and non-tech IPOs. Other 
studies examine the different role of auditors and audit reports in predicting post-IPO 
firm survival (Willenborg and McKeown, 2000; Weber and Willenborg, 2003).  
Hensler et al., (1997) examine the effects of several firm characteristics and 
IPO characteristics on the survival of IPO firms by using an accelerated failure time 
(AFT) model. The results show that large IPOs, old firms, firms which underprice 
more and firms with increased level of IPO activity in the aftermarket, firms with 
higher level of insider ownership survives longer. They also find that survival time 
decreases with the number of risk characteristics reported in the IPO prospectus. The 
IPO survives shorter if the firm is in from certain industries such as computer and data, 
restaurant, wholesale industry, and airline and survives longer if the IPO is from 
optical or drug industries.  
Espenlaub et al., (2012) examine IPO survival the Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM), where the nominated adviser plays a pivotal role in bringing the IPOs 
in the market. They find that Nomad reputation significantly affects IPO survival. 
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Initial public offerings managed by reputable Nomads survive longer almost by 
around two years than those sponsored by different Nomads. They find that survival 
rates of AIM IPOs are at par to those of North American IPOs. Ahmad and Jelic (2014) 
analyses the impact of lockup agreements on the survival of Initial Public Offerings 
(IPOs) during the time of 1990–2011by using a sample of UK IPOs. Their accelerated 
failure time (AFT) survival model demonstrates a significant impact of lockup length 
on the post-IPO survival. The authors report that the IPO firm survives 27% longer if 
the median of the lockup length increases by a year.  Moreover, the delisting rates for 
IPOs with shorter lockups are significantly higher than the delisting rates for IPOs 
with longer lockups regardless of the reasons for delisting.  
2.10 IPO Tone measures  
The content analysis has been used in the IPOs by a number of authors. For example, 
Hanley and Hoberg (2010) utilising word content examination break down 
information in the IPO prospectus into its standard and informative parts. They assert 
that the higher the informative substance, the higher the premarket due diligence that 
results in more exact offer price and less underpricing. That is because in the higher 
due diligence on the part of the underwriters diminishes the issuing company’s 
dependence on book building to value the issue. The inverse is valid for standard 
substance. 
Loughrun and McDonald (2013) use the S-1 forms that are the primary SEC 
recording in the IPO process. The tone of the S-1, as far as its authoritativeness in 
describing the company’s business methodology and operations, ought to influence 
investors’ capacity to value the IPO. Loughrun and McDonald (2013) find that IPOs 
with large amounts of dubious content have higher first-day returns, total offer price 
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corrections, and higher volatility. Their results give evidence to the hypothetical 
models of uncertainty, book building, and prospect theory. 
Loughrun and McDonald (2013) demonstrate that word records produced for 
different subjects misclassify normal words in financial context. Using a large sample 
of 10-Ks during 1994 to 2008, they show that 75% of the words recognised as negative 
by the heavily used Harvard Dictionary are words normally not considered negative 
in financial settings. They came up an alternative negative word list, alongside five 
categories of words, that better reflect tone in money related context. They relate the 
word lists to a number of financial variables—filing returns of 10-K reports, the 
volume of trading, volatility of share return, misrepresentation, material weaknesses, 
and unexpected earnings. 
I used the dictionaries that are constructed by Loughran and Mcdonald to 
measure the tone of each prospectus. 8 dictionaries in total were constructed in 
addition to Harvard Negative words dictionary. The Positive and Negative dictionaries 
contain words that are perceived as positive (e.g. best, innovation) or negative (e.g. 
delist, underperform) in the finance field. The Constraining dictionary has words such 
as (commit, limit). The Litigious dictionary has words from the legal field such as 
(law, indemnity). The Interesting dictionary has some words that make the text sound 
more interesting such as (compel, insist). The Uncertainty dictionary contains words 
that would indicate uncertainty and ambiguity such as (assume, might). The 
Superfluous dictionary has the unnecessary and replaceable words such as 
(effectuates, whilst). The Modal dictionary has the words  that will change the mode 
of the main verb that follows such as (almost, possibly). They have divided the Modal 
dictionary into strong, moderate and weak modal words. Besides those, there is a 
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dictionary that contains the irregular verbs. I calculate the weight of the usage of each 
dictionary in each of the prospectuses which give me an indication of the sentiment of  
the text used in the prospectus.   
Textual analysis has been utilised as a part of an increasing number of research 
papers in Accounting and Finance to quantify the tone and sentiment of corporate news 
releases, Management discussions and analysis (MD&A), yearly reports (10K 
reports), daily paper articles, and investor message sheets. Examples incorporate 
Engelberg (2008), Li (2008), and Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008), 
Tetlock (2007) Antweiler and Frank (2004). The outcomes in these studies could be 
summarised as negative words could be a successful method for measuring tone as 
negative words demonstrate a significant relationship with financial variables.  
Different papers look at the tone of different documents in the context of 
finance related variables. For example, Kothari, Li, and Short (2008) relate the tone of 
daily paper articles on the cost of their utilised funds, the variability of return, and 
forecasts by analysts. Henry (2008), Engelberg (2008), and Demers and Vega (2008) 
relates news discharges with lower firm income, earnings drift, or stock returns. Some 
papers relate the information content of IPO prospectus with the share returns, price 
variability and trading volume (e.g., Li (2008, 2009), Feldman et al. (2008), Hanley 
and Hoberg (2010)). 
  
43 
 
Chapter 3 
3. Methodology and data 
In this chapter I go through the methodology I used in this thesis. I discussed briefly 
the regression models such as OLS, tobit and fixed effect models. Then I discuss tone 
measures and the textual analysis and how we calculate the tone of each of the 
prospectuses in our sample. Then in the second section, I explain the data and the how 
I collected them and their sources. 
3.1 Methodology 
This thesis uses various techniques and methodologies to test the hypotheses. In 
particular, I used OLS regressions, Fixed effects model, event studies and textual 
analysis. I will discuss the above methodologies in brief in the following section. 
3.2 Regressions 
Ordinary least square regressions have been used in the theses for testing a number of 
relationships. Since this is a widely used measure, I will just mention the functional 
form. 
 ௜ܻ = ߚ௜ ௜ܺ + ߝ௜ (3.1) 
Where, 
Yi is the dependent variable, and Xi is a vector of independent variables and ߝ௜ 
is the error term. I obtain the cluster adjusted robust standard error (Petersen, 2009) to 
estimate the t statistics. 
I also use fixed effects model to address the issue that underwriters are repeat 
players in the IPO market. The general functional form of fixed effects model is as 
follows: 
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 ௜ܻ,௝,௧ = ൛ߚ௜,௝,௧ ௜ܺ,௝,௧ + ܥ௧ + ߝ௜,௝,௧ (3.2) 
 The regression includes underwriter fixed effects (cj) to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity at the underwriter level that may be correlated with the 
explanatory variables. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level to account for 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of errors (Petersen, 2009).  
I also used Tobit regression where the data is truncated in nature. For example, 
for the gross spread regression, only observe the fees within a certain range. So, Tobit 
model could be better specified as follows: 
 
௜ܻ = ߚ௜ ௜ܺ + ߝ௜  
ܻ௜ = ቊ
= ௜ܻ∗ ݂݅ ௜ܻ∗ ≥ ܿ 
= ܿ ݂݅ ௜ܻ∗ ≤ ܿ
ቋ 
(3.3) 
 
The theses also use Logit regression, where the dependent variables are binary 
in nature.  
The simplest idea would be to let ߨ௜ be a linear function of the covariates, say 
 ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ߨ௜) = పܺሖ ߚ (3.4) 
where β is a vector of regression coefficients. 
Exponentiation the above Equation, I found that the odds for the i-th unit are 
given by 
 ߨ௜ =
exp{ ሖܺ ௜ ߚ}
1 + exp{ ሖܺ ௜ ߚ}
 (3.5) 
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3.3 IPO tone measures 
I used the word lists developed by (Loughran and McDonald, 2011) in addition to 
Harvard IV dictionary for negative words. To analyse each prospectus, I used the 
AntWordProfiler. For each prospectus, I have gathered the following information: 
 Total number of words in the prospectus 
 The frequency of appearance of each word in the prospectus 
 The number of words appeared in the prospectus that belongs to each 
of the dictionaries. 
 Numerical characters have been excluded from the counting 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) have introduced nine different dictionaries in 
addition to the Harvard IV negative words dictionary. There is some overlap between 
those dictionaries were some words appear in more than one of them. The dictionaries 
are as follows (Negative, Positive, Uncertainty, Litigious, Constraining, Superfluous, 
Interesting, Modal, Irregular Verb in addition to Harvard IV Negative).  
The largest dictionary by far is Harvard IV. LM Negative dictionary is almost 
half the size of Harvard IV. The other LM dictionaries sizes range between few 
hundred words to less than a hundred. Following the same methodology used by 
Loughran and McDonald (2011), I have calculated the proportional weight of each 
dictionary as follows: 
 
ܲݎ݋݌݋ݎݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ ܹ݁݅݃ℎݐ ݋݂ ܽ ܦ݅ܿݐ݅݋݊ܽݎݕ
=  ෍
ܹ݋ݎ݀௜  ܨݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕ
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܰݑܾ݊݁ݎ ݋݂ ܹ݋ݎ݀ݏ
 
(3.6) 
For all the words from this specific dictionary. 
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I have also calculated the Time Frequency – Inverse Document Frequency 
(tf.idf) so that the weight of a certain word is in accordance with its importance across 
all the prospectuses under our study. The calculation of the weight of each word is as 
follows: 
 ௜ܹ,௝ = ቐ
(1 + log൫ݐ ௜݂,௝൯)
(1 + log(ܽ))
݈݋݃
ܰ
݀ ௜݂
    ݂݅ ݐ ௜݂ ,௝ ≥ 1
0                                            ܱݐℎ݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁
 (3.7) 
Where: 
௜ܹ,௝: the weight of the ݅௧௛ word in the ݆௧௛ document 
ݐ ௜݂,௝: the row word count of the ݅௧௛ word in the ݆௧௛ document 
ܽ : is the average word count in the document 
N: Number of documents 
݀ ௜݂: Number of documents containing at least one occurrence of the ݅௧௛ word 
I used the sample regressions I used in Chapter 1 and introduce the dictionary 
weight as dependent variables 
3.4 Event studies  
For the market model, I ran an OLS regression using the daily return for each company 
as the dependent variable and index return as the independent variable as follows: 
 ܴ௦ = ߙ +  ߚ ܴ௜ + ߝ௜ (3.8) 
Where: 
ܴ௦ : Daily return on share price 
ܴ௜ : Daily return on index 
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ߙ : Intercept 
ߚ : Slope 
ߝ௜: Random error 
I ran the regression for the period starting from the date of the IPO until the 
starting date of the event window. After getting the coefficients of the intercept and 
the slope of each regression, I calculated the expected return during the event window. 
Then I calculated the daily abnormal return as the excess return over the expected 
return as follows: 
 
 ܣܴ = ܴ௦ − ܧ(ܴ) (3.9) 
Where: 
ܣܴ : Abnormal Return 
ܧ(ܴ) : Expected return using the regression coefficients 
Then I calculated the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the period as the 
numerical sum of the daily return during the event study window. 
I also examined the same using Fama-French 4-Factor Model. 
 
ܴ௦  − ௙ܴ =  ߙ +  ߚଵ൫ܴ௠ − ௙ܴ൯ +  ߚଶܵܯܤ +  ߚଷܪܯܮ
+ ߚସܷܯܦ + ߝ௜ 
(3.10) 
Where: 
ܴ௦ : Daily return on share price 
48 
 
௙ܴ : Risk free rate of return 
ߙ : Intercept 
ߚ : Coefficient  
ߝ௜: Random error 
SMB: Small minus Big – The difference in return between small cap 
companies to large cap companies. 
HML: High minus Low – The difference in return between growth companies 
to value companies. 
UMD: Up minus Down – The difference in return between winner companies 
and loser companies. 
First, I ran an OLS regression for each company using the four factors to find 
the intercept and the coefficients multipliers. Then I did the same as what I did for the 
market model by calculating the expected return for every day during the event study 
window. Then I calculate the abnormal return as the difference between the actual 
return and the expected return. 
3.5 Data 
I collected all the IPOs that took place on the London Stock Exchange for the purpose 
of my analysis. In this theses, I am covering the IPO that took place in London Stock 
Exchange in both of its Main and AIM markets for the period starting from 1999 to 
2012. I was following the same criteria used in some of the previous studies in order 
to come with consistent and comparable results. To gain a comprehensive 
understanding, in my sample, I have only included the IPOs that are new admissions 
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and incorporated in the UK. I further excluded another 697 IPOs that are of financial 
and the investment firms as the behaviour of the firms operating in these sectors differ 
from the rest of the market.  
I have collected the data in this study from a number of sources. First, I 
identified the IPOs that took place in the covered period from the London Stock 
Exchange new issue report.  Once I have the list of IPOs that took place on the London 
Stock Exchange, I have collected the IPO prospectuses from Perfect Filings database. 
From the prospectuses, I have manually collected the IPO related information. In 
particular, I collected underwriters’ remuneration, gross proceeds, the number of 
bookrunners, lockup length. Some of the information such as the total amount of 
money raised in the IPO proceeds, the issuing price and the total number of shares are 
available both in the prospectus and in LSE website. In the case of discrepancy, I  used 
the data on the LSE website as it is assumed to have been reviewed and entered after 
the actual IPO took place. From Datastream, I collected the incorporation date to 
calculate the age of the company at the time of the IPO. I also collected some of the 
post-IPO information such as the size of capital over the three years following the IPO 
to calculate the companies’ growth and the trading prices. The initial list included 1075 
IPOs. There were around 103 companies where their information was missing and 
difficult to obtain so I had to exclude them. The final list included 972 IPOs with total 
proceeds of £41.7 Billion. Furthermore, four more companies were outliers and it was 
clear that the provided data was inaccurate. We had to remove them so the final list 
included 968 IPOs. The following figure provides an idea about the IPO market cycles 
and total proceeds raised by the sample IPOs. 
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Figure 3.1: Total Proceeds and Number of IPOs per year 
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Chapter 4 
4. Why underwriters charge more in the AIM compared to the Main market? 
4.1 Abstract 
In this chapter, I examined the factors that contribute to the spread charged by the 
underwriters for the IPOs that took place in both the Main and AIM markets in the 
London Stock Exchange over the period from 1999 – 2012. Though there exist few 
studies on underwriters spread on the Main Markets in different countries there are no 
studies on the second markets which have grown significantly in the past. I found that 
the spread charged is in the ranges between 4% - 6.43% with a median of 5%, which 
is in contrast to the previous US studies which reports a spread of 7%. I found that the 
economies of scale explain the spread charged in the Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM) better than the Main Market, implying the spread decreases when the proceed 
increases. I have tested some other hypotheses such as idiosyncratic risk, volatility, 
potential growth, underwriters’ prestige and rent-seeking. They do not explain spread 
charged for the Main market while shows more significance for AIM. I did not find 
evidence that underwriters charge less in the previous year to attract more business in 
the future. I also found that risky IPOs are underpriced more, meaning that 
underwriters mitigate risk to a certain extent by underpricing the issue.  
Keywords: AIM, Main market, Underwriters spread, IPOs, lockup, underpricing, risk. 
JEL code: G15, G24  
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4.2 Introduction 
This is the first empirical chapter. The first section is an abstract of the chapter. The 
second section is an introduction. Then, the third section is a brief about the 
institutional background in the UK such as the IPO market, the requirements such as 
having a nominated advisors for the companies listed in the AIM market and the 
underwriters fees. The fourth section is a literature review which is followed by the 
hypotheses of this chapter. On the sixth section, I discussed the date and methodology 
and then we go through the results and analysis. In this section, the seventh, we go 
through some descriptive analysis, then the empirical results. Then I discussed use of 
the spread as a marketing tool. The following part is a robustness check and then I 
discussed the determinants of underpricing. In the following section I discussed the 
results then on the ninth section I provide the conclusion of the chapter. 
The stock market is a part of the engine that drives the economy of countries. It 
employs the public equity into public companies to increase the wealth of the investors 
and hence reflects on the overall economy of the country. In order to have a stable 
market and to assure the best interest of the investors and the management these 
markets are highly regulated. IPO has a history that goes back to the early years of the 
17th century. Back then in March 1602, when there was a need to raise capital for the 
Dutch East India Company, the company issued stocks for the partners who decided 
to join their operations in one single large company. The company has proven that it 
could benefit from the high capital and was able to get a monopoly over all the trade 
with Asia (Robins, 2012). Afterwards, with the obvious benefits of the collaboration, 
the concept of IPO started to prosper and I have seen a number of companies starting 
to form. London was one of the pioneers in this market where it will be the focus of 
our study. 
The Initial Public Offering (IPO) is a major corporate financing event of a 
firm’s life cycle, and it involves a significant cost. The main purpose of this chapter is 
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to analyse the costs involved in raising money. There are direct costs and indirect costs 
of raising money. The direct costs consist of underwriter fees, legal fees, etc. The 
indirect costs consist of underpricing. Though there are a number of papers which 
looked into the indirect costs of raising money2 the number of papers that looked into 
direct costs is limited.3 The papers which investigate the direct cost of IPOs have been 
based on the US market. That is primarily because of the data availability in other 
markets. The only exception is Torstila (2003) who investigate IPO gross spread from 
a number of countries.  
Chen and Ritter (2000) documented that the IPO gross spread to the issuing 
firms in the United States is exactly 7% of gross amount of money raised to the 
investment banking syndicate for IPOs ranging between USD 20 million to USD 80 
million. After the paper had been published, this evidence of precisely 7% gross spread 
triggered an enquiry by the Department of Justice in the United States. Later on, 
eventually this could not be proved that there was evidence of explicit collusion by the 
underwriters. A class-action antitrust lawsuit was also started grounded on the 
evidence shown in Chen and Ritter (2000). However, it was settled privately after a 
2007 appeals court decision allowing the claim against the underwriters to proceed. 
Chen and Ritter (2000) claimed that the clustering of fees at 7% might not provide 
evidence on explicit collusion, however, asserts that their evidence is in line with 
implied agreement—or “strategic pricing”—with respect to the underwriters. Papers 
written later on by Hansen (2001) and Torstila (2003) do not argue that there is implied 
                                               
2 See for example Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, (2001), Ibbotson et al., (1994), Brennan and Franks (1997) 
Loughran and Ritter, 2002; Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Welch, 1992; Hughes and Thakor, 1992; Allen 
and Faulhaber, 1989; Chemmanur, 1993). 
3 For example, Chen and Ritter (2000), Hansen (2001) and Torstila (2003). 
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agreement between the underwriters.  Hansen (2001) show that the US IPO market is 
characterised by perfect competition and the entry barrier is low. That could be used 
as an argument against implicit collusion. Torstila (2003) shows with international 
data that there is evidence of clustering in gross spreads, however, at a much lower 
level than 7%. He also argues that clustering does not imply collusive practices.  
Abrahamson et al., (2011) conducted a study on European and the US IPO 
gross spread charged by the underwriters. They find that European IPO fees do not 
cluster, and only 1% of offerings raising $25 million or more experience gross spread 
as high as 7%.  The European IPO spread averages almost 4%, where the money raised 
is between $25 million to $100 million range. Their findings show that, certainly, 
European gross spreads are lower. They find that US IPOs cost 3% more than the 
European IPOs after controlling for money raised, characteristics of the IPO, multiple 
bookrunners, and time or country effects. Though the cost is lower for the larger 
offerings in both regions, their multivariate analysis shows that cost for larger 
European IPOs got cheaper over their study time while the cost of larger US IPOs has 
become expensive. They also conduct analysis for the same investment banks who 
raises money in the US and Europe. Same investment banks charge a significantly 
higher (lower) fee for IPOs in the US (Europe). 
Abrahamson et al. (2011) analyse why same investment bank charges higher 
fees in the US as compared to the Europe. Armitage (2011) examine the cost of 
seasoned equity offerings in the United Kingdom and find that mean (median) cost is 
5.78% (4.28%). They do not find evidence of economies of scale which is little 
surprising. Though Abrahamson et al. (2011) examine the large UK IPOs and 
Armitage (2000) look at the seasoned equity offerings, none of the studies examines 
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Alternative Investment market (AIM) which has been growing rapidly after launch in 
1995 and considered as one of the successful growth markets in the world. The main 
purpose of this study is to examine in detail the cost of raising money in the United 
Kingdom Main Market and the AIM and try to understand whether there is any 
difference between them. If there is any difference in cost of raising equity, why such 
difference exists. 
There exists a significant difference between the IPO markets in the United 
States and the United Kingdom. Ritter (2003) summarises the differences between the 
IPO markets of the United States and Europe in terms of price setting, the IPO 
allocation mechanism, allocations to individual and institutional investors, analyst 
coverage, etc. There are also differences between the European and US IPO markets 
in terms of the fees charged by underwriters (Abrahamson et al., 2011).  The US 
lockup length in the US is short (median lockup length is 180 days), and not much 
information is produced and disclosed during this short lockup period. Also, for the 
US IPOs, there is a quiet period when analysts affiliated with underwriters are not 
allowed to issue research reports and recommendations. UK lockup lengths are much 
longer (median lockup length of 598 days), where a few earnings announcements are 
normally made during the lockup period. Moreover, unlike the US, there is no quiet 
period in the UK. As more announcements are made during the longer lockup period, 
information asymmetry may be less of consideration in the UK market. An empirical 
question arises, how underwriters charge in such a market where the lockup lengths 
are longer and more information is produced and disclosed.  
The difference is even more striking when I compare the UK Main market and 
the alternative investment market. The length of lockup in the Main market is 
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concentrated at 180 days (see, for example, Hoque, 2011), whereas the length varies 
widely in the Alternative Investment Market. Furthermore, the relationship between 
underwriters and issuing firms is closer on the Alternative Investment Market than in 
the Main Market, as the AIM IPO firms need to have a corporate broker to maintain 
stock exchange listings. Other corporate finance activities, like stake building in target 
companies, further equity issues and director trading also need to be done through 
corporate brokers. Underwriters have more power in the UK to set the issue price, as 
argued by Chambers and Dimson (2009). The UK market serves as a good out of 
sample test for Abrahamson et al. (2011) and Chen and Ritter (2000), where the IPO 
market setting is distinct. The different types of institutional settings in the different 
markets in the UK present an interesting empirical issue, as to whether the fees charged 
in the two markets in the UK are different.  
In this chapter, I first test whether the fees charged in the United Kingdom 
Main market and Alternative Investment market are the same as it has been shown in 
some previous studies that show that the US underwriters tend to charge a fixed 
percentage of 7% of the total proceeds (Chen and Ritter, 2000). In a more recent paper, 
Abrahamson et al., (2011) compared the observed 7% fees in the US market to the 
European market, where they reported that the percentage fees charged vary. Although 
some of the studies argue that a fixed percentage indicate some collusion (Chen and 
Ritter, 2000). Hansen (2001) argues that the 7% to be an efficient innovation that fits 
IPO and is not due to collusion. In this chapter, I have collected the data of the IPOs 
that took place in both the Main and the AIM market of London Stock Exchange. I 
have found that the underwriters charge ranges between 4% - 6.43% with a median of 
5% over the entire sample. It goes in line with the aforementioned study that the 
European underwriters charge less than their US counterparts. 
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I also examined the cost of underpricing because underpricing is an indirect cost of 
raising finance. My results show that for the AIM market, there is a tendency to 
underprice more. In comparison to the Main Market, this has been noticed more among 
smaller and new companies. However, this is more noticed in the first trading day as 
the discrepancy tends to ease where a convergence towards the IPO issue price on the 
fifth trading day can be seen. 
In this chapter, I developed and tested a number of hypotheses that might be affecting 
the fees charged in the Main market and the alternative investment market. 
Particularly, I tested economies of scale, riskiness, rent-seeking by the underwriters, 
attracting future business. Within the coming sections of this chapter, I am going to 
discuss five hypotheses and will examine them separately throughout the chapter. The 
base of the hypotheses is the assumption that underwriters charge more in the AIM 
market compared to the Main market. Then I examine the reason in terms of the 
economies of scale. Thereafter, I look at the contribution of the risks and whether 
underwriters use underpricing as a tool to mitigate risks. Then I test the rent-seeking 
effect. Finally, I examined whether underwriters use lower charges to attract future 
business. 
 To test our hypotheses, I ran a number of OLS regression and fixed effect 
models taking the spread as the dependent variable. I have calculated the spread as the 
percentage of the difference between the total IPO proceeds and that received by the 
company to the total proceeds. I identified and tested a number of factors and measured 
their effect using our regression model. Results show that the factor that has the highest 
effect on the spread is the size of the proceed received. It has a negative relationship 
showing that as the total proceeds increases, the spread decreases. That has been 
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documented by Chen and Ritter (2000) and Abrahamson et al. (2011) where they have 
talked about the difference between the US market and European market. Although 
that there is a clustering in the US market around 7%, Corwin and Schultz (2005) has 
noticed a tendency to show the effect of the dis-economy of scale in the US market. 
The other factor that has shown to have a significant effect are the year dummies. That 
shows that the year which the IPO took place contributes to the total spread charged. 
That can be related to the financial situation and their aftermath as I cover the area 
where the dot-com bubble took place and financial crises of 2008. The reputation of 
the underwriter and the rent-seeking identified by the length of the lockup period 
contribute slightly to the spread charged. I have used the lockup period as the proxy 
to the presence of rent-seeking. Brav and Gompers (2003) have studied the possibility 
of using the lockup to gain access to future further issuing. They did not find enough 
evidence to support this hypothesis.  
I have tested some other factors that shown to have a very little or no effect on the 
spread. Carter (1992) has mentioned that underwriters look for low-risk IPO as this 
will lead to future business. Higher anticipated risk results in higher spread according 
to Chen and Mohan (2002). Idiosyncratic risk is a factor that is getting more prevalent 
as the age of companies pursuing IPO in recent years as per (Fink, Fink, Grullon, and 
Weston, 2005). To identify any hidden risk that could have caused the spread to be 
widened, I have calculated the idiosyncratic risk for every share over the first year 
from the IPO. I have also examined the volatility of the share price during the first 
year. The results show that both of them are insignificant in the regressions. I have 
also tested the age of the companies prior to the IPO. That is also insignificant in the 
regressions. I have further examined potential growth over the 2 – 3 years after the 
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IPO in terms of the growth of the market capitalization. This factor also found to be 
insignificant in the regressions.  
I have run the regression over different sub-groups of the sample based on the 
size of the proceeds and the market. Results show that smaller IPOs tend to follow the 
model more than larger IPOs. That is mainly the IPOs of £16.7M of proceeds or less 
which makes about 71% of the sample. Most of these IPOs come from the AIM 
market. That shows that the factor of size proceeds loses its significance as the size 
gets larger. 
I have done a range of robustness checks. Since there are a number of investment 
banks operating in the IPO market, I control for the investment bank level 
heterogeneity by using underwriter fixed effects in the regression. My results are 
qualitatively the same when I used fixed effects models. Secondly, I winsorize the 
spread at 5% level to minimise the effect of outliers on the fees charged. Again the 
results are similar to our OLS results. Third, I used Tobit regression because our 
dependent variable gross spread is truncated at a certain percentage. The results from 
Tobit regression are similar to that of OLS. Finally, I specify an alternative non-linear 
model. I find that the non-linear term is significant. In summary, our basic results 
survive the robustness checks. 
Price is one of the main factors in supply and demand. As a result, the spread 
charged by the underwriter has an effect on future business. As per James (1992), 
underwriters charge less if they expect further issues by the firm. However, when 
studying the market share, Dunbar (2000) noticed that underpricing is the main factor 
that affects market share rather than spread. Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001) have 
noticed that price is the main factor that causes firms to switch underwriters for their 
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further issues. In this chapter, I have examined whether the price charged in the 
previous years’ lead more business for the firms. I have found some evidence 
consistent with that notion. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section two discusses the 
institutional background in the United Kingdom. Section three discusses the literature 
and develops the hypotheses. In section four I explain the methodology and the data 
sources. Section five presents the empirical results. Finally, section 6 concludes.   
4.3 Institutional Background in the United Kingdom   
4.4 The IPO Market in the UK 
London has been a centre of the global finance for centuries. Financial markets can be 
traced back the late seventeenth century in Jonathan’s Coffee-house where they used 
to list the prices of commodities. It has been developing in terms of practice and laws 
until it reached a level of maturity at 1801 when a regulated stock exchange emerged. 
The regulations have been developing and reviewed since then. The stock exchange 
witnessed one of its first bubbles during the “Railway Mania” in 1845. The Bank of 
England took action and raised interest rates, which in the result, increased the cost of 
capital and hence slowed down the momentum, and eventually burst the bubble. As 
the number of traders increased in number, there was a need for a more spacious 
building to accommodate them. In 1854, a new stock exchange building was 
constructed. With the amount of trading and the exchange of stocks, a new Deed of 
Settlement came into force in 1876. The business was regularly going till it was 
disrupted by the Great War back in 1914. The stock exchange market was closed for 
almost six months. However, in the Second World War, the stock exchange market 
was only closed twice for much shorter periods. The first time was for six days in 1939 
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while in the second time, in 1945, it was closed only for one day. In 1986, another 
major event took place when the market was deregulated. That changed the whole 
structure of the market and resulted in more companies joining the market and a 
number of companies to go through mergers and acquisitions (“London Stock 
Exchange History”, 2013). 
In comparison to other major exchange markets, the LSE comes fourth in terms 
of market capital size. It comes after New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ), and the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange with a market capitalisation of 3,396 billion USD (World Federation 
of Exchanges, 2012).  
The highly regulated market made it difficult for smaller and less mature 
companies to benefit from the available public equity and other benefits from the 
companies’ shares float. A secondary market was introduced with a more flexible 
regulatory system. In 1995, the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) market was 
launched. The main purpose was to create a market for small and growing companies 
across the world. The admission criteria required to join the AIM market are less strict 
than those that are required to join the Main market. A summary of the difference 
between these criteria can be found in the following table as described by London 
Stock Exchange. 
In 1997, LSE started the Stock Exchange Electronic Trading Service. That in 
return attracted more investors and opened the door to larger sectors of the public to 
join the market. In 2007, a merger between London Stock Exchange and Borsa Italiana 
took place creating the London Stock Exchange Group ("London Stock Exchange 
History", 2013). 
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Currently, London Stock Exchange provide a different number of services that 
ranges from the primary markets of both the Main and AIM market where the Initial 
public offers (IPO) take place to the secondary markets where stocks are traded. They 
also provide data services such as real data on stock prices in addition to a number of 
reports and research papers they issue on a regular basis. 
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Table 4.1: The differences between AIM and MM in terms of admission requirements and continuing obligations 
 AIM MM 
1. Admission requirements  No requirement for minimum percentage of float 
No age requirement 
No minimum market capitalisation 
Admission documents not pre-vetted by Exchange or UKLA 
Flat rate admission fee: £4,535 till 2008, and from 2009 fees are 
charged based on size, min 6,720 and max 75,810. 
Minimum 25% of the shares need to be floated 
Normally 3-years of published account required 
Minimum market capitalisation of £700,000 
Pre-vetting of admission documents by the UKLA 
Admission fees based on size:  min £6,708 and max 
£388,173. 
2. Continuing obligations   
(i) Further issuance costs No issuance costs.  Similar sliding scale fees like initial issuance, companies 
get 10% discount compared to IPO cost 
(ii)Nominated advisers Nominated adviser required at all times No nominated advisers required, but sponsors needed for 
certain transactions 
(iii) Annual fees Flat rate annual fee: £5,350 plus NOMAD fees.  Sliding scale annual fees: e.g., £4,410, £10,063, £43,470 
respectively for up to £50m, up to £500m, >£500m market 
cap stocks 
(iv)Corporate 
transactions 
Shareholder approval is required if the transaction value is higher 
than the value of the company, simpler documentation required. 
Shareholder approval necessary for transactions of much 
lower value, complex documentation required 
(v) Related party transactions Shareholder approval for related party transactions not required – 
an announcement to the market that the transaction is fair and 
reasonable is sufficient 
Shareholder approval required for related party 
transactions 
(vi) Corporate Governance No prescriptive corporate governance 
Requirements. Combined Code does not 
formally apply, but companies encouraged to comply 
Firms have to comply with or explain 
non-compliance with the Combined 
Code and comply with other relevant 
Listing Rules 
(vii) Disclosure requirements Less prescriptive requirements on nature of financial information 
to be disclosed 
Firms have to comply with more stringent disclosure 
requirements set out in Listing, Disclosure and 
Transparency Rules 
Source: (Dukas and Hoque, 2016) 
4.5 Nominated Advisors (NOMADS) 
Having a nominated advisor (NOMAD) is a requirement for any company seeking to 
be listed on the Alternative Investment market. As per the LSE, A NOMAD is the 
primary regulator of an AIM company. A NOMAD should meet strict eligibility 
requirements set by LSE. Part of the listing process in AIM market, a company should 
assign a NOMAD who will support them to meet the listing requirements and grant 
them the final approval. NOMADS can also be appointed as the underwriter of the 
IPO. NOMADs are primarily smaller investment banks or corporate finance advisories 
rather than larger investment banks. 
NOMADs play different roles ranging from being advisors, regulators, 
middlemen and supervisors. The different roles of NOMADs and the fact that they 
charge fees for their services could create a conflict of interest. As advisors, NOMADs 
provide guidance on the rules of the market and thus reduce the cost of the regulating 
firms. Also, the supervisory role makes the NOMADs liable for any wrongdoing 
undertaken by the companies they regulate. Moreover, NOMADs are subject to losing 
their reputation if they fail to prevent their companies from committing such 
violations. 
A company seeking to be listed on the Main Market is required to meet a set 
of requirements related to the free float rules, minimum market capitalization and to 
show an established trading record. In other words, for a company to be eligible to be 
listed on the Main Market should have a minimum of 25 percent of the free float, a 
market capitalization of more than £700,000 and to show trading record for at least 
three years. 
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Despite the differences in regulations between AIM and Main Market, both 
markets share the same trading mechanism. Shareholders rights are protected under 
the UK legal system that applies to both markets. In additions, UK Listing Authority 
(UKLA) requires all companies to publish their accounting information no matter if 
they fall under UKLA regulations. In contrast to the US market, this prevents the 
companies to “go-dark”.  
According to Jenkinson and Ramadorai (2013), the main distinction between 
the two markets is that the Main Market companies have to abide by a higher degree 
of compliance, and have obligations to show higher disclosure and transparency in 
comparison to AIM. However, there are differences in taxation between AIM and 
Main Market. 
4.6 Underwriters fees 
With the number of regulations and the level of requirements, entry to LSE is not a 
straightforward task. Even for the AIM, where the level of requirements is less, 
companies need to meet certain requirements and comply with a number of 
requirements and standards to be listed. The investment bankers help companies to 
prepare for listing on the market. The underwriters’ engagement starts when a 
company decides to peruse the option to go public. The underwriter works with the 
company for a period that can extend over a number of years until it reaches a level 
where it will comply with the regulatory requirements. In addition, they will work with 
them to cover other aspects in terms of company structure, marketing, exposure, etc. 
Then the underwriter will prepare the prospectus for the IPO and begin the process of 
raising the capital from the public. The above-mentioned tasks by the investment 
banks fall under the direct cost to the company seeking the IPO. Nevertheless, another 
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cost that affects the company is the cost of underpricing. On the trading day, if the 
closing price is higher than the issue price, and then this would indicate that the issue 
price set by the underwriter was low, which is known as underpricing. Smaller and 
newer companies suffer more from this cost as it is more difficult to evaluate their 
companies. Yet, they could tolerate that since it will attract investors into their venture. 
The underwriters’ fees charged to companies perusing IPO varies in amount, 
percentage and type of payment. Most of the underwriters charge a retainer at the 
beginning of the engagement and then, a yearly fee until the date of the IPO. In our 
research, I have calculated this as part of the fees charged by the underwriter. IPOs 
with higher proceeds are expected to attract higher attention and hence higher total 
cost and more expensive in terms of the absolute value of money. However, as a 
percentage of the total proceeds generated by the IPO, the percentage tends to drop as 
the proceeds increases. Larger IPOs usually are undertaken by a syndicate managing 
the IPO as multi-bookrunners. The bookrunners in such a case can share the fees in 
terms of percentage or sometimes, they divide the market between them. Some of the 
underwriters are compensated by allocating them a number of shares exercisable after 
a lockup period from the IPO date. I have also included this type of compensation into 
the total fees charged by the underwriter calculating it using the issue price. However, 
some underwriters issue warrants and rights to issue shares at the predefined price 
after a certain period from the IPO date. This type of compensation was not included 
in the total fees calculated in this chapter. This is worthy of mentioning that the 
information on the fees charged by the underwriter have been collected manually from 
the IPO prospectuses as it is not legally binding for the underwriters to mention the 
exact fees charged as a total amount or as a percentage of the proceeds (Abrahamson 
et al., 2011). 
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4.7 Literature Review 
The literature on IPOs is very rich. Most of the papers try to understand the IPO 
underpricing and long-run underperformance. A number of puzzles still remain in the 
IPO literature: underpricing, long-run underperformance and use of lockups. 
However, less attention has been given to the cost of raising money. For the literature 
that covers the underwriters’ fees, a good number of them are focusing on the issue of 
the clustering of the spread fees especially in the US market around 7%. Some studies 
compare the same findings from the US markets to European markets (e.g., 
Abrahamson et al., 2011). In this section, I will review some of the previous literature 
and develop a number of hypotheses to be tested in this chapter. The hypotheses that 
I am going to develop and then test will focus on the difference in the spread charged 
by different markets in the United Kingdom. I will focus on the spread which is the 
difference between the total proceeds and the amount that is received by the IPO 
company at the end of the IPO. The spread is calculated as a percentage of the total 
proceeds.  
The cost of the IPO has direct and indirect parts. The direct cost is the fees that 
are charged by the underwriter and is usually consists of some fixed costs such as 
retainers, legal, printing, etc. in addition to a percentage of the proceed. I refer to the 
fees charged by the underwriter as the spread. The indirect cost occurs when the issue 
price happens to be underpriced. In this case, the company loses the difference 
between the issue price and the fair value of the share. I will examine if anticipated 
risk plays a part in underpricing.  
The underwriters’ fee is referred to as the spread. The fees components varies 
between fixed fees and some rights granted to the underwriters. For the sake of this 
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study, we calculate the spread as a percentage of the total proceed raised in the IPO. 
One of the papers that bring fee charged by the underwriters in the limelight is the 
paper the “The 7 Percent Solution” by Chen and Ritter (2000). In this paper, they 
discuss the factors that cause the underwriter's fees in the US market to be significantly 
higher than those of other countries. They also argue that for more than 90% of the 
deals with proceeds between $20 – 80 million have a spread of exactly 7%. This fact 
contradicts the dis-economies of scale where the increase of the amount of the 
proceeds should result in a decrease in the spread charged. In our sample, I will 
examine if the dis-economies of scale is a factor that contributes to the spread charged 
by the underwriters. This is also noticed in Abrahamson et al. (2011). The spread 
charged by the underwriters in the European market was decreasing as the proceeds 
increases. This is too observed in the US market even with the presence of the 
clustering around the 7% spread. Corwin and Schultz (2005) have noticed in their 
sample that the spread is negatively related to offering size. In addition, they have also 
reported that it is positively related to the aftermarket standard deviation. They defined 
the aftermarket standard deviation as the estimate of the standard deviation of a 
continuously compounded daily return from the 21st day after the IPO until the 125th 
day.  
Hansen (2001) investigates the implications of collusion in the IPO market as 
advocated by Chen and Ritter (2000). Hansen (2001) examines this in detail in three 
phases. In the first phase, he presents evidence from few tests that focus on market 
structure, whether there is implicit agreement, and whether the spread contains 
abnormal profit. He checks the nature of IPO market—monopoly or perfect 
competition. If there is a high concentration in the IPO market, then it may be worthy 
of investigation because the idea of implicit collusion is present in the highly 
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concentrated market. This was done in line with Dutta and Madhavan (1997) who 
show that this is not the case in their implicit collusion model because the dealer 
market they analyse is a competitive market as dealers are the same size with the same 
market share. However, the IPO investment bank market structure is different in the 
United Kingdom as well as in the rest of the world. For example, in 2012 Credit Suisse 
has a market capitalisation of 40.2 Billion GBP, Collin Stewart has a market cap of 
226.3 Million GBP. Hansen (2001) second test investigates entry into the IPO market. 
Perfect competition is characterised with low entry barriers. If there are low entry 
barriers, it is hard to imagine any sort of collusion.  Hansen (2001) finds evidence 
consistent with low barriers to entry and low and unchanging concentration in the US 
market over the 7% era that is against collusion. In the third test, Hansen (2001) apply, 
in the context of IPOs, the Christie et al. (1994) experiment for NASDAQ dealer 
collusion. Use of 7% contracts does not vanish after the collusion allegation review is 
publicised, though there was a federal investigation launched. The fourth test 
examines whether 7% contains abnormal profit. He develops a benchmark model and 
estimates the coefficients based on the non-7% spread that is paid in the US market. 
Using those estimated coefficients, he finds that the 7% spreads do not contain 
abnormal profit. In sum, his findings do not suggest any form of collusion, either 
implicit or explicit. On the other hand, Chen and Ritter (2000) simply argue that 7% 
contains abnormal profit as it is well above the spreads paid in foreign IPOs. However, 
their claim does not take into considerations the institutional and legal differences in 
IPO markets between the US and international markets such as the IPO procedure, the 
IPO contract, underwriter quality. Recently, Abrahamson et. al., (2011) analyse why 
the same underwriters charge less for the European IPOs compared to the US IPOs.  
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Abrahamson et. al., (2011) make comparisons in IPO gross spreads between 
the US and Europe. Since the IPO markets are fundamentally different in these two 
regions previous studies, previous studies have not been able to make comparisons 
(e.g. Chen and Ritter, 2000). Historically, the process of raising equity finance in the 
United States was unique. While the process of the US IPOs for a long time have been 
managed using the technique called book building, whereby investment banks 
campaign and gather officially nonbinding but serious indications of interest from 
institutional investors in the pre-IPO stage, IPOs in Europe used the straightforward 
fixed-price method or Dutch-auction process which are less time demanding and 
cheaper in terms of direct costs.4 Industry participants cite institutional difference is 
the  reason why gross spreads were higher in the United States than in Europe. More 
recently, nonetheless, the method of raising money has changed. Ljungqvist, 
Jenkinson, and Wilhelm (2003) indicate that at the end their sample period (July 1999) 
where Europe is two-third of their sample, approximately 80% of all non-US offerings 
used the book building method. This trend of book building in the Europe has 
continued by and large.  In the past decade, the majority of European IPOs have used 
book building, except for a very few small IPOs. Since the European IPO techniques 
have converged with those in the US, Abrahamson, et al. (2012) claim that IPO Spread 
across US and Europe are now comparable. 
Since the European and US IPOs use similar methods to raise IPOs in the 
recent times, in order to make a meaningful comparison between the US and European 
IPOs, Abrahamson, et al. (2012) use 10 years of data from 1998 to 2007 of European 
IPOs which use book building method. The only study that uses data across the Europe 
                                               
4 see, for example, Ritter (2003) and Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001). 
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is Torstila (2001), but this study covers the 1986-1999 when a number of different 
offering techniques are used to make any meaningful comparison hard between the 
US and European IPOs. Abrahamson et al. (2012) draw a data on European IPOs 
which matches a data set of US IPOs spanning the same time frame of 10 years. 
Moreover, as the world has become a global village leading investment banks compete 
for IPO business on both the continents—the US and European markets. Hence, 
Abrahamson et al. (2012) are capable of comparing IPO gross spreads across the US 
and Europe. In particular, they examine how and to what extent a certain investment 
bank charges for its practically same services at US and Europe.  
Abrahamson et al. (2012) find that the 7% gross spread had become even more 
pervasive in the United States than when Chen and Ritter (2000) reported. In their 
sample period (1998-2007), 95.4% of US IPOs in the range of $25 million to $100 
million had gross spreads of exactly 7%. The comparable number as reported in Chen 
and Ritter (2000) after adjusted for the inflation was 84%. Abrahamson et al. (2011) 
report that gross spreads of exactly 7% became more common among larger US IPOs 
during their sample period than in Chen and Ritter (2000) sample period. While 
Abrahamson et. al. (2011) find that 77% of all their sample offerings ranging $100 
million-$250 million charge exactly 7%, Chen and Ritter (2000) showed nearly no 
IPOs over $150 million charges a 7% gross fee. Third, Abrahamson et. al., (2011) 
show that there is no clustering for European IPO gross spread, and only a few IPOs 
(1 percent) raising $25 million or higher get charged gross spreads of a maximum of 
7%. The average fee for European IPOs is little higher than 4% for the IPOs raising 
$25 million to $100 million. Certainly, they find that there is a difference of 3 percent 
between the gross fees of European IPOs and the US IPOs. European IPOs are cheaper 
as compared to the US ones after controlling for IPO characteristics, the size of IPO, 
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multiple or single bookrunner, and time or country effects. They also show that gross 
spreads are lower for the larger offerings in both Europe and the US, that is, economies 
of scale are in place in the underwriting market. However, their multivariate analysis 
shows that there is a tendency to increase the fees for the larger US IPOs over their 
sample period, while European IPOs have shown a trend of decline in their fees. 
Finally, they show that the same underwriter charges less for an IPO of an in the 
Europe as compared to the United States for an IPO with similar characteristics.   
One might argue that institutional and country differences between the two 
markets explain the 3% difference between the gross spread of US and European IPOs. 
Abrahamson et al. (2012) examine five of such claims: legal costs, retail offerings, 
litigation risk, sell-side analysts, and the possibility that lower underpricing might 
offset higher fees. They do not find any evidence that these factors explain the lower 
level of gross spread in the Europe as compared to the United States.  The only 
evidence that supports their claim is that they find that European IPOs have a lower 
level of underpricing compared to the US IPOs.  
Chen and Mohan (2002) assert that underwriters have basically two ways to 
mitigate the risk of the issuing firm. The first one is explicit which underwriter spread 
is and the second one is implicit which is underpricing the issue. If an underwriter may 
well charge a spread which is adequate to reward for all the risk they bear, then 
underpricing turn out to be less dominant because mispricing may harm in underwriter 
reputation and/or economic loss. The finding that underwriter reputation is negatively 
correlated with underpricing is consistent with the safeguarding of investment banks 
reputation capital (Carter and Manster, 1990). Nonetheless, there are two major 
obstacles against charging a high spread as compensation for the risk taken by the 
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underwriters: competition and regulation (e.g., Chen and Mohan, 2002). As a result, 
underpricing is widely observed (Chen and Ritter, 2000). Competition and regulation, 
nonetheless, still leave room for underwriters to shift the cost from spread to 
underpricing and vice versa (Chen and Mohan, 2002).5 Thus, underpricing and spread 
works as substitutes for underwriters. However, in an alternative scenario, for a risky 
IPO, it is possible that due to regulations if a ceiling-level spread needs to be adhered 
it could be compensated by a higher level of underpricing to reward for underwriting 
a very risky IPO. Thus, Chen and Mohan (2002) conjecture that the underpricing and 
spread are complementary mechanisms and the nature of the relationship between 
these two be determined by the IPO features and negotiating power, the level of 
competition in the investment banking market and the underwriter’s pricing strategies.  
Since Chen and Mohan (2002) hypothesise that underpricing and spread could 
be substitutes or complementary they examine both of them. According to Chen and 
Mohan (2002) underwriter spread does not only reflects the investment banks risk 
taking in terms of bringing the new company to the market, but it also related with the 
underpricing of the issue. As underwriter spread and underpricing are interrelated, and 
both could be determined as a result of the decisions taken by the underwriter, 
analysing one of those in isolation without the other is incorrect. Thus Chen and 
Mohan (2002) examined the spread in a simultaneous equation modelling system. 
They estimate the spread in terms of the gross proceeds, other expenses, offering price 
                                               
5 Chen and Mohan (2002) provide an example: “Imagine a scenario where competition drives the 
underwriter spread to x%. To bear the full risk of underwriting, the underwriter will, say, underprice 
the issue by y% to achieve an equilibrium risk premium of (x+y)%. Or, in the case of an influential 
issuer, the underwriter can only underprice the issue by y%. To make up the loss of risk premium, the 
underwriter will negotiate an equilibrium spread of x%. In a different scenario, the lack of intense 
competition allows the underwriter to demand a (x+q)% spread, and a (y-q)% underpricing would be 
sufficient to bear the full cost of risk” (page 523-524) 
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and underpricing as the first equation. The second equation was the estimation of the 
underpricing in terms of standard deviation, underwriter reputation and the spread. 
They have argued in their system discussion that other expenses and fees are positively 
related with spread charged. The other expenses and fees in their system refer to the 
legal and bookkeeping expenses. They argue that the positive relation with the spread 
indicate that riskier issues are associated with higher spread and higher other expenses. 
They also examine whether the market for investment banking is segmented or not. 
The level of underpricing depends on the investment banking market structure, that is, 
whether the market is integrated or is segmented. In a fragmented market, some of the 
new issuers could not raise money with some underwriters. Consequently, the 
underpricing of IPOs reveal the pricing bias that results from the fact that some smaller 
companies are excluded from the service of large and reputable investment banks. 
An important factor that plays a significant role for the investment bankers in 
the process of bringing a company to the market is the risk associated with the 
company. Fink et al. (2005) have discussed how the idiosyncratic risk has risen since 
the 1960s. They have discussed in their paper how the age of the companies going 
public has fallen drastically as the average age was 40 years old back in the 1960s to 
an average of 5 years old in the late 1990s. This leads younger companies to have 
access to cheaper equity. Moreover, they argue in their paper that the positive trend of 
idiosyncratic risk is fully explained by the proportion of young firms in the market. 
Carter (1992) discussed the reason why reputable underwriters seek low-risk 
IPOs. They argue that bringing a low-risk IPO to the market will make them viable 
for future business. They have reported in their paper that the likelihood for an 
underwriter to issue further equity is positively related to its reputation and negatively 
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related to the IPO gross spread. However, still, the US market show a fixed gross 
spread for most of the IPOs. Chen and Ritter (2000) show that the 7% spread is 
consistent with their sample of 1,111 IPOs. As shown by subsequent research 
(Abrahamson et al., 2011) that 7% is relatively higher compared to their counterpart 
in the European markets, they have tested the hypotheses that this high spread is due 
to the level of riskiness of the firm seeking IPO. They did not find any evidence to 
support this hypothesis. They explained that the 7% persists for risky deals as well as 
for the relatively easy to value firms. They have argued that the clustering around the 
7% is more apparent than it was a decade before the publishing date of Chen and Ritter 
(2000). They also noticed that the 7% spread is not evident at the IPOs outside the US 
market. Moreover, there is no significant clustering for other financial markets inside 
the US such as a bond, convertible bond, and seasoned equity offering.  
Another aspect that I will be examining is the possibility of rent-seeking is that 
underwriters could be using the lockup to benefit from further issuing after the IPO. 
Brav and Gompers (2003) have examined, amongst some others, the roles of the 
lockup on IPOs, whether the underwriters extract extra compensation after the IPO 
use the lockup. They have examined the relationship between the length of the lockup 
and the reputation of the underwriters. They found that the relationship is negative. 
The more reputable underwriters, the shorter lockup period they impose. This suggests 
that reputable underwriters do not use longer lockup periods to get additional 
compensation. 
I will examine lockup period from the company side. Lockup period is used as 
a tool to overcome some issues such as information asymmetry and moral hazard 
issue. As a result, the longer the lockup period, the more likelihood of one or both 
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present. The paper by Karpoff, Lee, and Masulis (2013) examined the lockup 
agreements in Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs). They measured the duration of the 
lockup period to the issuer information asymmetry measures. They found that 
likelihood of lockup and its duration are positively related to the information 
asymmetry measures. In a sample of 1,926 IPOs over the period of 1996-2006, they 
reported that 81.5 percent of the sample has a lockup period of 180 days. However, 
with respect to the SEOs, in their sample, they have 2,579 SEOs over the same period 
with 64.4 percent with 90 days’ lockup. Besides the previous studies that attribute the 
lockup duration to control moral hazard, they argued that lockup reduces the likelihood 
of overpricing. They used eight information asymmetry proxies. These proxies are 
firm size, time since IPO, the number of analysts providing firm earnings forecasts, 
tangible assets, and the number of prior stock offers since IPO, bid-ask spread, return 
volatility and abnormal accruals. Part of their study was to examine the relation 
between the information asymmetry with the spread. They found that there is a 
positive relation between them. 
Hoque (2014) conducted further investigation on the relation between the 
lockup duration and information asymmetry. In his paper, they covered 1,117 IPOs 
over the period between 1999-2006 in both markets of London Stock Exchange, the 
Main Market and the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). In his study, he identified 
the companies with information asymmetry when the company is small (less than 
£11.92 Million) when underwritten by a non-prestigious underwriter and those that 
are issued in the AIM market. He has also identified the companies with high moral 
hazard. He has identified them using director ownership. If director ownership is 
higher than 0.75%, the company is identified to have moral hazard. He reported that 
information asymmetry drives underpricing. However, for the subset identified as a 
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high moral hazard, the standard deviation is reported not to be significant. This means 
that information asymmetry is not the driver of underpricing when a high moral hazard 
exists. In their analysis, they found that information asymmetry is not the driver for 
lockup duration. However, director ownership is significant for the whole sample and 
for the high moral hazard subset. Hence, they concluded that lockup duration is used 
to mitigate moral hazard. Therefore, information asymmetry drives underpricing and 
moral hazard drives lockup duration. Rent-seeking can be a factor in the spread 
charged as they could indicate the level of information asymmetry and moral hazard. 
I will examine this by testing the relationship between the lockups periods stated after 
the IPO to the spread charged. To the best of our knowledge, no previous studies have 
examined the relationship between rent-seeking and spread charged by the investment 
banks. I try to fill this gap in the literature.  
The last explanation I am seeking to explain in the spread in this chapter is the 
possibility that underwriters charge less to attract future business. James (1992) 
examine the pricing of the underwriters’ services. They reported in their paper that the 
underwriters charge less spread if they expect subsequent issuing from the firm. They 
argue that with a lower spread, the likelihood of the firms to switch to another 
underwriter for future issuing is less appealing given the switching costs. In other 
words, the spread is being used as a marketing tool in case if following issuing is 
expected. In a study by Dunbar (2000), they investigated the factors that affect the 
investment banks market share in the IPO market. Their study covers IPOs issued in 
the US market over the period between 1984 and 1995. They investigated the effect 
of a number of factors on the market share changes for established and less established 
investment banks in the IPO market. They found in their study that those factors are 
significant in gaining market share. They mentioned that if shares are underpriced at 
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the IPO, this will have a negative effect on their market share following the IPO. They 
have also reported that they tend to have a better market share if they diversify their 
portfolio in terms of sectors and IPO size rather than industry specialisation. Although 
they have reported that those factors are significant for the whole sample, they 
mentioned that these factors are more significant for the well-established bank in 
comparison to the less established ones. Industry specialisation factor was, 
economically, the most important factor. It was followed by the analyst reputation and 
initial IPO return. 
Another study by Krigman et al. (2001) investigated the main reason for the 
issuers to switch their IPO underwriter for their SEOs. In their study, they covered 
IPOs that took place in the mid-1990s. They argued that 30% of issuers undertaking 
SEOs within the first 3 years of the IPO switch their lead underwriters. They found 
that switchers were significantly underpriced compared to non-switcher. Therefore, 
their dissatisfaction is not attributed to the services offered by the underwriters; rather 
it is due to the money left on the table and hence lower proceeds. The second main 
reason was that companies look for higher reputation underwriters that will yield in 
more exposure in terms of more influential analyst coverage in comparison to the less 
reputation underwriter. 
In our study, I will examine the relationship between the spread charged and 
the future business by examining the relation between the current year spread with the 
number of IPOs undertook by the underwriter the following year. However, I have 
excluded some of the market sectors such as the financial sector. Moreover, I have not 
included any of the further equity issuances. Yet, this could be compensated by the 
assumption that the underwriters have some speciality as noted by (Dunbar, 2000). 
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Moreover, the paper by Christie and Schultz (1994) mentioned that competition could 
be a contributor to the spread charged, it could be a marketing tool used by the 
underwriter to attract future business. 
4.8 Hypothesis 
In this chapter, I am studying and comparing the main market which is a well-
established and mature stock exchange market with a high level of regulation 
compared to the AIM which is an emerging market that attracts smaller, less mature 
and hence riskier companies. In addition, the AIM market has fewer restrictions for 
the companies to be listed on them compared to the Main market. The company 
characteristics are different in the Main market compared to the alternative Investment 
Market. The main market attracts mature companies with higher age, lower 
underpricing, higher profitability, higher asset tangibility, lower growth prospects, low 
ownership concentration, high dividend payments (Vismara, Paleari and Ritter, 2012). 
Also, Main Market companies make acquisitions at a great pace and do more capital 
changes.6 On the other hand, AIM attracts companies with lower age, higher 
underpricing, lower profitability, lower asset tangibility, higher growth prospects, high 
ownership concentration, low dividend payments. However, AIM companies issue 
                                               
6 The following is a list of non-chargeable transactions for companies admitted to the MM: Capital 
reorganisation, Sub division of capital, Consolidation of capital, Redenomination, Capitalisation of 
reserves, The reclassification of shares in order to liquidate a company under a scheme for 
reconstruction, Establishment  and updating of issuance programmes, Block listings for issues of shares 
under employee share schemes and exercise of options (including issues of shares to directors not under 
an employee share scheme) with a market capitalisation below £2m, Further issues of shares issued 
under an existing offer for subscription, Substitution of issuer, Migration between ‘securities categories 
– equity shares’ (London Stock Exchange, 2011). 
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subsequent equity (SEOs) frequently as the companies do not need to pay fees to the 
stock exchange for SEOs. Initial fee considerations can be vital to the decision to issue 
equity on Alternative Investment Market. For the London Main Market, incremental 
admission fees are charged on equity issues. “Admission fees of minimum £6,708 to 
a maximum of £388,173 are charged based on size in the MM. In comparison, the flat 
rate admission fee of £4,535 was charged till 2008 in the AIM. From 2009, minimum 
£6,720 and maximum £ 75,810 fees are charged based on size. The admission and on-
going fees can be an important consideration to issuing equity on AIM compared to 
the MM.” (Doukas and Hoque, p 386). Given the different characteristics of both 
markets, I will start by establishing the fact that the spread charged by the underwriters 
is different in both markets. Considering those AIM companies are relatively new and 
the AIM companies require a nominated adviser (who normally is the IPO 
underwriter) the underwriters will charge more. I propose the following hypothesis: 
H 1. Underwriters spread is higher in the AIM compared to the Main market. 
I will then start to investigate the reasons behind the differences in both 
markets as Abrahamson et al. (2011) examined the differences between the European 
and US market.  as Abrahamson et al. (2011) and Corwin and Schultz (2005) have 
discussed how the spread charged is affected by the size of the proceeds raised in an 
IPO. Table 4.2 shows that the proceed size is higher in the Main market compared to 
the AIM market. I will examine if this is due to the concept of the economies of scale 
where the spread decreases as the proceed increases. I will examine this between the 
markets and within each market as well. I will look into the spread charged in both the 
Main and AIM markets in London Stock Exchange. After that, I will further examine 
our sample by dividing our sample into sub-groups based on the size of the IPO 
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proceeds and investigate the reasons behind them. The main market is comprised of 
companies with higher maturity level and larger proceeds expected from their IPOs. 
This implies that Main market enjoys relatively less risky companies. Larger IPO 
proceeds mean that those companies could benefit from the economies of scale. There 
has been much research discussing the underwriting pricing. They have discussed 
whether pricing varies over different markets and investigating the reasons behind 
that. The study by (Abrahamson et al., 2011) has found that the spread charged by the 
underwriters in the US market is almost fixed at 7%. In fact, they argue that it is 
becoming the norm for IPO rising up to $250 million. However, they have compared 
this to the European market where they have reported underwriters charge about 3% 
less than the US market. In this chapter, I would like to examine if the spread charged 
in the Main market and AIM market differs. 
 The second hypothesis that I would like to examine is the following: 
H 2. Underwriters charge more on AIM because money raised in the IPOs is 
less (Dis-economies of scale). 
Another difference is the level of riskiness between the two markets. Since, 
AIM attracts younger and newly created firms the riskiness of AIM should be higher 
than the Main market. There have been criticisms for AIM from different practitioners. 
Cited in Doukas and Hoque (2016) “For example, Roel Campos, a Commissioner at 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission, in 2007 was quoted saying “I’m 
concerned that 30% of issuers that list on AIM are gone in a year. That feels like a 
casino to me and I believe that investors will treat it as such.” Treanor, Jill “City hits 
out over US ‘casino’ jibe at AIM” The Guardian 10 March 2007. Similarly, John 
Thain, chief executive of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), criticized AIM for 
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its lack of regulation and corporate governance standards. Mr Thain, speaking at the 
World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, stated that AIM “did not have any 
standards at all and anyone could list.” James Quinn, NYSE Chief attacks AIM, The 
Telegraph, 27 January 2007.” (p 38). To protect underwriters’ reputation capital, they 
might be charging more for AIM companies.  
The age of the firm is a proxy that has been utilised in a few studies. Normally 
it is believed that older firms are less risky.  Another alternative that has been used in 
the literature is the underwriter reputation. (e.g., Carter and Manaster (1990) and 
Johnson and Miller (1988)). If the firms hire more reputable underwriters, the 
underwriters are thought to take on some risks for the firms. The reputable 
underwriters will do so to protect their reputation capital.  Also, highly reputed 
underwriters will have done better due diligence to endorse the quality of the firm 
truthfully. Both of these proxies has been used in a number of empirical studies to 
examine the impact of risk on underpricing. Most of the results find a significant 
relationship between these risk proxies and underpricing. However, the explanatory 
power of these proxies are not very high as the r-squared values of these regressions 
are rather low.  
I will look into two measures of risk. I will test the idiosyncratic risk which is 
the risk specified to the specific company going into the IPO. Another risk measure is 
the volatility of the share return after listing. However, the estimation of ex-ante risk 
for IPOs is considerably more troublesome in light of the fact that there is no authentic 
price data before the IPO to calculate risk. Most of the studies use the standard 
deviation of returns after the IPO as a proxy for risk before the IPO. By tradition, the 
standard deviations of the returns for the first twenty days utilised in many studies. 
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Since this ex-ante risk measure has demonstrated practically little explanatory power, 
some researchers conclude that risk does not fundamentally impact returns. Johnson 
and Miller (1988) reason that the standard deviation of post-IPO returns is a poor 
measure of ex-ante risk. Hence, a great part of the current research makes utilisation 
of totally distinctive risk proxies such as underwriter reputation as developed by Carter 
and Manaster (1990).  I will also examine if the underwriter will mitigate the 
anticipated risk by underpricing to give compensation to the subscribers on the short-
run. The third hypothesis that I am going to test is the following: 
H 3.  (a) Underwriters charge more on AIM because AIM IPOs are riskier. 
Rock (1986) contends that underpricing is a result of the effect of the risk 
assumed by uninformed investors. The issues need to be underpriced to reward the 
uninformed investors and to reduce the chances that informed investors cannot take 
advantage of uninformed investors. Beatty and Ritter (1986) develops Rock’s model 
further and find that underpricing increases with the riskiness of the IPO. Carter and 
Manaster (1990) develop another extension of Rock’s model exhibiting that as the risk 
of an issue increases, informed demand will expand, compounding the adverse 
selection issue and the required underpricing. Generally, investors cannot differentiate 
less risky firms from high-risk firms. In any case, the IPOs can involve highly 
reputable investment banks to take on some of the risks and provide investors with the 
confidence that they are not risky firms, which permits them to underprice less. Booth 
and Smith (1986) asserts that the underwriter puts its reputational capital at stake 
which works as a covenant and shares price reflect all withheld information about the 
firms’ performance. Underpricing gives both assurance and compensation to the 
utilisation of the underwriters’ reputational capital. Tinic (1988) recommends that 
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underpricing is a type of protection to ensure underwriters against potential due 
diligence legitimate liabilities. Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) claim that underpricing is 
a signal by a more informed issuer to indicate firm value and the variance of expected 
returns to less informed investors. Thus, underwriters could mitigate the risk of the 
firms by underpricing more. 
H 3(b) Alternatively, underwriters mitigate risk by lowering the issue price, 
i.e. underpricing more. 
The underwriters usually become corporate brokers, a prerequisite for every 
organization recorded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), who provide business 
related advice, new issue related services, co-ordinate with institutional investors and 
related services, and liaise with the London Stock Exchange and UK Listing Authority 
on administrative issues confronting listed organizations (FSA Listing Rules, 2007). 
They likewise execute equity related transactions, including insider trading, share 
repurchases, stake building in target organisations. Also, to keep their listing, AIM 
organisations are obliged to have a named investment bank that completes all the 
previously stated administrations. This infers that the association with the underwriters 
closer in the UK, in comparison to the US where firms often switch underwriters based 
on their performance during the IPO process, and to look for more prestigious 
underwriters and analyst coverage (e.g., Dunbar, 2000, and Ljungqvist, Marston, and 
Wilhelm, 2009). The close relationship with the underwriters in the AIM could also 
mean that there is a rent-seeking potentiality by the underwriters.  
Rent-seeking by the underwriters have been investigated by Brav and Gompers 
(2003) in the context of IPO lockups in the US and Hoque and Lasfer (2015) in the 
context of IPO lockups in the UK. From my data, I have noticed that the lockup period 
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is slightly higher in AIM market than it is in the Main market. The main purpose of 
having a lockup period is to show that owners are committed to the business and hence 
will raise the investors’ confidence to participate in the IPO. With higher expected risk 
and moral hazard from the smaller companies in AIM market, lockup period is 
expected to be higher. I will examine if the underwriters are proposing shorter lockup 
periods in return of higher spread. The fourth hypothesis that I am going to examine 
is the following: 
H 4. Underwriter charge more in the AIM because of rent-seeking. 
DuCharme, Rajgopal and Sefcik (2001) likewise look at marketing role during 
the process of IPOs. Their ‘marketing theory’ explores whether IPO underpricing is 
higher in the consumer oriented company such as business-to-consumer (B2C) web 
organisations. They also analyse for these set of firms whether IPO underpricing lead 
to increase in revenues after the IPO. Their evidence with respect to the marking 
hypotheses is mixed. They find that underpricing is significantly higher for B2C web 
organisations with respect to other web organisations, however, they do not find a 
significant relationship between underpricing and after IPO revenues. In another 
study, Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack (2002) additionally contend that very high 
underpricing pulls in media consideration and makes attention for the issuing firm. On 
the relationship that underpricing pulls in media consideration and makes profitable 
attention, Demers and Lewellen (2003) expect an increase in web activity taking after 
the IPO. They find that increase in the web in the month after the IPO is significantly 
connected with IPO returns, and the impact is economically significant. 
In a competitive market, many factors can be used to gain better market share. 
Pricing is one of the most important factors. I will examine if the future market share 
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is affected by the number of IPOs undertaken on the year before and I will test the 
significance of the spread charged by the underwriters on attracting future business. 
The fifth hypothesis that I are going to examine is the following: 
H 5. Underwriters charge less to attract future business. 
4.9 Data and methodology 
4.10 Data 
I have collected all the IPOs that took place on the London Stock Exchange for the 
purpose of our analysis. In this chapter, I am covering the IPO that took place in 
London Stock Exchange in both of its Main and AIM markets for the period starting 
from 1999 to 2012. I am following the same criteria used in some of the previous 
studies in order to come with consistent and comparable results. To gain a 
comprehensive understanding, in our sample, I have only included the IPOs that are 
new admissions and incorporated in the UK. I further excluded another 697 IPOs that 
are of financial and the investment firms as the behaviour of the firms operating in 
these sectors differ from the rest of the market.  
I have collected the data in this study from a number of sources. First, I 
identified the IPOs that took place in the covered period from the London Stock 
Exchange new issue report.7 Once I have the list of IPOs that took place on the London 
Stock Exchange, I have collected the IPO prospectuses from Perfect Filings database. 
From the prospectuses, I have manually collected the IPO related information. In 
particular, I collect underwriters’ remuneration, gross proceeds, the number of 
bookrunners, lockup length. Some of the information such as the money raised from 
                                               
7 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/ 
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the IPO proceeds, issuing price and the total number of shares are available both in the 
prospectus and on the LSE website. In the case of discrepancy, I used the data on the 
LSE website as it is assumed to have been reviewed and entered after the actual IPO 
took place. From Datastream, I collected the incorporation date to calculate the age of 
the company at the time of the IPO. I also collected some of the post-IPO information 
such as the size of capital over the 3 years following the IPO to calculate the 
companies’ growth and the trading prices. 
The initial list included 1075 IPOs. There were around 106 companies where 
their information was missing and difficult to obtain so I had to exclude them. The 
final list included 968 IPOs with a total proceed of £41.7 Billion. 
Table 4.2 shows a summary of the number of IPOs and their sizes over the 
sampling period. I noticed from the table that the total proceeds for all the IPOs on our 
sample is about £41.7 Billion. The number of IPOs that fit the sampling criteria from 
AIM market is much higher than the IPOs from the Main market. With 806 IPOs from 
the AIM market make more than 83% of our sample. I also noticed that the number of 
IPOs was high during the Dot Com bubble then afterwards with the burst of the bubble 
the number of IPOs dropped. Afterwards, the number of IPOs has been increasing over 
the years till it was hit by the financial crisis in the year 2008 where the number of 
IPOs has dropped again. Nevertheless, the number of IPOs started to show increase 
the following years after the crisis. The total proceeds of the IPOs in the AIM market 
captured in our sample show an amount of about £10.1 Billion over 13 years. Yet, this 
only makes about 25% of the total IPO proceeds. The IPO proceeds for the AIM 
market ranged from a low £39K up to £307 Million with an average of £12.6 Million 
per IPO.
 Table 4.2: IPO Sample Summary 
 Main  AIM  The whole sample 
Year Main 
IPOs 
Total 
Proceeds 
Average 
Proceeds 
size 
Average 
Proceeds 
Median 
 
AIM 
IPOs 
Total 
Proceeds 
Average 
Proceeds 
size 
Average 
Proceeds 
Median 
 
Total 
IPOs 
Total 
Proceeds 
Average 
Proceeds 
Average 
Proceeds 
Median 
1999 11 1,644.72 149.52 24.65 
 
24 71.12 2.96 2.34 
 
35 1,715.84 49.02 3.68 
2000 52 5,079.53 97.68 38.22 
 
80 493.19 6.16 3.88 
 
132 5,572.72 42.22 9.24 
2001 6 2,123.05 353.84 32.49 
 
46 180.76 3.93 2.10 
 
52 2,303.81 44.30 2.35 
2002 9 1,039.80 115.53 29.19 
 
30 75.57 2.52 1.86 
 
39 1,115.37 28.60 2.64 
2003 4 1,335.30 333.82 209.91 
 
30 112.92 3.76 1.57 
 
34 1,448.22 42.59 2.38 
2004 15 1,354.98 90.33 63.10 
 
122 1,000.45 8.20 3.40 
 
137 2,355.43 17.19 4.29 
2005 15 2,678.85 178.59 114.47 
 
166 2,016.46 12.15 4.07 
 
181 4,695.31 25.94 4.47 
2006 14 2,963.51 211.68 149.71 
 
117 2,264.79 19.36 4.82 
 
131 5,228.30 39.91 6.24 
2007 18 3,115.85 173.10 80.45 
 
81 1,622.31 20.03 5.65 
 
99 4,738.16 47.86 12.77 
2008 2 940.47 470.24 470.24 
 
16 355.37 22.21 12.17 
 
18 1,295.84 71.99 12.83 
2009 1 55.82 55.82 55.82 
 
8 523.22 65.40 47.29 
 
9 579.04 64.34 55.82 
2010 8 1,942.42 242.80 197.86 
 
27 659.12 24.41 20.48 
 
35 2,601.54 74.33 33.16 
2011 5 7,140.79 1,428.16 342.54 
 
33 391.15 11.85 3.26 
 
38 7,531.94 198.21 4.32 
2012 2 132.00 66.00 139.93 
 
26 398.50 15.33 6.93 
 
28 530.50 18.95 7.40 
Total 162 31,547.08 194.74 73.15 
 
806 10,164.94 12.61 3.93 
 
968 41,712.02 43.09 5.58 
This table shows a summary of the IPO dataset used in our study. Total proceeds are the amount of money raised in the IPO; the average proceeds size is the mean 
proceeds, and the average proceeds median is the average money raised.  Total proceeds, average proceeds size and average proceeds median are in GBP million. 
This information is shown per year and for the Main, AIM and the whole sample. 
   
The sample includes 162 IPOs from the Main market where the total proceeds 
are more than £31 Billion which makes about 75% of the total proceeds. The IPO sizes 
ranged from £1.58 Million to £6 Billion with an average of £194.7 Million per IPO. I 
have taken the effect of inflation into consideration. I have discounted all the amounts 
in our data sample to 2012 GBP value. I have used CPI index from the Office for 
National Statistics. 
I have also classified the underwriters’ status to be either a prestigious or non-
prestigious. I followed (Derrien and Kecskes, 2007). “I classify a broker as 
“prestigious” if it is a global investment bank.8 In instances in which prestige is not 
obvious, I consult the 1997 to 2003 editions of Thomson’s Extel Survey” (Derrien and 
Kecskes, 2007). However, I have consulted the 2013 Thomson’s Extel Survey to check 
the classification further as Derrien and Kecskes (2007) sample ends in 2003. 
4.11 Methodology 
To test our hypotheses, I first use univariate tests such as correlation analysis, plots 
for spreads and tabulate several univariate tables. Then, I proceed to the multivariate 
tests where I apply ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions in a linear model. After 
that, I conduct several robustness checks including fixed effects regression, running 
the OLS while winsorizing spread, Tobit model and also considered a non-linear 
model. The models are presented in detail when I discuss my empirical results.  
To test if the spread charged in the previous year is used to attract more 
business and how it would affect the future business I ran a couple of OLS models. 
                                               
8 I follow Derrien and Kecskes (2007) and include in prestigious underwriters global investment banks 
such as ABN AMRO (including Hoare Govett), Cazenove & Co., Credit Lynnais Securities, Dresdner 
Kleinwort Wassertein, HSBC Securities, Credit Suisse, Investec Hendersen Crosthwaite securities, 
KBC Securities, Peel Hunt, Lehman brothers, Nomura International, Schroder Salomon Smith Barney, 
SG securities, UBS, West LB, Merrill Lynch International, Goldman Sachs. 
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Both of the models examine the effect of the number of IPO taken, the average 
proceeds raised in them and the average spread charged by the underwriter in the 
previous year to the number of IPOs and then to the average spread charged in the 
current year. 
Then I examine the determinants of underpricing because spread charged is 
the direct cost of money raised and underpricing is an indirect cost of IPO. Hence, the 
spread charged and IPO underpricing could be substitutes or complementary. I try to 
shed light on this issue by running an OLS regression on IPO underpricing. 
I have not controlled for the industry in our models. This could cause a 
heterogeneity problem. However, I have segmented our sample based on the size of 
the IPO which will mitigate the heterogeneity when running the regression models for 
the segment. Yet, heterogeneity could still be present when regress the whole sample. 
4.12 Results and analysis 
In this section will analyse the collected data and will test the hypothesis identified 
earlier.  
4.13 Descriptive Statistics 
4.13.1.1 Main and AIM markets statistics 
During the period that I am covering in this chapter, the IPO market in the UK and 
globally has gone through ups and downs in terms of number of IPOs and the total 
amount of money raised. In this section, I will examine whether the results I get are in 
line with some of the previous studies such as Abrahamson et al., 2011; Armitage, 
2000; Chen and Mohan, 2002; H. C. Chen and Ritter, 2000 and some of the previous 
studies who argued that unlike the US market, the spread in the European market is 
not clustered. 
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I will compare the results across our sample between the Main market and AIM 
market and discuss the reasons behind the differences in terms of the nature of the 
markets and the markets components and the laws governing each of them. 
Table 4.2 shows a summary of the data of the whole IPO data sample under 
study over the period from 1999 to 2012. In this table, I have divided the IPOs based 
on the value of the proceeds received.  To produce comparable results to the paper of 
Abrahamson et al. (2011), I have identified four ranges from our sample in addition to 
the whole sample and that of Main and AIM market. I have used an average exchange 
rate of $1.5 per £1. The sets and the subsets based on the ranges are the whole sample, 
Main Market, AIM market, Small with less than £16.7 Million, Medium with proceeds 
between £16.7 Million – £66.7 Million, Large between £66.7 - £333.4 and Very Large 
with proceeds more than £333.4. The number if IPOs in each of the above subset is 
968, 162, 806, 686, 169, 93, and 20, respectively (in the same order). 
In Table 4.3 I show some statistics across the years, I am covering. I show the 
number of IPOs that took place in each year and average spread charged by the 
underwriters in terms of mean and median. I also show the average number of 
bookrunners per IPO which gives an idea of the frequency of using the multi-
bookrunners across the years too. I then show the return at the end of the first trading 
day and at the end of the fifth trading day when the price is more stable. In panels B, 
C, and D, I have shown the information for the different ranges. In order to compare 
the results from both markets, I have generated two more tables where Table 4.4 shows 
the data for the Main market and Table 4.5 shows the data for AIM market. In order 
to remove the effect of the Dot Com bubble, I have also shown the results excluding 
the years 1999 and 2000 for all panels in the three tables. 
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From Table 4.3, I notice that the median spread charged by the underwriters 
ranges between 4% - 6.69% with a median of 5% over the entire sample. The mean of 
the spread over the whole sample, on the other hand, ranges from 4.40% to 8.84%. 
However, looking at both Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, shows that the main attribution to 
this number comes from the AIM market as it has more IPOs. The median spread for 
the Main market shown in Table 4.4 ranges between 2.23% - 6.25% with an all-year 
median of 4%. Table 4.5 shows that that the median spread ranges between 3.76% - 
7.5% with a median over all the years of 5.08%. The mean of multi-bookrunners is 
lowest at 1 in 2001 and highest at 1.50 at the year 2011, with an overall average of 
1.12 for the entire sample.
 Table 4.3: IPOs Proceeds and spread charged by the Underwriters for Main and AIM Markets 
Panel A 
Year Count 
Mean of 
multi-
bookrunners 
Spread (Mean) 
% 
Spread (Median) 
% 
Median Proceeds 
(Millions) 
 
D1 Return 
(Mean) % 
D1 Return 
(Median) % 
D5 Return 
(Mean) % 
D5 Return 
(Median) % 
1999 35 1.11 4.40 4.00 3.68 25.13 6.25 62.63 11.67 
2000 132 1.02 4.28 4.00 9.24 32.60 10.25 84.53 11.27 
2001 52 1.00 6.42 5.00 2.35 25.38 8.18 17.54 7.76 
2002 39 1.05 6.34 5.40 2.64 3.01 7.22 -2.36 6.11 
2003 34 1.06 8.84 6.20 2.38 14.13 6.31 16.16 9.16 
2004 137 1.06 6.39 5.00 4.29 17.95 9.15 122.97 9.38 
2005 181 1.06 6.29 5.00 4.47 30.13 11.54 71.07 11.54 
2006 131 1.14 6.52 5.07 6.24 15.09 10.00 46.14 10.19 
2007 99 1.12 5.70 5.00 12.77 10.04 8.00 11.05 6.43 
2008 18 1.17 5.71 4.90 12.83 9.90 6.19 18.78 6.48 
2009 9 1.22 5.38 4.00 55.82 7.50 3.50 53.05 8.50 
2010 37 1.41 4.99 5.00 33.16 12.20 0.00 19.56 8.60 
2011 38 1.50 7.19 6.69 4.32 -7.16 0.00 8.49 3.65 
2012 30 1.23 8.11 6.43 7.40 -1.85 0.00 15.13 9.08 
All Years 972 1.11 6.05 5.00 5.58 18.88 8.09 55.44 9.20 
All years Ex. 1999 - 2000 805 1.12 6.42 5.00 5.35 16.36 7.95 50.35 9.09 
              
Panel B: 16.7 < Proceeds < 66.7  
All Years 168 1.10 4.48 4.39 30.63 17.26 7.92 6.38 7.74 
All years Ex. 1999 - 2000 131 1.12 4.61 4.43 31.89 11.62 6.67 -0.45 7.50 
              
Panel C: 66.7 < Proceeds < 333.4  
All Years 96 1.50 3.85 3.75 119.49 -0.53 2.84 -6.81 2.53 
All years Ex. 1999 - 2000 77 1.57 3.88 3.72 120.98 1.06 3.00 -3.73 3.00 
              
Panel D: Proceeds > 333.4 
All Years 22 2.18 3.31 3.00 643.65 -1.19 0.97 44.48 0.45 
All years Ex. 1999 - 2000 18 2.39 3.25 2.73 612.64 -3.86 0.15 -6.37 -0.47 
This table shows a summary of the IPOs proceeds and the fees charged and whether the shares were underpriced or not in day 1 and 5 of trading for the whole sample (both the Main and AIM Markets 
together). I have divided the table into 4 panels based on total proceeds. In panel A of this table, I have shown all the IPOs from our sample. Panel B shows IPOs with a proceed between £16.7M - £66.7M, 
Panel C shows IPOs with a proceed between £66.7M - £333.4M and Panel D shows the IPOs with a proceed larger than £333.4M. At the bottom of each panel, I have excluded the period 1999-2000 to 
eliminate the effect of the .com bubble. This table also shows the mean of the multi-bookrunner. It is the arithmetic mean of the number of the bookrunners for the IPOs during the mentioned period. The 
spread is the cost charged by the underwriters as a percentage of the gross proceeds. The spread is shown as mean and median in this table. The table also shows the median of the absolute amount of the 
proceeds in millions. The table shows the underpricing factor for Day 1 and Day 5 of trading as mean and median (D1 Return, D5 Return prospectively). The underpricing factor is calculated as the return 
on trading. If IPO was underpriced, the underpricing factor is positive, if it was overpriced, the underpricing factor is negative, and if fair price, the underpricing factor is 0.  
 
Since underpricing is an indirect cost of IPO, I also compute the underpricing 
by following Abrahamson et al., (2011). In particular, I have calculated the overpricing 
and underpricing of the shares’ issue price using the return of both the first and the 
fifth trading days. This factor is simply the return of a share having been purchased at 
the IPO and sold at the closing price of the (first/fifth) trading day. When I look at the 
whole sample in Table 4.3, I can see that the mean return for the first trading day 
ranges between -7.16% and 32.60%, with an average of 16.36% for the whole sample. 
However, median ranges between 0.00% and 11.54%, with an average median of 
7.95%. Underpricing based on day 5 even shows a higher level of underpricing. I 
notice that the mean return for the fifth trading day ranges between -2.36% and 
122.97%, with an average of 50.35% for the whole sample. However, median ranges 
between 3.65% and 11.67%, with an overall median of 9.09%. 
 The average spread charged for the whole market for the whole sample 
and then for the medium, large and very large subsets are 6.05%, 4.48%, 3.85%, and 
3.31%, respectively. When looking at Table 4.4 for the Main market, I find that the 
average spread charged for the in the same order above are 4.04%, 4.37%, 3.87% and 
3.31%. Finally, from Table 4.5 for AIM market the average spread for the different 
subsets are 6.47%, 4.55%, 3.81% while there were no IPO in our sample with proceeds 
that exceed 333.4M in the AIM market. This explains how the average spread for both 
the whole sample and the Main market sample with proceeds more than 333.4M are 
the same. In comparison to the paper by Abrahamson et al., (2011), for the European 
markets, they reported 3.43% while I reported 4.04% for the Main market. The Main 
market shows to be closer those results and more in line than the AIM market results 
of 6.47% or even for the whole sample of 6.05% as it is affected by the high number 
of IPOs in the AIM market. They have reported in their paper the following spreads: 
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4.22%, 3.76%, and 2.60% for the ranges ($25Million - $100 Million, $100 Million - 
$500 Million and over $500 Million). These results are comparable to the results I got 
from the Main market which are 4.37%, 3.87% and 3.31% respectively. So, in other 
words, the larger the size of the IPO the lower the gross spread becomes. This provides 
an early indication of the economies of scale hypotheses that I propose in the 
Hypotheses section. 
The table shows that the level of underpricing was much lower following the 
financial crisis in 2008. When I look at the median, the lowest values are recorded in 
the year 2009 onwards with a value of 3.50% in the year 2009 and 0.00% in the 
following three years. The effect is even more explicit when looking at the mean. 
Although that for the year 2010 the average return was 12.20%, the average return for 
the following two years shows a loss of 7.16% and 1.85% consecutively. Yet, spread 
charged seems to be increasing during those years. I have come to the same conclusion 
when I look at Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. This also could be attributed to the low number 
of IPOs during the last years in comparison to the years before the financial crisis. The 
mean of the underpricing factor for both the first, the fifth trading days, and the median 
of the fifth trading day show that for the AIM market, there is a higher tendency to 
underprice the shares which result in higher returns. The mean of the underpricing 
factor shows more tendency to overprice if I look at the first trading day. This tendency 
seems to ease where it comes closer to the fair price as I approach the fifth trading day. 
 The positive relationship between the underpricing and spread charged can 
also be noticed in the paper by Abrahamson et al., 2011. Looking at the European 
markets, I can see that for the years 1999 and 2000, average return jumped from 8.0% 
in the year 1998 to 11.4% and 11.8%. The spread charged also increased on average 
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from 3.98% in the year 1998 to 4.09% and 4.24% in the following two years. On the 
other hand, this is not noticed on the US market as the spread charged seems to be 
unchanged.
Table 4.4: IPOs Proceeds and spread charged by the Underwriters for Main Market 
Panel A: Main Market 
Year Count 
Mean of 
multi-
bookrunners 
Spread (Mean) 
% 
Spread (Median) 
% 
Proceeds 
(Millions) 
(Median) 
D1 Return 
(Mean) % 
D1 Return 
(Median) % 
D5 Return 
(Mean) % 
D5 Return 
(Median) % 
1999 11 1.27 3.73 3.75 24.65 21.32 18.23 120.38 14.72 
2000 52 1.06 4.11 4.00 38.22 22.82 9.33 28.30 5.85 
2001 6 1.00 4.30 4.56 32.49 10.06 7.96 13.39 13.45 
2002 9 1.22 4.06 4.39 29.19 1.45 8.19 -12.17 3.33 
2003 4 1.50 3.71 4.13 209.91 4.20 0.26 6.70 5.25 
2004 15 1.40 4.15 4.25 63.10 0.12 5.00 -2.25 4.93 
2005 15 1.53 3.79 3.75 114.47 59.21 7.67 -0.63 2.50 
2006 14 1.86 4.02 3.99 149.71 13.51 13.01 13.66 13.01 
2007 18 1.39 4.02 3.65 80.45 9.78 4.58 0.55 3.04 
2008 2 1.00 6.25 6.25 470.24 -12.17 -12.17 -12.17 -12.17 
2009 1 2.00 4.00 4.00 55.82 0.00 0.00 11.11 11.11 
2010 10 1.90 3.16 2.88 197.86 1.78 0.00 8.24 13.52 
2011 5 4.20 2.98 2.23 342.54 -22.75 0.00 -23.36 -0.94 
2012 4 2.25 6.95 4.00 139.93 0.24 0.00 3.10 3.04 
All Years 166 1.45 4.04 4.00 73.15 15.95 6.52 17.57 5.09 
All years Ex. 1999 - 2000 103 1.66 4.04 3.78 109.55 11.90 5.13 1.17 4.93 
              
Panel B: 16.7 < Proceeds < 66.7        
All Years 67 1.09 4.37 4.50 31.02 35.60 10.50 16.90 10.00 
All years Ex. 1999 - 2000 35 1.14 4.60 4.50 41.59 31.67 9.52 2.63 11.11 
              
Panel C: 66.7 < Proceeds < 333.4        
All Years 63 1.65 3.87 3.75 139.63 -0.47 2.55 -4.84 2.50 
All years Ex. 1999 - 2000 44 1.84 3.94 3.57 152.31 2.35 2.43 1.42 3.46 
              
Panel D: Proceeds > 
333.4           
All Years 22 2.18 3.31 3.00 643.65 -1.19 0.97 44.48 0.45 
All years Ex. 1999 - 2000 18 2.39 3.25 2.73 612.64 -3.86 0.15 -6.37 -0.47 
This table shows a summary of the IPOs proceeds and the fees charged and whether the shares were overpriced or underpriced in day 1 and 5 of trading as a total for the Main Market. I have divided the 
table into 4 panels based on total proceeds. In panel A of this table, I  have shown all the IPOs from our sample. Panel B shows IPOs with a proceed between £16.7M - £66.7M, Panel C shows IPOs with 
a proceed between £66.7M - £333.4M and Panel D shows the IPOs with a proceed larger than £333.4M. At the bottom of each panel, I have excluded the period 1999-2000 to eliminate the effect of the 
.com bubble. This table also shows the mean of the multi-bookrunner. It is the arithmetic mean of the number of the bookrunners for the IPOs during the mentioned period. The spread is the cost charged 
by the underwriters as a percentage of the gross proceeds. The spread is shown as mean and median in this table. The table also shows the median of the absolute amount of the proceeds in millions. The 
table shows the underpricing factor for Day 1 and Day 5 of trading as mean and median (D1 Return, D5 Return prospectively). The underpricing factor is calculated as the return on trading day. If IPO 
was underpriced, the underpricing factor is positive, if it was overpriced, the underpricing factor is negative, and if fair price, the underpricing factor is 0. 
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Table 4.5: IPOs Proceeds and spread charged by the Underwriters for AIM Market 
Panel A 
Year Count 
Mean of 
multi-
bookrunners 
Spread (Mean) 
% 
Spread (Median) 
% 
Proceeds 
(Millions) 
(Median) 
D1 Return 
(Mean) % 
D1 Return 
(Median) % 
D5 Return 
(Mean) % 
D5 Return 
(Median) % 
1999 24 1.04 4.71 4.16 2.34 26.87 4.77 36.16 6.53 
2000 80 1.00 4.39 4.00 3.88 38.96 12.02 121.08 17.30 
2001 46 1.00 6.70 5.54 2.10 27.37 8.21 18.08 7.76 
2002 30 1.00 7.02 7.04 1.86 3.48 6.18 0.58 6.42 
2003 30 1.00 9.53 6.57 1.57 15.45 6.68 17.42 9.16 
2004 122 1.02 6.67 5.19 3.40 20.14 9.95 138.36 10.53 
2005 166 1.02 6.51 5.30 4.07 27.50 12.63 77.55 12.89 
2006 117 1.05 6.82 5.40 4.82 15.28 9.38 50.03 10.16 
2007 81 1.06 6.08 5.00 5.65 10.10 8.75 13.39 7.61 
2008 16 1.19 5.64 4.78 12.17 12.66 8.01 22.65 7.88 
2009 8 1.13 5.55 3.76 47.29 8.43 3.63 58.30 8.50 
2010 27 1.22 5.67 5.30 20.48 16.06 0.00 23.76 8.06 
2011 33 1.09 7.83 7.50 3.26 -4.80 0.00 13.32 8.16 
2012 26 1.08 8.28 6.77 6.93 -2.17 0.00 16.99 9.65 
All Years 806 1.04 6.47 5.08 3.93 19.49 8.48 63.24 10.00 
All years Ex. 1999 - 2000 702 1.04 6.77 5.36 4.07 17.01 8.33 57.57 9.68 
              
Panel B: 16.7 < Proceeds < 66.7        
All Years 101 1.11 4.55 4.31 30.44 5.10 5.63 -0.59 6.98 
All years Ex. 1999 - 2000 96 1.11 4.62 4.35 30.44 4.30 5.52 -1.57 6.65 
              
Panel C: 66.7 < Proceeds < 333.4        
All Years 33 1.21 3.81 4.00 101.88 -0.65 4.00 -10.58 3.00 
All years Ex. 1999 - 2000 33 1.21 3.81 4.00 101.88 -0.65 4.00 -10.58 3.00 
              
Panel D: Proceeds > 
333.4           
All Years 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
All years Ex. 1999 - 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
This table shows a summary of the IPOs proceeds and the fees charged and whether the shares were overpriced or underpriced in day 1 and 5 of trading as a total for the AIM Market. I have divided the 
table into 4 panels based on total proceeds. In panel A of this table, I have shown all the IPOs from our sample. Panel B shows IPOs with a proceed between £16.7M - £66.7M, Panel C shows IPOs with 
a proceed between £66.7M - £333.4M and Panel D shows that there are no IPOs with a proceed larger than £333.4M. At the bottom of each panel, I have excluded the period 1999-2000 to eliminate the 
effect of the .com bubble. This table also shows the mean of the multi-bookrunner. It is the arithmetic mean of the number of the bookrunners for the IPOs during the mentioned period. The spread is the 
cost charged by the underwriters as a percentage of the gross proceeds. The spread is shown as mean and median in this table. The table also shows the median of the absolute amount of the proceeds in 
millions. The table shows the underpricing factor for Day 1 and Day 5 of trading as mean and median (D1 Return, D5 Return prospectively). The underpricing factor is calculated as the return on trading 
day. If IPO was underpriced, the underpricing factor is positive, if it was overpriced, the underpricing factor is negative, and if fair price, the underpricing factor is 0. 
 
4.13.1.2 Bookrunners statistics 
In our sample, I have identified 150 bookrunners. I have classified 35 of them as 
Prestigious while the remaining 115 bookrunners are identified as Non-Prestigious. I 
have followed Derrien and Kecskes, 2007 in identifying the prestigious bookrunners. 
I have identified the global investment firms as prestigious in case if the bookrunners 
status is not obvious, Iconsult the Thomson’s Extel Survey. For my sample, I have 
noticed that although the prestigious bookrunners make up only 23% of the total list 
of the bookrunners, they underwrote more than 43% of the IPOs in our sample. 
Moreover, the prestigious bookrunners were dominant in the Main market where they 
were present in more than 88% of the IPOs. In the AIM market, however, they were 
overtaken by the non-prestigious where the prestigious made only about 39% of the 
IPOs. 
Table 4.6, Panel A shows the top 10 prestigious bookrunners ranked on the 
number of IPOs undertaken during the sample period. In this list, I can see that most 
of the companies have undertaken more IPOs in the AIM market compared to IPOs 
undertaken in the Main market. This bias towards the AIM market can be explained 
by the fact that the IPOs from the AIM market make about 83% of the whole sample. 
This is the case for seven of the top ten bookrunners except for Merrill Lynch and 
Credit Suisse that have undertaken more IPOs in the Main market. Investec Bank 
seems to have almost divided the number of IPOs between the two markets. However, 
the bookrunners that have undertaken more of the Main market IPO show higher 
average fees in the Alternative Investment market. This is obvious as this is due to the 
higher IPO proceeds in the Main market than the AIM market. 
 
Table 4.6: Top 10 Prestigious bookrunners ranking 
N Bookrunner  
Tota
l 
IPO
s 
Mai
n 
IPO
s 
AIM 
IPOs 
Total Average 
Fees (Million) 
Main Average 
Fees (Million) 
AIM 
Average 
Fees (M) 
Total 
Average 
Proceeds 
(Million) 
Main 
Average 
Proceeds 
(Million) 
AIM 
Average 
Proceeds 
(Million) 
Total 
Average 
Spread 
% 
Average 
Spread 
Main % 
Average 
Spread 
AIM % 
Panel A: Underwriters ranking based on number of IPOs 
1 
KBC PEEL HUNT LTD 
(UK) Limited 54 4 50 455.77 1,081.53 405.71 12.61 28.64 11.33 5.05 4.23 5.05 
2 Seymour Pierce Limited 49 1 48 429.72 3,057.99 374.96 9.51 116.36 7.29 2.66 7.14 2.66 
3 Collins Stewart 40 7 33 925.62 1,287.55 848.85 20.52 30.35 18.44 4.15 6.16 4.15 
4 Evolution Securities Limited 36 7 29 766.05 1,269.38 644.56 17.32 29.33 14.43 3.80 5.65 3.80 
5 WH Ireland Limited 34 0 34 200.59 
                            
-    200.59 2.96 -    2.96 0.00 10.14 0.00 
6 Brewin Dolphin 33 3 30 401.43 1,261.82 315.39 9.36 37.46 6.55 3.13 7.10 3.13 
7 Numis Securities Limited 28 0 28 1,428.85 
                            
-    1,428.85 33.37 -    33.37 0.00 5.46 0.00 
8 BofA Merrill Lynch 27 25 2 16,066.11 17,158.74 2,408.21 544.58 583.84 53.82 3.74 4.30 3.74 
9 Investec Bank plc 25 11 14 1,171.15 1,593.70 839.15 25.50 37.73 15.89 4.17 5.50 4.17 
1
0 Credit Suisse 24 23 1 11,578.49 11,958.85 2,830.30 463.47 480.38 74.48 3.77 3.80 3.77 
Panel B: Underwriters ranking based on number of Total Average Proceeds 
1 BNP PARIBAS 1 1 0 105389.943 105,389.94 - 6022.28 6022.28 - 1.75 1.75 0.00 
2 Société Générale 1 1 0 105389.943 105,389.94 - 6022.28 6022.28 - 1.75 1.75 0.00 
3 Barclays Capital 2 2 0 54688.4164 54,688.42 - 3110.81 3110.81 - 1.88 1.88 0.00 
4 BofA Merrill Lynch 27 25 2 16066.1117 17,158.74 2408.21138 544.58 583.84 53.82 3.78 3.74 4.30 
5 
MORGAN STANLEY and 
CO. INTERNATIONAL 
PLC 
18 15 3 15278.085 16997.6026 6680.49704 595.12 676.15 189.98 3.87 3.88 3.83 
6 Citi 15 13 2 14649.5905 15,876.86 6672.308 640.78 714.55 161.33 3.42 3.33 4.00 
7 Credit Suisse 24 23 1 11,578.49 11958.8495 2,830.30 463.47 480.38 74.48 3.78 3.77 3.80 
8 UBS Investment Bank 22 20 2 10,222.43 10,938.08 3,066.00 433.70 466.99 100.83 3.89 3.98 2.95 
9 J.P. Morgan Cazenove 20 16 4 9,726.64 11,239.26 3676.18115 235.74 273.37 85.25 3.95 3.62 5.28 
1
0 Goldman Sachs International 19 19 0 9,440.48 9,440.48 - 259.45 259.45 - 3.91 3.91 0.00 
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Panel C: Underwriters ranking based on number of Total Average Proceeds with more than 5 IPOs 
1 BofA Merrill Lynch 27 25 2 16066.1117 17,158.74 2408.21138 544.58 583.84 53.82 3.78 3.74 4.30 
2 
MORGAN STANLEY and 
CO. INTERNATIONAL 
PLC 
18 15 3 15278.085 16,997.60 6680.49704 595.12 676.15 189.98 3.87 3.88 3.83 
3 Citi 15 13 2 14649.5905 15,876.86 6672.308 640.78 714.55 161.33 3.42 3.33 4.00 
4 Credit Suisse 24 23 1 11578.4935 11,958.85 2830.30488 463.47 480.38 74.48 3.78 3.77 3.80 
5 UBS Investment Bank 22 20 2 10222.4345 10938.0776 3066.00336 433.70 466.99 100.83 3.89 3.98 2.95 
6 J.P. Morgan Cazenove 20 16 4 9726.64388 11,239.26 3676.18115 235.74 273.37 85.25 3.95 3.62 5.28 
7 Goldman Sachs International 19 19 0 9,440.48 9440.47852 - 259.45 259.45 - 3.91 3.91 0.00 
8 Deutsche Bank 14 9 5 7,610.31 8,710.65 5,629.69 203.82 237.92 142.44 4.62 4.74 4.40 
9 HSBC 9 7 2 4,179.90 3,409.87 6874.99748 168.10 169.99 161.48 4.13 3.39 6.73 
1
0 Cazenove and Co. Ltd 10 8 2 3,422.67 4,109.75 674.34 89.18 104.75 26.93 4.04 4.32 2.92 
This table shows the top prestigious bookrunners. Panel A ranks the bookrunners based on the number of IPOs. Panel B ranks them based on the total average proceeds. Panel C ranks them based on the 
number of IPOs but excluding bookrunners who have undertaken less than 5 IPOs to overcome the bookrunners who only participated in the Mega IPOS. The table shows The total IPOs. Average Fees 
charges, Average proceeds for the IPOs and the average spread charged by the bookrunners as a percentage of the total proceeds for the whole sample, then for the Main and AIM markets. 
 
 
In Table 4.6, Panel B, the bookrunners are ranked based on the total average 
proceeds. Table 4.6, Panel B shows more bookrunners undertaking IPOs in the main 
market. At the top 3, I can see bookrunners that have been present only once in our 
sample such as BNP PARIBAS and Société Générale or only twice like Barclays 
Capital. For the first two, they were both in the huge Glencore Intl plc IPO with 
proceeds of £6bn. However, they were part of 8 bookrunners who shared the £105M. 
Yet, as I am ranking based on the average fees, they showed at the top. To overcome 
this issue, Table 4.6, Panel C shows the top ten bookrunners that have undertaken five 
or more IPOs during the sampling period. This table shows all the bookrunners that 
have undertaken IPOs in both the Main and the AIM markets except for Goldman 
Sachs International that has only undertaken Main market IPOs based on our sample. 
Thus, most of the IPOs undertaken by the bookrunners in this list are from the Main 
market. 
Table 4.7, Panel A shows the top non-prestigious bookrunners ranked on the 
number of IPOs. Among the top ten bookrunners, I can see that all of them have 
undertaken IPOs from the AIM market. However, the table shows that only three of 
them have also undertaken IPOs from the Main market. Nevertheless, those three 
companies have only taken one, two, and four IPOs from the Main market. Moreover, 
the average proceeds of those IPOs ranged between £14m and £39m. 
In Table 4.7, Panel B, I have ranked the non-prestigious bookrunners on the 
total average fees. This resulted in showing some bookrunners that have less 
frequently appeared in our sample. Eight bookrunners out of the top ten have 
undertaken IPOs from the Main market while only six have undertaken IPOs from 
AIM market. Again, I am faced with the same problem of showing bookrunners with 
only a few lucrative IPOs. 
Table 4.7: Top 10 Non-Prestigious bookrunners ranking 
N Bookrunner  
Tota
l 
IPO
s 
Mai
n 
IPO
s 
AIM 
IPOs 
Total Average 
Fees (Million) 
Main Average 
Fees (Million) 
AIM 
Average 
Fees 
(Million) 
Total 
Average 
Proceeds 
(Million) 
Main 
Average 
Proceeds 
(Million) 
AIM 
Average 
Proceeds 
(Million) 
Total 
Average 
Spread 
% 
Average 
Spread 
Main % 
Average 
Spread 
AIM % 
Panel A: Underwriters ranking based on number of IPOs 
1 
Teather and Greenwood 
Limited 26 0 26 295.03 - 295.03 7.19 - 7.19 5.67 0.00 5.67 
2 Charles Stanley Securities 23 0 23 269.86 - 269.86 4.40 - 4.40 6.49 0.00 6.49 
3 
Daniel Stewart and 
Company plc 19 0 19 216.02 - 216.02 3.28 - 3.28 7.63 0.00 7.63 
4 William de Broe Plc 18 4 14 385.27 574.21 331.28 7.84 14.18 6.02 5.45 4.09 5.83 
5 Cenkos Securities plc 17 0 17 1474.78 - 1474.78 31.00 - 31.00 6.42 0.00 6.42 
6 Arbuthnot Securities Limited 16 1 15 406.94 1,372.29 342.58 7.83 28.49 6.45 6.05 4.82 6.13 
7 
Hichens, Harrison and Co. 
plc 16 0 16 121.36 - 121.36 2.14 - 2.14 7.25 0.00 7.25 
8 Noble and Company Limited 15 0 15 319.93 - 319.93 4.93 - 4.93 7.91 0.00 7.91 
9 J M Finn and Co  15 0 15 174.61 - 174.61 2.84 - 2.84 7.40 0.00 7.40 
1
0 Panmure Gordon and Co 14 2 12 968.22 2,231.79 757.63 21.64 39.50 18.66 5.00 5.96 4.84 
Panel B: Underwriters ranking based on number of Total Average Proceeds 
1 
Schroder Salomon Smith 
Barney 1 1 0 17095.49 17,095.49 - 569.85 569.85 - 3.00 3.00 0.00 
2 Lazard and Co. Limited 3 3 0 14201.32 14,201.32 - 452.49 452.49 - 3.67 3.67 0.00 
3 Bear Stearns 1 0 1 12309.27  12309.27 307.73 - 307.73 4.00 0.00 4.00 
4 Warburg Dillon Read 1 1 0 4414.30 4,414.30 - 98.10 98.10 - 4.50 4.50 0.00 
5 
Renaissance Securities 
(Cyprus) Limited 6 2 4 4023.05 7884.23 2092.46 112.12 252.7 41.82 4.56 3.61 5.03 
6 Pathfinder Prospectus 1 1 0 3575.12 3,575.12 - 102.15 102.15 - 3.50 3.50 0.00 
7 Fairfax I.S. PLC 6 1 5 3,332.84 4539.76 3,091.45 73.38 108.17 66.42 4.69 4.20 4.79 
8 RBC Capital Markets 2 1 1 2,776.49 5,134.09 418.90 116.88 228.18 5.59 4.88 2.25 7.50 
9 Mirabaud Securities LLP 10 1 9 2,723.40 8,143.31 2121.19 46.57 162.87 33.65 5.94 5.00 6.05 
1
0 
FOX-PITT, KELTON 
LIMITED 1 0 1 2,161.95 - 2,161.95 259.45 259.45 - 3.91 3.91 0.00 
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Panel C: Underwriters ranking based on number of Total Average Proceeds with more than 5 IPOs 
1 
Renaissance Securities 
(Cyprus) Limited 6 2 4 4,023.05  7,884.23  2,092.46  112.12  252.70  41.82  4.56 3.61 5.03 
2 Fairfax I.S. PLC 6 1 5 3,332.84  4,539.76  3,091.45  73.38  108.17  66.42  4.69 4.20 4.79 
3 Mirabaud Securities LLP 10 1 9 2,723.40  8,143.31  2,121.19  46.57  162.87  33.65  5.94 5.00 6.05 
4 
ORIEL SECURITIES 
LIMITED 9 1 8 2,101.67  5,701.73  1,651.67  54.25  162.91  40.67  4.51 3.50 4.64 
5 Canaccord Genuity Limited 6 0 6 1,892.49   -  1,892.49  34.75   -  34.75  5.88 0.00 5.88 
6 Liberum Capital Limited 8 0 8 1,736.26   -  1,736.26  41.16   -  41.16  4.88 0.00 4.88 
7 Cenkos Securities plc 17 0 17 1,474.78   -  1,474.78  31.00   -  31.00  6.42 0.00 6.42 
8 Altium Capital Limited 10 2 8 1,163.59  1,875.95  985.50  29.73  50.52  24.53  4.13 3.63 4.25 
9 Panmure Gordon and Co 14 2 12 968.22  2,231.79  757.63  21.64  39.50  18.66  5.00 5.96 4.84 
1
0 Fox-Davies Capital Limited 6 0 6 807.52   -  807.52  13.60   -  13.60  7.26 0.00 7.26 
This table shows the top Non-prestigious bookrunners. Panel A ranks the bookrunners based on the number of IPOs. Panel B ranks them based on the total average proceeds. Panel C ranks them based 
on the number of IPOs but excluding bookrunners who have undertaken less than 5 IPOs to overcome the bookrunners who only participated in the Mega IPOS. The table shows The total IPOs. Average 
Fees charges, Average proceeds for the IPOs and the average spread charged by the bookrunners as a percentage of the total proceeds for the whole sample, then for the Main and AIM markets. 
 
To overcome this issue as I did with the prestigious bookrunners, in Table 4.7, Panel 
C, I have regenerated this table showing bookrunners that have at least undertaken five 
IPOs. For both tables, I  can notice that they are dominated by IPOs from the AIM 
market. It shows some bookrunners undertaking one or two IPOs from the Main 
market. 
4.13.1.3 Spread Clustering 
(Abrahamson, et al., 2011) argued in their paper that underwriters in the US market 
show an average fee of about 7% of the proceeds while the underwriters in the 
European markets, in contrast, tend to charge less. In Table 4.8, Panel A I have shown 
the percentage of IPOs were bookrunners charge 7% in comparison to those who 
charge differently in both the Main and AIM markets. The table shows that the 
percentage of underwriters who are charging fees of 7% varies across the years by 
only 4.22% over the whole sample. This result is driven by the IPOs that joined the 
AIM. Only one IPO in the Main market charged around 7%, while 40 IPOs in the AIM 
charged around 7%. These results also highlight the fact that underwriters in the AIM 
charge more than in the Main market. See Table 4.8. 
The information is also presented in Figure 1 showing the number of 
bookrunners who are charging 7% compared to those who are charging differently in 
both the Main and AIM markets.   
 Table 4.8: Number of IPOs charging about 7% and 5% of the net proceeds 
Year Total IPO 
Total 
AIM Total Main 
Total 
different 
from 7% 
Total 
about 7% 
AIM 
about 
7% 
Main 
about 7% 
Percentage of IPOs 
charging about 7% 
Panel A: Number of IPOs charging about 7% of the net proceeds (Between 6.7 and 7.3) 
1999 35 24 11 33 2 2 0 5.71 
2000 132 80 52 130 2 2 0 1.52 
2001 52 46 6 50 2 2 0 3.85 
2002 39 30 9 36 3 3 0 7.69 
2003 34 30 4 32 2 2 0 5.88 
2004 137 122 15 130 7 7 0 5.11 
2005 181 166 15 172 9 9 0 4.97 
2006 131 117 14 129 2 2 0 1.53 
2007 99 81 18 97 2 2 0 2.02 
2008 18 16 2 18 0 0 0 0.00 
2009 9 8 1 9 0 0 0 0.00 
2010 37 27 10 32 5 5 0 13.51 
2011 38 33 5 36 2 1 1 5.26 
2012 30 26 4 27 3 3 0 10.00 
All Years 972 806 166 931 41 40 1 4.22 
 
Panel B: Number of IPOs charging about 5% of the net proceeds (Between 4.7 and 5.3) 
1999 35 24 11 31 4 2 2 11.43 
2000 132 80 52 114 18 5 13 13.64 
2001 52 46 6 45 7 4 3 13.46 
2002 39 30 9 36 3 0 3 7.69 
2003 34 30 4 33 1 1 0 2.94 
2004 137 122 15 113 24 19 5 17.52 
2005 181 166 15 155 26 23 3 14.36 
2006 131 117 14 110 21 17 4 16.03 
2007 99 81 18 80 19 18 1 19.19 
2008 18 16 2 15 3 2 1 16.67 
2009 9 8 1 8 1 1 0 11.11 
2010 37 27 10 27 10 9 1 27.03 
2011 38 33 5 30 8 8 0 21.05 
2012 30 26 4 26 4 3 1 13.33 
All Years 972 806 166 823 149 112 37 15.33 
This table has 2 panels. Panel A shows the number of IPOs per year and for each market. Then it shows how many of these IPOs have a spread 
of 7% and the percentage of underwriters charging 7% Panel B shows the number of IPOs per year and for each market. Then it shows how 
many of these IPOs have a spread of 5% as this is the median of our sample. Then it shows the percentage of underwriters charging 5%. 
 Figure 4.1: Showing number of IPOs charging about 7% of the net proceeds (Between 
6.7 and 7.3) 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Showing number of IPOs charging about 5% of the net proceeds (Between 
4.7 and 5.3) 
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As our sample showed that the median of the fees charged by the underwriter 
is 5%, I have reproduced the above table and figure for the fees of 5%. Table 4.8, Panel 
B shows the percentage of IPOs where the underwriters charged 5%. As you can see 
from the table, for most of the years except for 2002 and 2003, the IPOs with 5% fees 
charged are more than 10%. This percentage seems to be increasing over the years as 
it reached about 27% of the IPOs of 2010 it also makes about 15.33% of the whole 
sample compared to 4.22 of underwriters charging 7%.  Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 
show the same information in a bar chart. 
This goes in line with the findings reported in the paper by (Abrahamson, et 
al., 2011) where they have reported that there is a concentration of a spread of 7% for 
the IPOs conducted in the US market. Yet, no such concentration is present in the 
European market. 
Figure 4.3 shows that the charged fees have a downgrading slope as the value 
of the proceeds increase with most of the values at 5% or less. This is shown more 
clearly when I take the log of the proceeds as shown in Figure 4.4. As I took the log 
of the IPO proceeds in millions, and since there are a number of IPOs with proceeds 
less than £10 million, part of the values is shown in the negative part of the chart. I 
noticed that the value of the charged percentage is scattered over for Log (proceeds 
£M) that are less than 0.5. As I move along the X-axis towards Log (proceeds £M) of 
1.5 the charged fees drop down to around 5%. For the area that comes after that, I can 
see that the charged fees drop even more to below 5%. These give support for the 
economies of scale hypothesis. 
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Figure 4.3: Curve Model showing the relation between Proceeds and the Spread 
 
Figure 4.4: Spread percentage to proceeds (All Sample) 
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To further investigate these findings with the whole sample, I have generated 
the same figures for Main and AIM market. The same findings can be noticed in the 
Main and AIM markets. Figure 4.5 shows the scattering of spread charged versus 
proceeds in £Millions. Figure 4.6 for the Main market shows the same information but 
versus Log (proceeds £M). I notice that the spread is highly scattered at the lower 
values of log (proceeds £M) and then it starts sloping downwards until it reaches about 
5% at log (proceeds £M) of 50. Then spread is slightly ranging below 5%. 
 
Figure 4.5: Spread percentage to log proceeds (All Sample) 
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Figure 4.6: Spread percentage to proceeds (Main Market) 
Figure 4.7 shows the information for AIM market with proceeds in £Millions. 
Figure 4.8 shows it in correspondence to log (proceeds £M). From this figure, dis-
economies of scale are also prevalent here as the downward slope indicate a decrease 
of the spread charged as the proceed increases. I noticed that there a convergence 
towards 5% as the value of log (proceeds £M) increases. What is noticeable here is 
that the higher fees charged in the AIM are driven by the very small IPOs which raised 
money in the AIM 
To a certain extent, these findings agree with the findings reported by 
Abrahamson et al., 2011. In their paper, they reported a clustering of the spread at 7% 
at the US market where no such clustering is present in European markets. From our 
sample, I have noticed that the spread scatter widely for the smaller IPOs, and then the 
spread charged start to converge towards 5% and falls below it in larger IPOs. Hence, 
I conclude that there is no clustering of fees for the UK IPOs as Abrahamson et al. 
(2011) shows no clustering for European IPOs. 
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Figure 4.7: Spread percentage to log proceeds (Main Market) 
 
Figure 4.8: Spread percentage to proceeds (AIM Market) 
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4.14 Empirical Results 
4.14.1.1 Correlation analysis and Univariate regressions 
To examine whether there is any correlation among the variables, first, I conducted a 
correlation matrix and then I ran a series of univariate regressions. Table 4.9 presents 
the results of correlation analysis. It shows that there a high significance correlation 
between the spread and log of proceeds, market dummy, multi-bookrunners dummy, 
the number of bookrunners, prestigious underwriters and the log of the lockup period. 
Moreover, there is significant yet less than the aforementioned variables with the age 
of the company on the day of the IPO. I noticed the log(proceeds) has a correlation 
with the same variables as the spread. In addition to them, the table also shows a 
correlation with high significance between log(proceeds) and both the age of the 
company at the day of the IPO and log(Lockup).  By looking at the first column, it 
shows that the log of proceeds is negative -0.499 and it is statistically significant. It 
means that higher the proceeds, the lower the spread. The market dummy is positively 
correlated with the spread, and the coefficient is 0.2425. Multi-bookrunner, the 
number of bookrunners, prestigious and age are negatively correlated, and 
idiosyncratic risk, return volatility, lockup length are positively correlated with the 
spread. Potential growth and underpricing are positively correlated, but the coefficient 
is very small. Another aspect of the correlation matrix is that it detects any problem of 
multicollinearity in the models. For example, multi-bookrunner and number of 
bookrunners are highly positively correlated, as expected, at 0.8189. This implies that 
I cannot include both of these variables (multi-bookrunners and number of 
bookrunners) in the same regression model; otherwise, it will create the problem of 
multicollinearity. 
  
Table 4.9: Correlation Table 
Variables Spread Log 
Proceeds 
Market 
Dummy 
Multi-
bookrunner 
Number of 
bookrunners 
Prestigious Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
Return 
Volatility 
Age at 
IPO in 
Days 
Potential 
Growth 
Log 
Lockup 
period 
Underpricing 
Spread 1            
Log Proceeds -0.5*** 1           
Market Dummy 0.243*** -0.603*** 1          
Multi-
bookrunner 
-
0.119*** 
0.397*** -0.333*** 1         
Number of 
bookrunners 
-
0.127*** 
0.387*** -0.331*** 0.819*** 1        
Prestigious -0.12*** 0.37*** -0.37*** 0.171*** 0.168*** 1       
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
0.02 -0.004 0.015 -0.01 -0.009 -0.031 1      
Return 
Volatility 
0.028 -0.206*** 0.039 -0.052 -0.05 -0.042 -0.006 1     
Age at IPO in 
Days 
-0.072* 0.149*** -0.161*** 0.064* 0.048 0.062 -0.063* -0.063* 1    
Potential 
Growth 
0.006 0.016 -0.04 0.022 0.023 0.035 -0.023 -0.008 0.009 1   
Log Lockup 
period 
0.109*** -0.221*** 0.249*** -0.283*** -0.236*** -0.115*** -0.001 -0.026 -0.071* -0.05 1  
Underpricing 0.008 -0.172*** 0.021 -0.102*** -0.091*** -0.052 -0.062* 0.261*** -0.057 0.012 -0.003 1 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table shows the correlation between the variables I am testing in this chapter. The spread is the amount charged by the underwriter as a percentage of the IPO proceeds. Log proceeds are the log of 
the proceeds raised from the IPO. The Market dummy takes a value of 0 for the Main market and 1 for the AIM market. Multi-bookrunner is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has more than 1 
bookrunner and 0 if only one bookrunner. The number of bookrunners is the actual number of bookrunners in each IPO. Prestigious is a dummy with a value of 1 if the underwriter is prestigious and 0 if 
it is not. Idiosyncratic risk shows the firm specific risk. The return volatility is the standard deviation of the share return from the IPO date for a year. The Age at IPO shows the age of the company at the 
day of the IPO and is calculated in days. Potential growth is a factor showing if the company increased the size of its capital at the years following the IPO. Log lockup period where the lockup period is 
measured in days. 
 
To examine the effect of the different variables on the spread, I have run a 
univariate regression for all the variables with the spread. I have run the regression 
using the whole sample, then for each market separately. A summary of the univariate 
regression is shown in Table 4.10. 
In Table 4.10 I showed the univariate analysis for the whole sample in column 
A. Then I showed it for the Main market in column B and finally for AIM market in 
column C. I noticed that the log proceeds variable is negatively related to the spread 
charged and showing the highest significance when looking at the whole sample in 
column A and the AIM market in column C. They both show a negative coefficient. 
The variable that comes next in terms of significance when looking at the whole 
sample is the market dummy. It has a positive relationship with the spread. Looking 
at column C, the second variable in terms of significance is lockup period. The 
coefficient shows a positive relation with the spread. This means that the longer the 
lookup period, the more the cost charged. 
Some of the variables showed insignificance across all three panels. Those are 
Age of the company, idiosyncratic risk, Return Volatility, Day 1 and Day 5 returns 
and potential growth. The univariate analysis of AIM market in panel C shows more 
significance than the Main market which means that the main market is less sensitive 
to those variables compared to the growing AIM market.
 Table 4.10: Univariate OLS Regression with Spread 
 A: Whole sample  B: Main Market  C: AIM Market 
Independent 
Variable 
Coefficient 
 (t Statistic) 
Adjusted ࡾ૛  Coefficient 
 (t Statistic) 
Adjusted ࡾ૛  Coefficient 
 (t Statistic) 
Adjusted ࡾ૛ 
Log (Proceeds 
MCPI Adjusted 
-2.386*** 
(-17.92) 
0.2486  -0.582** 
(-2.45) 
0.0302 
 
 -2.978*** 
(-15.76) 
0.2350 
Market (Main or 
AIM) 
-2.417*** 
(-7.77) 
0.0578 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Prestigious -0.893*** 
(-3.75) 
0.0134  0.134 
(0.32) 
-0.0056 
 
 -0.296 
(-1.05) 
0.0001 
Multi-
bookrunner 
-1.643*** 
(-3.72) 
0.0131  -0.606** 
(-2.02) 
0.0188 
 
 -0.583 
(-0.82) 
-0.0004 
Number of 
bookrunners 
-1.08*** 
(-3.97) 
0.0150  -0.402*** 
(-2.73) 
0.0384 
 
 -0.621 
(-0.92) 
-0.0002 
Rent-Seek 2.454*** 
(3.39) 
0.0107  1.095 
(1.5) 
0.0078 
 
 1.195 
(1.34) 
0.1802 
Age in Days 1E-4* 
(-1.92) 
0.0038  -8.06E-6 
(-0.28) 
-0.0071 
 
 -1.3E-4 
(-1.2) 
0.0008 
St. Deviation 3E-5 
(-0.52) 
-0.0008  -0.001 
(-0.9) 
-0.0012  -3.7E-5 
(-0.53) 
-0.0009 
Idiosyncratic 5E-5 
(-0.31) 
-0.0009  -0.002 
(-0.14) 
-0.0061  -6.6E-5 
(-0.42) 
-0.0010 
Day 1 Return -0.009 
(-0.17) 
-0.0010  -0.015 
(-0.13) 
-0.0060 
 
 -0.024 
(-0.41) 
-0.0012 
Day 5 Return 0.006 
(0.17) 
-0.0010  -0.02 
(-0.18) 
-0.0062  -0.006 
(-0.18) 
-0.0012 
Potential Growth 0.001 
(0.18) 
-0.0011  -0.007 
(-0.52) 
-0.0050 
 
 0.003 
(0.5) 
-0.0010 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table shows a summary of the univariate regression between the Spread charged by the underwriters in terms of a percentage of the proceeds and the above listed factors. The market factor is 
a dummy with 1 for Main market and 0 for AIM market. Prestigious is a dummy with 1 if a prestigious underwriter and 0 if a non-prestigious underwriter. Rent-seek is the log of lockup period in 
days. The STDev is the standard deviation of share price during the first year of trading. Idiosyncratic is calculated for the first year of trading. D5Return and D1Return are the return on the fifth 
and the first day of trading if purchased at the IPO. The potential growth is the Slope of the Market Capitalization of each company during the first 2 – 3 years of trading. Panel A, B and C shows 
the results for the whole sample, Main market and AIM market respectively. 
4.14.1.2 Multiple-regression model 
I now turn the attention to testing my hypotheses in a multivariate setting, where I test 
a number of hypotheses controlling for a number of factors. In this section, I will 
examine the relation between fees charged in terms of spread and a number of different 
variables. In the paper by Abrahamson et al., 2011, they used an OLS model to test 
the effect of a number of variables over the spread. The independent variables in their 
model are whether the company is from the high-tech sector, whether the company 
was backed by venture capitalists, whether privatisation was involved, whether the 
IPO involves multiple bookrunners, year dummies, and country dummies. In my 
study, I will use some of the variables used by Abrahamson et al., 2011 that apply to 
the market I am studying which are proceeds, Multi-bookrunners. Since UK market 
has two segments the Main market and the AIM, I use a market dummy (Main or AIM) 
instead of the country dummy and year dummy. In addition, I will control for the 
effects of the Prestigious Bookrunner, Number of bookrunners, and lockup period. I 
will run OLS regression for the following model: 
 
ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௜ =  ߙ +  ߚଵܮ݋݃ ܲݎ݋ܿ݁݁݀ݏ௜ + ߚଶܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ௜
+  ߚଷܯݑ݈ݐ݅ܤ݋݋݇ݎݑ݊݊݁ݎ௜ + ߚସܲݎ݁ݏݐ݅݃݅݋ݑݏ௜
+ ߚହܦ1 ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃௜ + ܴ݅ݏ݇௜
+ ߚ଺ܮ݋݃ܮ݋ܿ݇ݑ݌ܲ݁ݎ݅݋݀௜ + ቌ ෍ ߚ௝ܻ݁ܽݎ௝
ଶ଴ଵଶ
௝ୀଵଽଽଽ
ቍ + ߝ௜ 
(4.1) 
The first variable is the log of the proceeds. Besides being one of the variables 
used in previous studies, it is one of the main contributors to the spread charged, as it 
is the main goal for the bookrunners to maximise their return while minimising the 
risk. It shows the significance of the level of success anticipation by the investors. If 
the coefficient of log proceeds is negative, then, it means that there is a negative 
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relationship between the amount of proceed and the spread charged which will support 
the hypothesis of economies of scale. As I am comparing the Main market and AIM 
market, I have introduced the Market dummy where its value is 0 for the Main market 
and 1 for AIM market. I noticed earlier that the spread is higher in the AIM market 
compared to the Main market, I would expect the coefficient to have a positive relation 
with the spread which will support the economies of scale hypothesis too as the size 
of the proceeds is lower on the AIM market compared to the Main market. The level 
of confidence of the coefficient will be an indication of the difference in characteristics 
between both markets. Multi-bookrunners presence indicates that strong due diligence 
is in place. I have used a value of 1 when multi-bookrunners are present and 0 
otherwise. The coefficient is expected to be positive as to have multi-bookrunners will 
involve more coordination and hence more cost. The prestigious variable will indicate 
the level of the cost of hiring a prestigious underwriter if the coefficient is positive. If 
negative, then this will indicate the level of competition between the prestigious 
companies. The underpricing variable will indicate the costs of finding the fair value 
of the share. It is expected to be negative, as the lack of effort to get a fair price would 
lead to a lower spread.  
I have also examined the effect of rent-seeking on the spread in terms of the 
lockup period. I ran a regression between the log of the lockup period and the spread. 
This proved to have some significance with a correlation of 0.1085 and a Beta of 2.45. 
If the coefficient’s sign is negative, this would indicate rent-seeking either from the 
company. It could indicate that company is offering higher compensation to the 
underwriters to reduce the lockup period. On the other hand, it could indicate that the 
underwriter is incentivising the company with lower spread to accept longer lockup 
period and hence longer engagement.  
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In our study, I have considered a number of other variables and examined their 
statistical significance in the model. To test whether underwriters charge more for in 
the AIM because the riskiness is higher in the AIM, I introduce two risk proxies (one 
at a time). In terms of risk, I have looked into two variables. I have considered the 
idiosyncratic risk and the volatility of the return on the share price. To identify possible 
risks that could have contributed to the underwriter fees, I identified the idiosyncratic 
risk for every share price over the first year after the IPO. I calculated the idiosyncratic 
risk as the standard error using the least square method between the share return on 
the issue price and the index price. Then I annualised the result. I then tested the 
correlation with Spread. With a correlation of 0.0198, Beta has shown insignificant, 
and the F test of the estimate is also insignificant, I concluded that the idiosyncratic 
risk is insignificant in our model and hence has no effect on fees charged by the 
underwriters. I also tested the volatility of the return on the share price as an indicator 
of a hidden risk factor by using the standard deviation of the share prices over the first 
year. The correlation was slightly higher with 0.0273, and both beta and F test for the 
estimate showed to be insignificant and hence this variable was not included too. Since 
both our risk factors proved insignificant and hence I cannot conclude that higher 
charges in AIM are due to higher risk in terms of daily volatility. Moreover, when I 
look at Table 4.10, I also noticed that the coefficient for both the Standard Deviation 
and Idiosyncratic are low. 
I have introduced another variable that is the number of bookrunners. Since 
the previous studies show a negative relationship between the presence of multi-
bookrunners and spread charged, I have decided to examine this variable even further 
by looking at the number of bookrunners. I will observe whether the coefficient will 
follow the last coefficient or not. If it does, then this could mean that with more 
120 
 
bookrunners there will be more complication and then more cost. If otherwise, then it 
could indicate that cooperation leads to more efficiency. However, with a correlation 
of 0.82 between the multi bookrunner dummy and the number of bookrunners, in 
addition to the fact the model presented better results with the multi-bookrunner 
dummy, I have decided not to use the number of bookrunners variable. 
In this chapter, I have identified a number of variables. I extracted some of the 
variables directly from the above-mentioned data sources. Besides that, I have 
estimated three other variables that are an idiosyncratic risk, return risk, and potential 
growth. 
The idiosyncratic risk is the risk associated directly with a particular company 
in the separation of the market systematic risk. To calculate the idiosyncratic risk, I 
started by calculating the daily return on the market index as an indicator of the 
systematic risk. I have used “FTSE All Share” Index for the main market and “FTSE 
AIM All Share” index for the AIM market. Then I calculated the daily return on the 
share price starting from the 1st trading day for 1 year. I then ran a regression between 
the two series as shown in the following equation: 
 ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௧ = ߙ + ߚܫ݊݀݁ݔܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௧ +  ߝ௧ (4.2) 
The difference between the index return and company return is captured in the 
standard error. The average daily idiosyncratic risk is estimated using the standard 
error. To annualise, I multiply it by the square root of 260. Some of the companies 
stopped trading in less than 260 days. In this case, I multiply it by the square root of 
the number of observations. 
To estimate the return risk, I measured the volatility of the return of the share 
for the first trading year. As the volatility of the return is captured in the standard 
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deviation of the return sample, I used the standard deviation as the estimate of the 
return risk. I have estimated the potential growth of the company at the time of the 
IPO. I used the size of capital over the 3 years following the IPO. I calculated the 
estimate of the capital size over the time and used the slope β as the indicator for the 
potential growth. 
To examine the spread charged by the underwriters and how a different number 
of variables would affect it. To do this, I have identified a number of independent 
variables, and then I used the ordinary least square model regression (OLS) to measure 
the level of how would they affect. I also used the OLS model to examine the variables 
that would affect the underpricing. The underpricing that I have calculated is the return 
of a share at the end of the 1st trading day if purchased at the IPO price. This shows 
whether the price was overpriced, underpriced or fairly priced. 
Another factor that I considered to proxy for risk is to include in the spread 
model the company’s age at the time of the IPO. I have calculated the age of the 
company in days starting from the incorporation date until the day of trading. I ran the 
regression for this variable over 715 IPO from our sample where the data were 
available. This also proved insignificant. There was a correlation of -0.072, and beta 
of−1.15×10ି଺ with Spread, so it was not included in the model (Results are not 
reported to save space). 
In contrast to the risk and age of company where both showed low significance, 
I examined the possibility of potential growth of the company. Potential growth would 
be expected to have a negative relationship with the fees charged by the underwriter. 
I measured the potential growth of the companies by observing the change in their 
market capitalization over 2 – 3 years following the IPO. I used the slope of the log as 
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the potential growth. I ran a simple linear regression between the spread and potential 
growth variable and got a correlation of 0.005 and a Beta of  7.94×10ି଺ which also 
proved insignificant and hence did not include it in the model. 
I also examined the return on the first and the fifth day of trading to check the 
effect of the over/underpricing on the fees charged and this too proved insignificant as 
univariate. However, I have included the return of first trading day or on other words, 
Underpricing. This is calculated as the return of stock having been bought at the IPO 
using the issue price and being sold at the end of the 1st/5th trading day after it 
becomes public. 
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Table 4.11: Spread Regression for different sizes of IPO proceeds and for AIM and 
Main 
  Whole sample   
  All Less than 
16.7M 
16.7M - 
66.7M 
66.7M - 
333.4M 
Greater 
than 
333.4M 
Main AIM 
Control 
Variables 
Log 
Proceeds 
-
3.183*** 
(-17.83) 
-4.553*** 
(-15.88) 
-0.362 
(-0.41) 
-1.642 
(-1.59) 
1.601 
(0.76) 
-0.389 
(-1.38) 
-
3.588*** 
(-17.8) 
 Multi-
bookrunner 0.584 (1.38) 
0.957 
(1.05) 
0.538 
(1.08) 
0.012 
(0.03) 
1.045 
(0.86) 
-0.3 
(-0.82) 
1.296** 
(2.08) 
 Prestigious 0.793*** 
(3.58) 
1.076*** 
(3.88) 
-0.124 
(-0.37) 
0.599 
(1.34) 
2.251 
(0.89) 
0.259 
(0.62) 
0.963*** 
(3.97) 
 Underpricing 
D1 -0.004** (-2.15) 
-0.005** 
(-2.13) 
-0.002 
(-0.6) 
-0.006 
(-1.21) 
0.183 
(1.25) 
-0.001 
(-0.33) 
-0.005** 
(-2.15) 
 Log(Lockup)  0.681 
(1.06) 
1.7** 
(2.03) 
-0.227 
(-0.23) 
0.095 
(0.09) 
-6.192 
(-1.19) 
0.706 
(0.86) 
1.223 
(1.62) 
 Market 
Dummy  -1.69*** (-4.68) 
-0.487 
(-0.52) 
-0.213 
(-0.53) 
-0.344 
(-0.82)    
Year 
Dummies 
2000 0.674 
(1.15) 
0.675 
(0.91) 
0.718 
(0.66) 
0.766 
(0.78) 
-0.299 
(-0.13) 
0.408 
(0.73) 
0.718 
(0.96) 
 2001 1.702** 
(2.54) 
1.856** 
(2.32) 
1.41 
(0.85) 
1.901 
(1.06) 
0.413 
(0.16) 
0.53 
(0.64) 
2.08** 
(2.59) 
 2002 1.541** 
(2.17) 
1.754** 
(2.02) 
1.284 
(0.94) 
0.368 
(0.26) 
-0.746 
(-0.34) 
0.372 
(0.51) 
1.979** 
(2.27) 
 2003 3.943*** 
(5.35) 
4.301*** 
(4.85) 
0.773 
(0.47)  
0.071 
(0.03) 
0.333 
(0.34) 
4.572*** 
(5.24) 
 2004 2.119*** 
(3.64) 
2.216*** 
(3.07) 
1.595 
(1.39) 
0.573 
(0.55)  
0.62 
(0.91) 
2.591*** 
(3.64) 
 2005 2.262*** 
(3.97) 
2.451*** 
(3.47) 
1.449 
(1.25) 
0.546 
(0.56) 
0.923 
(0.49) 
0.331 
(0.5) 
2.769*** 
(3.97) 
 2006 2.992*** 
(5.08) 
3.406*** 
(4.64) 
1.339 
(1.14) 
1.416 
(1.42) 
-1.062 
(-0.55) 
0.646 
(0.96) 
3.586*** 
(4.99) 
 2007 2.756*** 
(4.51) 
3.36*** 
(4.21) 
1.027 
(0.9) 
0.92 
(0.94) 
1.662 
(0.68) 
0.504 
(0.8) 
3.493*** 
(4.65) 
 2008 3.145*** 
(3.51) 
2.882** 
(2.33) 
1.307 
(0.92) 
1.353 
(0.99) 
7.331* 
(2.31) 
2.741** 
(2.16) 
3.372*** 
(3.24) 
 2009 2.841** 
(2.47) 
2.735 
(1.35) 
0.492 
(0.29) 
0.994 
(0.82)  
0.497 
(0.29) 
3.727*** 
(2.85) 
 2010 3.03*** 
(4.06) 
3.986*** 
(3.43) 
1.193 
(0.97) 
0.396 
(0.37) 
1.88 
(0.87) 
-0.093 
(-0.12) 
3.946*** 
(4.31) 
 2011 3.831*** 
(5.27) 
4.425*** 
(4.87) 
1.724 
(1.22) 
1.544 
(1.16) 
-1.632 
(-0.68) 
0.047 
(0.05) 
4.404*** 
(5.12) 
 2012 5.111*** 
(6.5) 
5.762*** 
(5.99) 
0.803 
(0.52) 
8.482*** 
(6.22)  
6.394*** 
(5.14) 
5.584*** 
(6.11) 
Constant  5.741*** 
(3.24) 
2.039 
(0.82) 
4.612 
(1.49) 
5.724 
(1.62) 
9.707 
(0.84) 
2.415 
(0.98) 
2.345 
(1.13) 
 Adjusted  0.3295 0.3251 -0.0729 0.3296 -0.1473 0.1345 0.3286 
 Observations 967 686 169 92 20 161 806 
 Prob > F 0 0 0.9885 0.0001 0.6465 0.0024 0 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table summarises 7 Regressions where each one is presented in one of the columns. The Table consists of three vertical 
sections. The first Section is for the whole sample (Main/AIM Markets). Under this section, I have run 5 regressions. The 
first one for the whole sample. The second regression is for the IPOs with a proceed less than £16.7 million. The third 
regression with proceeds between £16.7 – 66.7 million. The fourth regression with proceeds between £66.7 – 333.4 million. 
The fifth regression with proceeds larger than £333.4 million. The second section shows the regression of the IPOs from Main 
market only. The third section shows the regression of the IPOs from AIM market only. 
The control Variables are the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Prestigious is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO 
has a prestigious underwriter and 0 otherwise, Log(lockup) is the log of the lockup period, and Idiosyncratic shows the 
idiosyncratic risk for the shares in the sample. Market dummy is 0 for Main market and 1 for AIM market. 
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The F test in Table 4.11 indicates high significance for the whole sample, for 
IPOs with less than 16.7M and AIM market. Taking into consideration that the number 
of IPOs from the AIM market makes more than 70% of our sample, I can conclude 
that the level of significance is mainly coming from the AIM market which indicates 
a difference in the characteristics between the two markets. Most of the variables 
tested showed a high level of significance in those aforementioned segments except 
for the two bookrunners variable. Multi-bookrunner is showing to be significant on 
AIM market. This is because multi-bookrunners are seen on most of the larger IPOs 
rather than those in AIM market. The F test for the Main market shows a significance 
of more than 95%. Yet, Adjusted ܴଶ is 0.14 and none of the variables of the model 
shows high significance. Furthermore, F test shows that the model is insignificant for 
IPOs with proceeds between 16.7M - 66.7M and Greater than 333.4M. 
When I look at 66.7M to 333.4M segment, I can notice that Adjusted ܴଶ is 
0.33. This segment has the top IPOs from the AIM market and the bottom IPOs from 
the Main market with more than third of the IPOs are from the AIM market. This can 
be considered as emerging companies that have reached a level of maturity to be part 
of the Main market yet it has a potential to grow there or at the top of AIM market and 
has the chance to migrate to the main market. From Table 4.11, I can notice that the 
Log proceeds has about 90% significance. The negative relationship between log 
proceeds and the spread indicates that the higher the proceeds, the lower the spread 
and hence I conclude the presence of dis-economies of scale. Moreover, the coefficient 
of the log proceeds variable is higher – as an absolute value – for the Main market and 
larger IPO segments, which support the presence of the dis-economies of scale too. 
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Moreover, the number of bookrunners variable is showing significance at 95 
level. This could indicate that more bookrunners are interested in this segment of the 
market. Multi-bookrunners were in more than 33% of the IPOs in this segment 
compared to less than 7% of the whole sample. In addition, the Multi-bookrunner 
variable has high significance only when looking at the AIM market. However, the 
significance is proven to be poor otherwise. 
The coefficient of the prestige variable is of high significant for the whole 
sample, less than 16.7M and AIM market. It is positively related to the spread that 
means that prestigious underwriters charge more than their non-prestigious 
counterparts do. However, as this coefficient is significant in the AIM market and the 
smaller IPO segment, this shows that for smaller companies, they have to pay more to 
make their IPO more appealing to the prestigious underwriters. In addition, not being 
significant for the Main market and the larger IPOs shows that underwriters do not 
compete on cost in the competition for larger IPOs.  
Underpricing variables show a negative relationship with the proceeds with 
small coefficients compared to the other variables. This means that the more the IPO 
is underpriced, the less the spread charged however with a small multiplier. Therefore, 
I conclude that underwriters mitigate risk to some extent by lowering the issue price. 
Thus I accept H3(b). The lockup period variable is showing significance only for IPOs 
with proceeds less than 16.7M. This variable too has a positive relationship with the 
spread. This indicates that companies with smaller IPO will have to pay relatively 
more to prolong the underwriters’ engagement and hence no presence of rent-seeking. 
As the lookup is used as a tool to mitigate moral hazard and to compensate for the 
information asymmetry, the longer lockup indicates more risk and hence higher 
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spread, especially for smaller IPOs. Thus I reject the null of H4 and conclude that there 
is some evidence of rent-seeking. 
Table 4.11 shows that the year dummies have a high significance on the value 
of the fees charged. By reviewing the coefficients of the years’ dummies, I can notice 
that the fees charged have been increasing since 1999 (the year 1999 is not shown in 
the table as it is the reference variable for the years’ dummies).  
As a result, the model is a better representation of the AIM market than the 
Main market. It shows that the Main market is less sensitive to the factors that attribute 
to the spread charged at the AIM market. They AIM IPOs at our sample make about 
71% of the whole sample under study. This complies with the aforementioned results 
about smaller size IPO as most of the IPOs that took place in the AIM market fall 
under the category of less than 16.7M. 
4.15 Spread as a marketing tool 
With lower cost, the demand is expected to increase. Here I will examine our fifth 
hypothesis to see if the underwriters charge lower spread in order to attract more 
business. I ran the following two regression models: 
 
ܰ݋. ݋݂ ܫܱܲݏ௧ =  ߙ + ߚଵܰ݋. ݋݂ ܫܱܲݏ௧ିଵ  
+ ߚଶܮ݋݃ ܣݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁ ܲݎ݋ܿ݁݁݀ݏ௧ିଵ
+ ߚଷܣݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁ ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௧ିଵ +  ߝ௜ 
(4.3) 
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ܣݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁ ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௧
=  ߙ + ߚଵܰ݋. ݋݂ ܫܱܲݏ௧ିଵ  
+  ߚଶܮ݋݃ ܣݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁ ܲݎ݋ܿ݁݁݀ݏ௧ିଵ
+  ߚଷܣݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁ ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௧ିଵ +  ߝ௜  
(4.4) 
The first model is an estimator of the number of IPOs per underwriter based 
on the number of IPO, the log of the average proceeds and the average spread charged 
in the previous year. I first ran a pooled simple OLS regression for the whole sample 
then I applied the fixed effects model for the bookrunners. I have checked tested the 
model for multicollinearity and it is not affecting the results. As you can see from 
Table 4.11, the number of IPOs conducted in the previous year has a positive 
relationship with the IPOs conducted the current year. This means the more IPOs a 
bookrunner can undertake in a year, the more the number of IPOs in the following 
year. However, the effect of the number of IPOs in a year has a significance, yet, a 
minimal effect on the average spread charged on the following year. The average 
proceeds coefficient is insignificant except for the number of IPOs when applying the 
fixed effects model. The average spread charged from the previous year has a positive 
relationship with the number of IPOs undertaken in the following year. This means 
that the spread charged is not used as a marketing tool by the underwriters and hence 
I will reject hypotheses H5. The positive relationship could be explained by the fact 
that the book-runners are emerging to be more reputable facing less competition and 
would charge higher spread. (Robins, 2012) have reported that underwriters that are 
more reputable charge higher spread on the long-run. This could give an explanation 
for our findings. 
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Table 4.12: The effect of Year t-1 level of fees on Year t 
  No. Of IPOs (t) Average Spread 
(t) 
No. of IPOs 
(t) (FE) 
Average Spread 
(t) (FE) 
Control Variables No. of IPOs (t-1) 0.408*** 0.005*** 0.236*** 0.004*** 
 Average Spread (t-1) 6.083*** 0.267*** 7.292*** 0.132*** 
 Log Average Proceeds 
(t-1) 
6.083 0.000 -0.052** 0.000 
Constant  0.238*** 0.008*** 0.376*** 1.085*** 
Adjusted ܴଶ / 
Overall R 
 0.240 0.183 0.233 0.1808 
Observations 
(Groups) 
 1950 1950 1950 (150) 1950 (150) 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table shows the effect of a number of factors in a previous year over the number of IPOs and the Average Spread 
charged on the consequence year. The factors of the previous year are the number of IPOs, Average Spread and Log 
Average Proceeds. The factors of the last year are denoted by t-1. The tables show 2 types of regressions; the first 2 columns 
are pooled regression while the last 2 columns are using Fixed Effects for the bookrunners. Adjusted ܴଶ is the standard 
value for the pooled regression and the overall value for the Fixed Effects regression. Observations shows the groups for the 
Fixed Effects regression. Prob > 0 indicates the significance of the model. 
 
4.16 Robustness Checks 
I have identified 115 underwriters in the model. Some underwriters may charge more 
than other underwriters. In other words, our OLS model is unable to capture the 
heterogeneity existing at the investment bank level. Hence, I reiterate our models using 
the fixed effect specifications to examine whether the results of OLS still hold.   
 
ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௜ =  ߙ +  ߚଵܮ݋݃ ܲݎ݋ܿ݁݁݀ݏ௜ + ߚଶܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ௜
+  ߚଷܯݑ݈ݐ݅ܤ݋݋݇ݎݑ݊݊݁ݎ௜ + ߚସܲݎ݁ݏݐ݅݃݅݋ݑݏ௜
+ ߚହܦ1 ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃௜ + ܴ݅ݏ݇௜
+ ߚ଺ܮ݋݃ܮ݋ܿ݇ݑ݌ܲ݁ݎ݅݋݀௜  ቌ ෍ ߚ௝ܻ݁ܽݎ௝
ଶ଴ଵଶ
௝ୀଵଽଽଽ
ቍ +  ߝ௜ 
(4.5) 
To put more emphasis on the bookrunners and to capture its specific effect, I 
have repeated the regression of the same model using Fixed Effects model for the 
bookrunners. The results are shown in Table 4.12. The results are similar to those from 
Table 4.11.   
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Table 4.13: Spread Regression for different sizes of IPO proceeds and for AIM and 
Main Using Fixed-Effects for Bookrunners 
  Whole sample   
  All Less than 
16.7M 
16.7M - 
66.7M 
66.7M - 
333.4M 
Main AIM 
Control 
Variables 
Log Proceeds -3.458*** 
(-15.23) 
-5.123*** 
(-14.59) 
-1.239 
(-1.04) 
-2.31** 
(-2.69) 
-0.703* 
(-1.79) 
-3.957*** 
(-15.15) 
 Multi-
bookrunner 0.356 (0.76) 
0.921 
(0.84) 
0.62 
(0.93) 
0.432 
(1.21) 
-0.44 
(-1) 
1.21* 
(1.67) 
 Prestigious -0.18 
(-0.08)   
0.482 
(0.56) 
0.11 
(0.06)  
 Underpricing 
D1 -0.003 (-1.4) 
-0.003 
(-1.06) 
-0.002 
(-0.68) 
-0.003 
(-0.68) 
0.001 
(0.27) 
-0.004 
(-1.39) 
 Log(Lockup) 1.601** 
(1.97) 
3.233*** 
(2.85) 
-0.463 
(-0.34) 
0.112 
(0.11) 
1.506 
(1.5) 
2.196** 
(2.15) 
 Market 
Dummy  -1.144*** (-2.61) 
0.387 
(0.35) 
-0.551 
(-0.95) 
0.217 
(0.59)   
Year 
Dummies 
2000 0.242 
(0.37) 
0.363 
(0.43) 
1.832 
(0.86) 
0.773 
(0.71) 
0.207 
(0.3) 
0.12 
(0.14) 
 2001 1.158 
(1.54) 
1.508* 
(1.67) 
2.446 
(0.96) 
1.446 
(0.96) 
0.481 
(0.51) 
1.408 
(1.51) 
 2002 0.655 
(0.84) 
0.821 
(0.86) 
2.305 
(1) 
-0.462 
(-0.36) 
0.151 
(0.17) 
0.897 
(0.92) 
 2003 3.06*** 
(3.77) 
3.604*** 
(3.65) 
1.181 
(0.45)  
0.774 
(0.71) 
3.533*** 
(3.55) 
 2004 1.592** 
(2.38) 
1.804** 
(2.16) 
2.548 
(1.2) 
1.065 
(0.95) 
0.72 
(0.89) 
1.961** 
(2.32) 
 2005 1.689** 
(2.53) 
2.3*** 
(2.76) 
2.378 
(1.1) 
0.009 
(0.01) 
-0.165 
(-0.21) 
2.221*** 
(2.63) 
 2006 2.078*** 
(3.05) 
2.709*** 
(3.16) 
2.775 
(1.25) 
1.002 
(0.92) 
0.467 
(0.59) 
2.624*** 
(3.04) 
 2007 2.116*** 
(2.96) 
3.297*** 
(3.46) 
2.062 
(0.94) 
0.546 
(0.47) 
0.064 
(0.08) 
2.909*** 
(3.21) 
 2008 2.071** 
(2.08) 
1.856 
(1.28) 
2.969 
(1.17) 
2.486 
(1.64) 
2.347 
(1.62) 
2.227* 
(1.87) 
 2009 1.392 
(1.02) 
3.845 
(1.32) 
0.772 
(0.25) 
0.592 
(0.46) 
-0.069 
(-0.04) 
2.714 
(1.57) 
 2010 2.078** 
(2.41) 
4.418*** 
(3.18) 
1.883 
(0.83) 
-0.39 
(-0.34) 
-0.723 
(-0.74) 
2.963*** 
(2.7) 
 2011 3.611*** 
(4.28) 
5.231*** 
(4.81) 
2.349 
(0.99) 
0.805 
(0.63) 
-0.378 
(-0.34) 
4.403*** 
(4.27) 
 2012 2.738*** 
(3) 
3.403*** 
(2.97) 
2.289 
(0.92) 
14.048*** 
(8.77) 
6.166*** 
(4.37) 
3.128*** 
(2.84) 
Constant  4.276* 
(1.75) 
-1.829 
(-0.57) 
5.636 
(1.29) 
6.986** 
(2.34) 
1.401 
(0.4) 
1.137 
(0.41) 
Adjusted   0.31 0.3077 0.025 0.4273 0.2 0.3169 
Observations 967 686 169 92 161 806 
Prob > F 0 0 0.991 0 0.0043 0 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
 
This table summarises 6 Regressions using Fixed Effects for the bookrunners where each one is presented in one of the 
columns. The Table consists of three vertical sections. The first Section is for the whole sample (Main/AIM Markets). Under 
this section, I have run 5 regressions. The first one for the whole sample. The second regression is for the IPOs with a proceed 
less than £16.7 million. The third regression with proceeds between £16.7 – 66.7 million. The fourth regression with proceeds 
between £66.7 – 333.4 million. The second section shows the regression of the IPOs from Main market only. The third section 
shows the regression of the IPOs from AIM market only. 
The control Variables are the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Prestigious is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO 
has a prestigious underwriter and 0 otherwise, Log(Lockup) is the log of the lockup period, Idiosyncratic shows the 
idiosyncratic risk for the shares in the sample. Market dummy is 0 for Main market and 1 for AIM market. 
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However, the coefficient of the Log Proceeds has increased in absolute value. So I 
accept the economies of scale hypothesis. Looking into the underwriter status 
variables; I can notice that prestigious variable shows less significance in this table. 
With respect to the bookrunner variables, it shows more significance than in Table 
4.11 for the same segment (66.7M – 333.4M). This time they both are significant. In 
summary, I find that log of proceeds is negatively related, lockup length is positively 
related, and the market dummy is positively related when using the fixed effects 
model. This implies that economics of scale, rent-seeking are valid explanations of 
higher spread charged and AIM companies are riskier. 
Table 4.13 shows the same results as above after I have winsorized the spread 
variable with a 5% from both ends in order to eliminate the effect of outliers. In this 
process, I look into the values of the spread. The values that are above the 95th 
percentile will be adjusted to be the same as the 95th percentile and the data that are 
below the 5th percentile will be adjusted to be the same as the 5th percentile. I noticed 
from the table that the results did not change much from the original results in Table 
4.10. From the above tables, lockup period variable when proved significant has a 
positive relationship with the spread charged. This can be noticed in Table 4.11 for 
IPOs less than £16.7 Million, and AIM market. In Table 4.13 it can be noticed for the 
whole sample, Less than £16.7 Million and AIM market. Therefore, I can conclude 
that lockup period variable contributes to the higher spread in AIM market rather in 
the Main market and hence the increase in the cost for the smaller IPOs reflects the 
higher cost of a longer engagement from the underwriter and not due to the rent-
seeking. 
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Table 4.14: Spread Regression for different sizes of IPO proceeds and for AIM and 
Main Using 5% Winsor for the spread 
  Whole sample   
  All Less than 
16.7M 
16.7M - 
66.7M 
66.7M - 
333.4M 
Greater 
than 
333.4M 
Main AIM 
Control 
Variables 
Log 
Proceeds -2.574*** 
(-18.07) 
-3.526*** 
(-15.53) 
-0.32 
(-0.39) 
-1.521* 
(-1.86) 
1.177 
(0.71) 
-0.436* 
(-1.78) 
-
2.574*** 
(-18.07) 
 Multi-
bookrunner 
0.378 
(1.12) 
0.746 
(1.03) 
0.447 
(0.97) 
0.018 
(0.05) 
0.784 
(0.82) 
-0.262 
(-0.83) 
0.378 
(1.12) 
 Prestigious 0.538*** 
(3.04) 
0.78*** 
(3.56) 
-0.221 
(-0.71) 
0.397 
(1.12) 
1.982 
(0.99) 
0.195 
(0.54) 
0.538*** 
(3.04) 
 Underpricing 
D1 
-0.004** 
(-2.35) 
-0.005** 
(-2.3) 
-0.002 
(-0.65) 
-0.005 
(-1.17) 
0.148 
(1.29) 
-0.001 
(-0.4) 
-0.004** 
(-2.35) 
 Log(Lockup)  0.366 
(0.72) 
1.147* 
(1.73) 
-0.462 
(-0.49) 
-0.011 
(-0.01) 
-5.156 
(-1.26) 
0.358 
(0.5) 
0.366 
(0.72) 
 Market 
Dummy  -1.255*** 
(-4.35) 
-0.213 
(-0.29) 
-0.166 
(-0.45) 
-0.177 
(-0.53)   
-
1.255*** 
(-4.35) 
Year 
Dummies 
2000 0.567 
(1.21) 
0.484 
(0.82) 
0.889 
(0.88) 
0.57 
(0.73) 
-0.222 
(-0.12) 
0.425 
(0.87) 
0.567 
(1.21) 
 2001 1.479*** 
(2.76) 
1.598** 
(2.52) 
1.401 
(0.91) 
1.655 
(1.16) 
0.553 
(0.27) 
0.474 
(0.66) 
1.479*** 
(2.76) 
 2002 1.573*** 
(2.77) 
1.82*** 
(2.64) 
1.315 
(1.04) 
0.119 
(0.11) 
-0.692 
(-0.41) 
0.283 
(0.44) 
1.573*** 
(2.77) 
 2003 2.917*** 
(4.96) 
3.182*** 
(4.53) 
0.76 
(0.5)  
0.153 
(0.09) 
0.28 
(0.33) 
2.917*** 
(4.96) 
 2004 1.783*** 
(3.84) 
1.862*** 
(3.25) 
1.56 
(1.46) 
0.362 
(0.44)  
0.5 
(0.85) 
1.783*** 
(3.84) 
 2005 1.882*** 
(4.14) 
2.026*** 
(3.62) 
1.468 
(1.37) 
0.375 
(0.48) 
1.054 
(0.71) 
0.315 
(0.55) 
1.882*** 
(4.14) 
 2006 2.624*** 
(5.58) 
3.006*** 
(5.17) 
1.297 
(1.19) 
1.123 
(1.42) 
-0.91 
(-0.6) 
0.593 
(1.01) 
2.624*** 
(5.58) 
 2007 2.36*** 
(4.84) 
2.91*** 
(4.61) 
1.065 
(1) 
0.672 
(0.86) 
1.481 
(0.76) 
0.47 
(0.86) 
2.36*** 
(4.84) 
 2008 2.715*** 
(3.79) 
2.55*** 
(2.6) 
1.215 
(0.92) 
0.988 
(0.91) 
6.683* 
(2.68) 
2.726** 
(2.47) 
2.715*** 
(3.79) 
 2009 2.448*** 
(2.67) 
2.944* 
(1.84) 
0.526 
(0.34) 
0.579 
(0.6)  
0.408 
(0.28) 
2.448*** 
(2.67) 
 2010 2.66*** 
(4.47) 
3.557*** 
(3.87) 
1.247 
(1.09) 
0.282 
(0.33) 
2.007 
(1.18) 
0.07 
(0.1) 
2.66*** 
(4.47) 
 2011 3.381*** 
(5.82) 
3.846*** 
(5.35) 
1.66 
(1.27) 
1.487 
(1.4) 
-0.739 
(-0.39) 
0.49 
(0.57) 
3.381*** 
(5.82) 
 2012 3.856*** 
(6.14) 
4.307*** 
(5.65) 
0.728 
(0.5) 
6.517*** 
(6)  
4.697*** 
(4.34) 
3.856*** 
(6.14) 
Constant  5.982*** 
(4.22) 
2.975 
(1.52) 
-0.32 
(-0.39) 
-1.53* 
(-1.86) 
1.18 
-0.71 
-0.44* 
(-1.78) 
-2.89*** 
(-18.02) 
Adjusted  0.3408 0.3234 -0.0744 0.3236 0.0189 0.0966 0.3349 
Observations 967 686 169 92 20 161 806 
Prob > F 0 0 0.9903 0.0001 0.5504 0.0163 0 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
 
This table summarises 7 Regressions where each one is presented in one of the columns. The Table consists of three vertical 
sections. The first Section is for the whole sample (Main/AIM Markets). Under this section, I have run 5 regressions. The first 
one for the whole sample. The second regression is for the IPOs with a proceed less than £16.7 million. The third regression 
with proceeds between £16.7 – 66.7 million. The fourth regression with proceeds between £66.7 – 333.4 million. The fifth 
regression with proceeds larger than £333.4 million. The second section shows the regression of the IPOs from Main market 
only. The third section shows the regression of the IPOs from AIM market only. 
The control Variables are the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Prestigious is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO 
has a prestigious underwriter and 0 otherwise, Log(lockup) is the log of the lockup period, Idiosyncratic shows the 
idiosyncratic risk for the shares in the sample. Market dummy is 0 for Main market and 1 for AIM market. 
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In order to examine the possibility of spread being bounded either from the top 
or from the bottom, I ran a Tobit regression. If the underwriters were charging different 
from the fair price due to some imposed constraints or limitation, Tobit regression 
would have come with the fair value. Tobit regression did not indicate any type of 
censoring. The results from Tobit and OLS are qualitatively the same. 
Finally, as Figure 4.4, Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.8 are showing the spread in 
relationship to the log of proceeds variable have a nonlinear relationship, I have tested 
a cubed regression using the log of proceeds. 
 
ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀ = ߙ +  ߚଵ log(݌ݎ݋ܿ݁݁݀ݏ) +  ߚଶ(log(݌ݎ݋ܿ݁݁݀ݏ))ଶ
+ ߚଷ(log(݌ݎ݋ܿ݁݁݀ݏ))ଷ + ߝ௜ 
(4.6) 
 
When I used the whole sample, the coefficients ߚଵ, ߚଶ, ߚଷ, ߙ were -5.20, 2.34, 
-0.38, and 8.25 respectively. The value of F is zero and the Adjusted ܴଶ is 0.3178. 
This shows that proceeds only is the main factor that affects the spread. To further 
investigate and understand which part of our sample is mostly affected by the spread, 
I have repeated the regression the different markets and proceeds sizes. I found that 
the model is significant mainly for AIM market and IPOs less than 16.7M. This 
conclude that proceeds are the main factor in determining the spread for small IPOs 
while has less significance for larger IPOs. 
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Table 4.15: Spread Regression for different sizes of IPO proceeds and for AIM and 
Main Using Tobit Model 
  Whole sample   
  All Less than 
16.7M 
16.7M - 
66.7M 
66.7M - 
333.4M 
Greater 
than 
333.4M 
Main AIM 
Control 
Variables 
Log 
Proceeds 
-3.183*** 
(-18.02) 
-4.553*** 
(-16.11) 
-0.362 
(-0.44) 
-1.642* 
(-1.79) 1.601 
(1.7) 
-0.389 
(-1.47) 
-
3.588*** 
(-18.01) 
 Multi-
bookrunner 
0.584 
(1.39) 
0.957 
(1.06) 
0.538 
(1.15) 
0.012 
(0.03) 
1.045 
(1.93) 
-0.3 
(-0.87) 
1.296** 
(2.11) 
 Prestigious 0.793*** 
(3.62) 
1.076*** 
(3.94) 
-0.124 
(-0.39) 
0.599 
(1.51) 
2.251 
(1.98) 
0.259 
(0.66) 
0.963*** 
(4.01) 
 Underpricing 
D1 
-0.004** 
(-2.18) 
-0.005** 
(-2.16) 
-0.002 
(-0.64) 
-0.006 
(-1.36) 
0.183** 
(2.81) 
-0.001 
(-0.35) 
-0.005** 
(-2.18) 
 Log(Lockup)  0.681 
(1.08) 
1.7** 
(2.06) 
-0.227 
(-0.24) 
0.095 
(0.11) 
-6.192** 
(-2.67) 
0.706 
(0.92) 
1.223 
(1.64) 
 Market 
Dummy  
-1.690*** 
(-4.73) 
-0.487 
(-0.53) 
-0.213 
(-0.57) 
-0.344 
(-0.92) 
  
Year 
Dummies 
2000 0.674 
(1.16) 
0.675 
(0.92) 
0.718 
(0.7) 
0.766 
(0.88) 
-0.299 
(-0.28) 
0.408 
(0.78) 
0.718 
(0.98) 
 2001 1.702** 
(2.56) 
1.856** 
(2.36) 
1.41 
(0.91) 
1.901 
(1.19) 
0.413 
(0.36) 
0.53 
(0.68) 
2.080*** 
(2.63) 
 2002 1.541** 
(2.19) 
1.754** 
(2.05) 
1.284 
(1) 
0.368 
(0.3) 
-0.746 
(-0.77) 
0.372 
(0.54) 
1.979** 
(2.29) 
 2003 3.943*** 
(5.41) 
4.301*** 
(4.92) 
0.773 
(0.5) 
 0.071 
(0.07) 
0.333 
(0.37) 
4.572*** 
(5.3) 
 2004 2.119*** 
(3.68) 
2.216*** 
(3.11) 
1.595 
(1.48) 
0.573 
(0.62) 
0.62 
(0.97) 
2.591*** 
(3.68) 
 2005 2.262*** 
(4.01) 
2.451*** 
(3.52) 
1.449 
(1.34) 
0.546 
(0.63) 
0.923 
(1.09) 
0.331 
(0.53) 
2.769*** 
(4.02) 
 2006 2.992*** 
(5.14) 
3.406*** 
(4.71) 
1.339 
(1.21) 
1.416 
(1.59) 
-1.062 
(-1.24) 
0.646 
(1.02) 
3.586*** 
(5.05) 
 2007 2.756*** 
(4.56) 
3.36*** 
(4.27) 
1.027 
(0.95) 
0.92 
(1.05) 
1.662 
(1.51) 
0.504 
(0.86) 
3.497*** 
(4.71) 
 2008 3.145*** 
(3.54) 
2.882** 
(2.36) 
1.307 
(0.98) 
1.353 
(1.11) 
7.331*** 
(5.17) 
2.741** 
(2.3) 
3.372*** 
(3.28) 
 2009 2.841** 
(2.5) 
2.735 
(1.37) 
0.492 
(0.31) 
0.994 
(0.93) 
 0.497 
(0.31) 
3.727*** 
(2.88) 
 2010 3.03*** 
(4.1) 
3.986*** 
(3.48) 
1.193 
(1.03) 
0.396 
(0.42) 
1.88 
(1.95) 
-0.093 
(-0.13) 
3.946*** 
(4.37) 
 2011 3.831*** 
(5.32) 
4.425*** 
(4.94) 
1.724 
(1.3) 
1.544 
(1.3) 
-1.632 
(-1.53) 
0.047 
(0.05) 
4.404*** 
(5.18) 
 2012 5.111*** 
(6.57) 
5.762*** 
(6.08) 
0.803 
(0.55) 
8.482*** 
(6.98) 
6.394*** 
(5.48) 
5.584*** 
(6.18) 
Constant  5.741*** 
(3.27) 
2.039 
(0.83) 
4.612 
(1.59) 
5.724* 
(1.82) 
9.707 
(1.88) 
2.415 
(1.04) 
2.345 
(1.14) 
Pseudo   0.0768 0.0749 0.0127 0.1568 0.3847 0.0673 0.0759 
Observations 967 686 169 92 20 161 806 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0.9824 0 0.0191 0.0009 0 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table summarises 7 Tobit Regressions where each one is presented in one of the columns. The Table consists of three 
vertical sections. The first Section is for the whole sample (Main/AIM Markets). Under this section, I have run 5 regressions. 
The first one for the whole sample. The second regression is for the IPOs with a proceed less than £16.7 million. The third 
regression with proceeds between £16.7 – 66.7 million. The fourth regression with proceeds between £66.7 – 333.4 million. 
The fifth regression with proceeds larger than £333.4 million. The second section shows the regression of the IPOs from Main 
market only. The third section shows the regression of the IPOs from AIM market only. 
The control Variables are the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Prestigious is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO 
has a prestigious underwriter and 0 otherwise, Log(Lockup) is the log of the lockup period, and Idiosyncratic shows the 
idiosyncratic risk for the shares in the sample. Market dummy is 0 for Main market and 1 for AIM market. 
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Table 4.16: Spread Nonlinear Regression for different sizes of IPO proceeds and for 
AIM and Main Using Cubed Model 
 Whole sample   
 All Less than 
16.7M 
16.7M - 
66.7M 
66.7M - 
333.4M 
Greater 
than 
333.4M 
Main AIM 
log(proceeds) -5.207*** 
(-16.66) 
-5.125*** 
(-9.48) 
-21.309 
(-0.1) 
232.346 
(0.54) 
41.965 
(0.13) 
-1.171 
(-0.4) 
-5.17*** 
(-15.1) 
(log(proceeds)^2 2.325*** 
(7.1) 
2.554*** 
(4.15) 
15.188 
(0.11) 
-107.942 
(-0.54) 
-7.754 
(-0.07) 
0.488 
(0.32) 
2.56*** 
(5.22) 
(log(proceeds)^3 -0.383*** 
(-3.96) 
-0.613 
(-0.89) 
-3.543 
(-0.12) 
16.57 
(0.54) 
0.221 
(0.02) 
-0.106 
(-0.42) 
-0.512** 
(-2.32) 
Constant 8.26*** 
(52.24) 
8.2*** 
(37.51) 
14.25 
(0.13) 
-161.41 
(-0.53) 
-57.95 
(-0.17) 
5.28*** 
(2.95) 
8.2*** 
(43.53) 
Adjusted R2 0.3178 0.2534 -0.0177 -0.0213 0.0464 0.0204 0.2855 
Observations 968 686 169 92 21 162 806 
Prob F > 0 0 0 0.9943 0.7764 0.2991 0.0999 0 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
 
This table summarises 7 Regressions using nonlinear cubed regression model to examine the relationship between the spread 
and log proceeds. The Table consists of three vertical sections. The first Section is for the whole sample (Main/AIM Markets). 
Under this section, I have run 5 regressions. The first one for the whole sample. The second regression is for the IPOs with a 
proceed less than £16.7 million. The third regression with proceeds between £16.7 – 66.7 million. The fourth regression with 
proceeds between £66.7 – 333.4 million. The second section shows the regression of the IPOs from Main market only. The 
third section shows the regression of the IPOs from AIM market only. 
 
Another nonlinear regression that I have tested is the curve regression using 
the following model: 
 
ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀ =  
1
ܾଵ + ܾଶ log(݌ݎ݋ܿ݁݁݀ݏ)
+ ܾଷ ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃
+ ܾଷ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊ ܵݐ݀݁ݒ +  ߝ௜ 
(4.7) 
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Table 4.17: Spread Nonlinear Regression for different sizes of IPO proceeds and for 
AIM and Main Using Curve Model 
 Whole sample   
 All Less than 
16.7M 
16.7M - 
66.7M 
66.7M - 
333.4M 
Greater 
than 
333.4M 
Main AIM 
b1 0.119*** 
(47.5) 
0.118*** 
(40.06) 
0.231*** 
(4.06) 
0.119 
(0.87) 
0.252 
(0.37) 
0.183*** 
(6.7) 
0.118*** 
(43.74) 
b2 0.026*** 
(24.51) 
0.026*** 
(19.52) 
-0.004 
(-0.2) 
0.028 
(0.97) 
0.022 
(0.19) 
0.015** 
(2.33) 
0.026*** 
(22.04) 
Underpricing -0.005** 
(-2.38) 
-0.006** 
(-2.27) 
-0.002 
(-0.71) 
-0.005 
(-0.77) 
0.015 
(0.86) 
-0.001 
(-0.39) 
-0.006** 
(-2.48) 
Day 1 Return Volatility -0.089*** 
(-2.83) 
-0.09** 
(-2.38) 
-0.027 
(-0.32) 
-0.032 
(-0.33) 
0.322 
(1.2) 
-0.004 
(-0.05) 
-0.088** 
(-2.5) 
Adjusted R2 0.8146 0.8091 0.8702 0.8254 0.8122 0.8491 0.8127 
Observations 968 686 169 92 21 162 806 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
 
This table summarises 7 Regressions using nonlinear curve regression model to examine the relationship between the spread 
and log proceeds. The Table consists of three vertical sections. The first Section is for the whole sample (Main/AIM Markets). 
Under this section, I have run 5 regressions. The first one for the whole sample. The second regression is for the IPOs with a 
proceed less than £16.7 million. The third regression with proceeds between £16.7 – 66.7 million. The fourth regression with 
proceeds between £66.7 – 333.4 million. The second section shows the regression of the IPOs from Main market only. The 
third section shows the regression of the IPOs from AIM market only. 
 
I can notice from Table 4.16, an Adjusted ܴଶ value of more than 0.80 appears 
across all the 7 regressions with a high significance for both ܾଵ, ܾଶ at all the regression 
except when the proceeds are between 66.7M and 333.4M. This shows that the main 
contributor to the spread is the size of the proceeds.  
Figure 4.3 shows a high effect of the proceeds on the spread charged by the 
underwriters. The effect is higher with the smaller IPOs. As the proceeds increase, the 
effect eases and becomes flatter.  
4.17 Determinants of Underpricing  
As the underwriters are not addressing the extra risk in the IPOs by increasing the 
spread, I will examine the second part of our third hypothesis. I will check if the 
underwriters will underprice the share price more for the riskier IPOs. From Table 4.9 
I can notice that the idiosyncratic risk and the potential growth have a small correlation 
factor. However, the volatility of the share return shows higher correlation factor of a 
positive 0.2608.I ran the following Underpricing regression model: 
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ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃௜
=  ߙ +  ߚଵܮ݋݃ܲݎ݋ܿ݁݁݀ݏ௜ + ߚଶܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ௜
+  ߚଷܯݑ݈ݐ݅ܤ݋݋݇ݎݑ݊݊݁ݎ௜ + ߚସܲݎ݁ݏݐ݅݃݅݋ݑݏ௜
+ ߚହܵℎܽݎܴ݁݁ݐݑݎܸ݊݋݈௜ ቌ ෍ ߚ௝ܻ݁ܽݎ௝
ଶ଴ଵଶ
௝ୀଵଽଽଽ
ቍ +  ߝ௜ 
(4.8) 
I ran the regression for the whole sample, each market, and the different 
proceeds’ sizes. A summary of the regression in Table 4.17. 
Overall, the model was significant for the whole market, AIM market, and the 
small IPOs. From Table 4.17, the model shows to be significant for the whole sample, 
AIM market and the small IPOs. As you can see, the factor of the share return volatility 
is positive and significant for the whole sample, AIM market, and the small IPOs. This 
shows that the riskier IPOs tend to be underpriced more.  
Log proceeds and Return Volatility variables showed to have a high 
significance on the model too. Log Proceeds variable has a coefficient of -12.98 for 
the whole sample. The negative value means that there is a negative relationship 
between the IPO size and underpricing. On other words, the cost of underpricing is 
higher with smaller IPOs. Moreover, as an absolute value, the Log Proceeds 
coefficient is higher for the small IPOs than the whole AIM market.  
The coefficient for the Market dummy is 18.44 where AIM is 1 and Main is 0. 
This value eases the effect of Log Proceeds variable coefficient. The evidence 
mentioned above support this hypothesis. The AIM market has smaller IPOs in terms 
of proceeds and companies in this market are exposed to more risk. I found that IPOs 
from the AIM market are underpriced more than the IPOs from the Main market. This 
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could be introduced by the underwriters to mitigate the risk. This evidence supports 
the hypothesis H3(b). 
Table 4.18 Underpricing Regression for different sizes of IPO proceeds and for AIM 
and Main 
  Whole sample   
  All Less than 
16.7M 
16.7M - 
66.7M 
66.7M - 
333.4M 
Greater 
than 
333.4M 
Main AIM 
Control 
Variables 
Log 
Proceeds 
-12.977*** 
(-3.82) 
-14.491*** 
(-3.12) 
-10.329 
(-0.25) 
-37.046 
(-1.48) 
48.27 
(1.87) 
-17.649 
(-1.22) 
-12.194*** 
(-3.8) 
 Market 
Dummy 
18.437*** 
(2.74) 
13.115 
(0.87) 
35.107* 
(1.96) 
12.108 
(1.17) 
 
  
 Multi-
bookrunner 
-10.89 
(-1.4) 
-6.885 
(-0.48) 
-8.438 
(-0.36) 
-5.518 
(-0.54) 
-1.99 
(-0.11) 
-22.716 
(-1.18) 
-8.884 
(-0.92) 
 Prestigious -2.289 
(-0.55) 
-7.062 
(-1.58) 
8.535 
(0.55) 
18.627 
(1.66) 
25.11 
(0.56) 
13.821 
(0.61) 
-4.057 
(-1.06) 
 Return 
Volatility 
4.078*** 
(6.88) 
4.429*** 
(7.7) 
-0.943 
(-0.21) 
-2.28 
(-0.83) 
-5.55 
(-0.73) 
0.641 
(0.15) 
4.270*** 
(7.98) 
Year 
Dummies 
2000 11.976 
(1.09) 
12.476 
(1.04) 
19.498 
(0.38) 
13.997 
(0.6) 
10.41 
(0.29) 
-4.264 
(-0.14) 
18.468 
(1.57) 
 2001 11.532 
(0.9) 
11.038 
(0.85) 
-2.968 
(-0.04) 
25.325 
(0.56) 
-31.14 
(-0.85) 
-15.644 
(-0.34) 
15.203 
(1.19) 
 2002 -12.715 
(-0.94) 
-15.314 
(-1.09) 
-39.169 
(-0.61) 
20.582 
(0.61) 
-6.09 
(-0.18) 
-21.21 
(-0.52) 
-12.228 
(-0.88) 
 2003 0.237 
(0.02) 
-3.062 
(-0.21) 
-18.489 
(-0.24) 
 -20.69 
(-0.69) 
-7.104 
(-0.13) 
1.607 
(0.12) 
 2004 5.576 
(0.5) 
2.964 
(0.25) 
11.599 
(0.22) 
0.303 
(0.01) 
 -19.563 
(-0.52) 
8.611 
(0.76) 
 2005 18.889* 
(1.74) 
12.592 
(1.09) 
46.162 
(0.85) 
20.072 
(0.81) 
-5.22 
(-0.19) 
47.117 
(1.26) 
16.907 
(1.52) 
 2006 7.864 
(0.7) 
5.298 
(0.44) 
5.631 
(0.1) 
17.946 
(0.71) 
-17.42 
(-0.59) 
4.575 
(0.12) 
8.628 
(0.75) 
 2007 4.234 
(0.37) 
-2.269 
(-0.18) 
5.367 
(0.1) 
33.095 
(1.35) 
-22.21 
(-0.81) 
-4.775 
(-0.14) 
5.742 
(0.48) 
 2008 3.385 
(0.2) 
1.735 
(0.09) 
27.03 
(0.41) 
24.473 
(0.73) 
-10.37 
(-0.3) 
-29.472 
(-0.42) 
8.345 
(0.51) 
 2009 11.015 
(0.51) 
-12.824 
(-0.39) 
-3.885 
(-0.05) 
31.824 
(1.03) 
 -6.16 
(-0.07) 
14.513 
(0.7) 
 2010 13.201 
(0.93) 
26.543 
(1.41) 
15.704 
(0.27) 
22.991 
(0.86) 
-13.92 
(-0.47) 
-2.659 
(-0.06) 
16.919 
(1.16) 
 2011 -14.652 
(-1.07) 
-20.659 
(-1.4) 
14.478 
(0.22) 
8.44 
(0.25) 
-54.96* 
(-2.06) 
-12.627 
(-0.25) 
-13.651 
(-1) 
 2012 -7.506 
(-0.5) 
-14.339 
(-0.92) 
16.195 
(0.22) 
22.14 
(0.65) 
 -18.669 
(-0.27) 
-6.586 
(-0.45) 
Constant 7.298 
(0.68) 
10.808 
(0.94) 
1.093 
(0.02) 
43.277 
(0.83) 
43.28 
(0.83) 
43.527 
(1.06) 
5.192 
(0.47) 
 Prob > F  0 0 0.8061 0.8047 0.7461 0.8473 0 
 Adj R 
Square 
0.096 0 0 -0.0385 0 0 0.1371 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
 
This table summarises 7 Regressions that are estimating the underpricing level. The underpricing is the return on the share 
having been bought on the IPO and sold at the closing of the first trading day, where each one of them is presented in one of 
the columns. It shows the results for the whole sample, IPOs from the Main market, IPOs from the AIM market, and 
different sizes of IPOs from both markets. The sizes of proceeds are shown in Millions of UK Pounds. The control 
Variables are the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Market dummy is 0 for Main market and 1 for AIM market. 
Multi-bookrunner takes a value of 1 if there is more than one bookrunner in the IPO and 0 if only one. Prestigious is a 
dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has a prestigious underwriter and 0 otherwise, Return Volatility shows the standard 
deviation of the return on the share from the IPO date for a year. 
  
138 
 
4.18 Discussion of the results 
AIM market is a new sector for the smaller and younger companies seeking access to 
the public equity. AIM market has been growing since 1995. For the IPOs in our 
sample, the money raised in the AIM market is about one-third the size of the money 
raised in the Main market over the same period and applying the same filters. There is 
no doubt that there are a number of differences in the characteristics of the two 
markets. In this section, based on the statistics of the data I have and using the 
regression model analysis results, I would like to verify and validate that the spread 
charged by the underwriters differs between the two markets. 
From Table 4.3, Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, I can see that the spread charged 
differs. For the whole sample, the spread charged is (Mean = 6.42%, Median = 5.00%). 
When looking at the AIM market only, I find the results to be close as IPOs from the 
AIM market make about 71% of the whole sample. AIM market reported higher 
spread (Mean = 6.47%, Median = 5.08%). When I compare this to the Main market I 
can notice that the spread in this market is lower (Mean = 4.04%, Median = 4.00%). 
Moreover, when I look into the spread regression model, I can see from Table 
4.3, Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 that the market dummy is always positive and highly 
statistically significant when including the whole sample. This is also true for the 
univariate analysis in Table 4.10. The factor of the market dummy in the univariate 
table is 2.42 with 99% level of significance. From the above, I can accept the first 
hypothesis that underwriters spread is higher in the AIM compared to the Main market. 
Economies of scale are noticed in many economic contracts and many aspects 
of business activities. The increase in production is often accompanied by a reduction 
in cost. I will go through our findings from our statistical analysis and examine if the 
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economies of scale apply to the spread charged as the proceeds increase. From Table 
4.5, the spread charged for the IPOs in the AIM market is (Mean = 6.47%, Median = 
5.08%). As I have discussed earlier, the size of proceeds is much higher in the Main 
market where I can see the spread is lower than the AIM market. The spread charged 
in the main market is (Mean = 4.04%, Median = 4.00%) as shown in Table 4.4. 
In addition, when I look at Figure 4.4, Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.8 showing the 
spread to the log proceeds, I can notice that there is a downward sloping in all the three 
of them. This shows that the spread decreases as the proceed increases. Log of 
proceeds has the highest significance and is negative in the whole sample and in AIM. 
They both show a negative coefficient, which supports Hypothesis H2 about the dis-
economy of scale. The absolute value of log proceeds has increased when I apply the 
FE model, the Tobit model and the non-linear model which support the hypothesis of 
the economies of scale. 
How do underwriters deal with the IPOs in AIM? I addressed this issue by 
using several data. When underwriter evaluates the company seeking the IPO in order 
to set a fair share price, even with the due diligence in place, it is difficult to cover all 
the risk factors especially with small and young companies as those in the AIM market. 
With that in mind, I would examine the first part of our third hypothesis. Would the 
underwriter charge more in AIM market due to the associated higher risk? 
I turn my attention to the fact that whether underwriters charge more for risky 
IPOs. The risk factors that I are testing here are the idiosyncratic, the volatility of the 
share return over the first year and on the contrast, I am testing the potential growth. 
From Table 4.10 I can see that the univariate test between the spread and the three 
factors mentioned above all show insignificant. Moreover, from Table 4.9, I can see 
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that the correlation between the spread and the three mentioned factors are minimal. 
However, I can look at the lockup period as an indirect indicator of the risk level as it 
is expected to have longer lockup period for riskier companies. The univariate test in 
Table 4.10 shows a positive 2.45. Also, from Table 4.11 and Table 4.12 I can see that 
the lockup period has higher significance for AIM and the smaller IPOs. This shows 
that risk in AIM IPOs has a minimal effect on the spread charged. Hence, I cannot 
accept the hypothesis H3(a) that the underwriters charge more in the AIM because the 
IPOs are riskier.  
The insignificance of the risk proxies could imply that the proxies are not 
suitable to represent riskiness of the IPOs. I have examined two measures of risk. I 
have examined the idiosyncratic risk which is the risk specific to the specific company 
going public. Another risk measure is the volatility of the share return after listing. 
However, the estimation of ex-ante risk for IPOs is considerably more troublesome in 
light of the fact that there is no authentic price data before the IPO to calculate risk. 
The standard deviation of secondary returns after the IPO has been much of the time 
utilised as a proxy for ex-ante risk. By tradition, the standard deviations of the returns 
are utilised. This ex-ante risk measure has demonstrated practically little explanatory 
power, causing some prior researchers to conclude that risk does not fundamentally 
impact returns. Later studies (e.g., Johnson and Miller (1988) reason that the standard 
deviation of post-IPO returns is a poor measure of ex-ante risk; a great part of the 
current research makes utilisation of totally distinctive risk proxies (e.g., Carter and 
Manaster (1990).  Nonetheless, I will also examine if the underwriter will mitigate the 
anticipated risk by underpricing to give compensation to the investors in the short-run. 
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To shed further light on the rent-seeking potential by the underwriters, I have 
examined the relationship between the spread and the lockup period. If the relation is 
negative, then this could mean that the underwriter offers a lower cost to the company 
to have a longer lockup period. Longer lockup period would allow the underwriters to 
benefit from any further issuing. Moreover, it could also indicate that the underwriter 
is offering the company shorter lockup period for a higher spread. A shorter lockup 
will allow the owners a faster exit from the company. 
From Table 4.9, the correlation between the spread and the log of the lockup 
period is positive. In addition, looking at Table 4.10, I can notice that the coefficient 
of the log of the lockup period is positive and significant for the AIM market and the 
small IPOs. The same can be noticed from the iterations in Table 4.11 and Table 4.12 
where the results did not change much from the original results in Table 4.10. 
The above findings contradict the rent-seeking hypothesis and hence I will 
reject the fourth hypothesis that the underwriters charge more in the AIM market 
because of the rent-seeking. On the contrary, the positive relationship suggests that the 
longer the engagement, the higher the spread. 
4.19 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have analysed the role of the underwriters and fees charged for 
managing the IPO. I have covered the IPOs that took place in both the Main market 
and the AIM market of London Stock Exchange over the span of 13 years from 1999 
to 2012. After excluding the financial companies, the companies that are not 
incorporated in the UK and those with missing information, our sample had 972 IPOs. 
I examined the fees charged by the underwriters in terms of percentage and found that 
it ranges between 4% and 6.43% with a median of 5%. I have also calculated the 
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underpricing of the shares at the IPO and found that underpricing is less on the Main 
Market compared to the AIM market. However, IPOs issued in the AIM market 
showed that they are underpriced when calculated on the first day of trading. When I 
calculated it for the fifth day of trading, I have noticed that gap get narrower and this 
shows that prices were closer to the fair price.  
I have also explored the fees charged by the bookrunners in both markets and 
found that fees vary between the IPOs. Nevertheless, as the proceeds increase, the fees 
tend to get lower as a percentage of the proceeds. The regression model showed that 
the main attribute to the fees charged is the value of the proceeds. Another factor that 
affects the fees was the year is which the IPO took place in. I have examined a number 
of factors such as rent-seeking in terms of the length of the lockup period. This proved 
to have little significance. I have also examined a number of other factors such as the 
age of the company at the time of the IPO, some risk factors such as idiosyncratic risk, 
and the potential growth. They all proved insignificant. I have also examined the 
pricing of the shares as an early indicator of the underwriters’ proof of their due 
diligence and hence the post-IPO performance. I found that the underwriters provided 
fair prices when looking at the median of the share return on the first and fifth trading 
days. I have also run regressions to identify the factors that affect the pricing of the 
shares. I find that the model better describes AIM market and the smaller IPOs. 
I investigated five hypotheses. The first hypothesis was that underwriters 
charge more in percentage terms in the AIM market compared to the Main market. I 
showed that the spread charged in AIM market has a mean of 6.47% and a median of 
5.08% compared to a mean of 4.04% and a median 4.00% of for the Main market. The 
second hypothesis was to investigate the reason for the higher charges in the AIM 
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market where I tested the economies of scale from three different aspects. First, by 
examining the regression model for the spread, I found that log proceeds have a 
negative relationship with the spread. Second, when looking at the fees charged 
distribution, I noticed a convergence to 5% that continues below it as the value of the 
proceeds increases. Third, when studying underpricing, I found that the cost of 
underpricing is higher for smaller IPOs. 
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Table 4.19: Hypothesis analysis Summary 
Hypothesis (Conclusion) Supporting evidences 
Hypothesis 1. Underwriters spread is 
higher in the AIM compared to the 
Main market. (Accept) 
- Statistically, from Tables 1, 2, and 3, 
both the mean the median for the 
AIM market is higher than the Main 
market. 
Hypothesis 2. Underwriters charge 
more on AIM because money raised in 
the IPOs is less (Dis-economies of 
scale). (Accept) 
- From Table 6, the coefficient of the 
log(proceeds) is negative 
- From the regression model, the 
coefficient of the log(proceeds) is 
negative too. 
- Figures 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8 and 1.9 
all show a negative sloping 
- The return model shows that AIM 
IPOs are more underpriced which is 
results in a higher spread. 
Hypothesis 3. (a) Underwriters charge 
more on AIM because AIM IPOs are 
riskier. (Reject) 
(b) Alternatively, underwriters mitigate 
risk by lowering the issue price, i.e. 
underpricing more. (Accept) 
- (a) From Table 6, the coefficients of 
both risk factors are small and 
insignificant. 
- (a) Lockup period is used to mitigate 
risk. Its coefficient is positive 
- (b) From the return model, I found 
that IPO issue prices in AIM market 
are more underpriced compared to the 
Main market. 
Hypothesis 4. Underwriter charge more 
in the AIM because of rent-seeking. 
(Reject) 
- Log Lockup Period coefficient is 
positive both in Table 6 for the 
Univariate and in the regression 
model. 
Hypothesis 5. Underwriters charge less 
to attract future business. (Reject) 
- The model of future IPOs shows the 
coefficient of the spread charged the 
previous year to be positive. 
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The third hypothesis was to examine the risk factor and the usage of 
underpricing to mitigate risk. I tested idiosyncratic risk and the Standard Deviation for 
the share price. They both proved to be insignificant. Then, I tested the underpricing; 
this proved significant for the smaller IPOs and the AIM market. However, I found a 
positive relationship with the log of the lockup period which indicates a level of risk. 
The fourth hypothesis was to examine the possibility of rent-seeking contributing to 
the overall charged fees. I used the lockup period as an indication of rent-seeking. 
When examining rent-seeking, I found that the coefficient has a positive value which 
means that it is not used for rent-seeking.  
The fifth hypothesis was the usage of lower charges by the underwriters to 
attract future business. I have examined 2 models in terms of the number of IPOs and 
value of proceeds. Both showed to be insignificant. However, I have noticed a positive 
relation between the average proceeds from last year to the number of IPOs the 
following year. This could be a result of the bookrunners are emerging to be more 
reputable. A summary of the hypothesis findings can be found in Table 4.19. 
This chapter is one of the first work which tries to shed light on the 
underwriter’s role in bringing a company public in the Alternative Investment Market. 
Though the Alternative Investment market is one of the most popular markets for 
smaller companies (Vismara et al., 2013) there are no studies, to the best of our 
knowledge, which tries to examine the cost of raising money in such a market. I try to 
fill the gap in the literature. 
I tested a number of hypotheses. I find that economies of scale are a strong 
determinant of gross spread. The higher the money raised, the lower the cost. I test 
risk hypotheses. However, none of the proxies for risk is significant. I cannot conclude 
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that by using our measures that higher the risk higher the gross spread. Our measures 
for risk could be problematic as all uses the share price data after the IPO. I find some 
evidence that Indirect cost of IPO, underpricing, is negatively related to the gross 
spread. I did not find evidence that gross spread charged works as a marketing tool. I 
also found some evidence that investment bankers charge higher spread at the same 
time they impose higher lockup on the company, which might be consistent with the 
rent-seeking behaviour. However, further research is needed to shed more lights on 
the rent-seeking behaviour and underwriters spread.  
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Chapter 5 
5. Short-run IPO dynamics and value of textual analysis 
5.1 Abstract 
In this chapter, I examine whether IPO texts are related to the short-run IPO dynamics 
like IPO underpricing, spread, lockup length, volatility and idiosyncratic risk. I took 
advantage of hand-collected data from the London Stock Exchange. I do so because 
no previous study has examined the IPO tones and its impact on short-run IPO 
dynamics in the UK, where the market structure in the UK is different in comparison 
to the US from a number of ways. I find that IPO tone is related to underpricing, spread 
and lockup length. However, I did not find any relationship between IPO tone and 
volatility or idiosyncratic risk. This may be due to the fact that these are not good 
measures of ex-ante uncertainty.  
Keywords: London Stock Exchange, Underpricing, spread, lockup length, volatility, 
idiosyncratic risk, Textual analysis. 
JEL: G14, G24, G30, G32 
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5.2 Introduction 
In this chapter, I have started with an abstract of the chapter. The second section is the 
introduction of the chapter. The third section is the literature review which is followed 
by the hypotheses of this chapter. The fifth section is the data and methodology where 
we discuss the textual analysis and the tone measures. The empirical results are 
discussed in the sixth section where I started with the descriptive data then went 
through the hypotheses for the short-run dynamics. On the seventh section, I 
concluded. 
There has been a large literature on issues in IPOs in the last 40 years. Yet, there are 
some puzzles remain with respect to underpricing and design of lockups. Though there 
has been a number of theories to explain underpricing including winners curse 
(Benvenist and Spindt, 1989), asymmetric information (Rock, 1986), IPOs as a 
marketing tool (Demers and Lewellen, 2003), information cascades (Welch, 1992), 
lawsuit avoidance (Hughes and Thakor, 1992; Tinic, 1988), behavioural biases 
(Welch, 1992, Loughran and Ritter, 2002), still it is not clear the reasons for 
underpricing. Also, lockup length is another puzzling issue in the IPO literature. 
Though there have been theories of asymmetric information and moral hazard (Brav 
and Gompers, 2003 and Hoque and Lasfer, 2016) to explain the existence and length 
of lockup, the evidence is not conclusive. In this chapter, I am examining some of the 
puzzling issues in the IPO literature using textual tones.  
Textual analysis has been used in a growing number of papers and research 
contributing to the literature in Accounting and Finance to measure the tone and 
sentiment of corporate news releases, Management discussions and analysis (MD&A), 
annual reports (10K fillings), articles in the newspaper, and message boards for 
investors. Examples include Engelberg (2008), Li (2008), and Tetlock, Saar-
Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008), Tetlock (2007) Antweiler and Frank (2004). The 
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results of these studies could be summarised as negative words could be an effective 
way of measuring tone as negative words show a significant correlation with financial 
variables. 
Other papers examine the tone of various documents with the financial 
variables. For instance, Kothari, Li, and Short (2008) relate the tone of newspaper 
articles on the cost of capital, return volatility, and analyst forecasts.  Demers and Vega 
(2008), Engelberg (2008), and Henry (2008) relates news releases with net income of 
firms, drift in earnings, or share price returns.  Some papers relate the information 
content of IPO prospectuses with the share price returns, share price volatility and 
trading volume (e.g., Feldman et al. (2008), Hanley and Hoberg (2010), and Li (2008, 
2009)).  
 In this chapter, I am examining the effect of the text used in the IPO 
prospectuses on the short-run IPO dynamics of the newly listed companies on the 
London Stock Exchange. In particular, I use the spread, lockup period, underpricing, 
idiosyncratic risk and share price volatility to test for the short-run effect. I do so to 
shed light on the puzzles that remain in the IPO literature.  
All the studies that relate IPO underpricing, volatility and spread to the tone of 
the IPO are based on the US data. To the best of our knowledge, there is no study 
which use the UK data to examine the information content of an IPO prospectus. I fill 
this gap in the literature. The UK and US IPO markets are very different. For example, 
UK market uses book building method and the UK uses open offers and placing 
method. In the book building procedure, information is gathered from the investors 
and reliance on the underwriters is less. On the other hand, open offers and placing 
method rely heavily on the underwriters’ due diligence. Hence, methods of IPO (e.g., 
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book building versus open offer and placing) has direct implications on the 
underpricing and IPO gross spread.   
Lockup length in the US is very standardised, and the median lockup length is 
180 days, and most of the IPOs has 180 days of lockups (Field and Hanka, 2001; Brav 
and Gompers, 2003). In the UK, the lockup length is very diverse and heterogeneous 
(Hoque, 2011). The average lockup length in the UK is 365 days, and the highest is 
1080 days. Also, there are few different types of lockups, absolute versus relative date, 
one versus gradual release of the shares (Hoque, 2011). Since the US lockup length is 
shorter, not much information is produced during the lockup length. However, in the 
UK more information is produced and disclosed as the lockup lengths are longer. Thus 
the longer length of the lockups in the UK might have implications on the IPO 
prospectuses. Also, there is a quiet period in the US which is 40 days after the IPO 
(before 2002, it was 25 days). There is no quiet period in the UK.  Since more 
information is produced and disclosed after the IPO, asymmetric information is less 
of a problem in the UK. Hence, the tone measure at the time of IPO may be not related 
to the lockup length in the UK.   
Our results show a significant relationship with the dictionary words and IPO 
underpricing, lockup length and spread. I find that superfluous words and underpricing 
are significantly related. I also find that positive words are significantly related to 
underpricing. These results are in sharp contrast to the US market, where Loughrun 
and McDonald (2015) show a positive relationship between uncertain, weak modal 
and negative words and IPO underpricing. It may show different IPO market structure 
present in the US as compared to the UK. While in the US, book building is the IPO 
method normally followed, while in the UK private placements and open offer are 
practised most of the times. Rather our results are more consistent with Hanley and 
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Hoberg (2010) where they find standard content is positively related, and informative 
content is negatively related to underpricing. 
Our results show a positive relationship between most of the tone measures 
and IPO spread. This is somehow consistent with Hanley and Hoberg (2010) who find 
a positive relationship between standard content and informative content with the 
Spread in the US market. Higher information disclosure in the UK increases the 
spread, which shows the underwriters can possibly measure the riskiness of the 
company and charge an appropriate fee for the services they provide. I need to bear in 
mind that the IPO spread in the US is almost fixed at 7%, while in the UK, it shows a 
large variation ranging from 4-11%. Our sample is dominated by the small AIM 
companies which might be riskier. Thus bookrunners charge according to the risk of 
the companies as reflected by the IPO tones in the prospectuses.  
I also find a significant negative relationship between negative, litigious and 
uncertainty words and lockup length. The results show higher the risk related words 
the lower the lockup length. These results are consistent with the asymmetric 
information explanation of lockup length. Since these words mitigate the information 
asymmetry – to some extent - it reduces the lockup length.  
I do not find any relationship between the tone measure of IPO and total 
volatility and idiosyncratic risk. This might be due to several reasons. The first one is 
that volatility and idiosyncratic risk is not an appropriate measure of ex-ante 
uncertainty of the IPO. Both volatility and idiosyncratic risk are measured after the 
IPO, hence might not reflect the true ex-ante risk of an IPO. Secondly, the effect of 
tone measures might die out as the time progresses. Since total volatility and 
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idiosyncratic risk is measured after some time of the IPO, it is unable to capture the 
impact the tone as measured by words mentioned in IPO. 
I contribute to the IPO literature in various ways. There has been a 
longstanding puzzle in the IPO literature regarding underpricing and lockups. This 
chapter tries to explain the underpricing and lockups with the tones from prospectuses. 
This is related to the literature on tones of IPOs and 10-K using the US data (see 
Loughrun and McDonald, 2011, Hanley and Hoberg, 2010). I did an out of sample test 
using the data from UK where the IPO market setup is different. I also tested whether 
the lockup length is related to the asymmetric information problem using the IPO tone. 
Previous papers find that lockups serve to mitigate the information asymmetry and 
they reduce moral hazard problems. Using the tone information from IPO 
prospectuses, I find that IPO lockups mitigate the information asymmetry. This paper 
is related to a number of lockup papers in the US (Field and Hanka, 2001, Brav and 
Gompers, 2003, Brau et al., 2005) and the UK (Hoque, 2011, Hoque, 2015, Hoque 
and Lasfer, 2016). 
Our work expands on earlier literature that analyses disclosure with regards to 
IPOs. For instance, Beatty and Ritter (1986) provide evidence that more detail data in 
the prospectuses regarding the use of proceeds found to increase underpricing. 
Conversely, Leone, Rock, and Willenborg (2007) and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) 
find that organisations that disclose more (less) information regarding the utilizations 
of the funds are associated with lower (higher) first day returns. Different researchers 
analyse whether there is a connection between the length and level of disclosure in the 
risk factors and valuation of IPOs. Beatty and Welch (1996) and Arnold, Fishe, and 
North (2010) analyse the prospectus in terms of length and level of disclosure of risks 
and find that more information disclosure in risk related section is connected with 
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higher IPO first day returns. Guo, Lev, and Zhou (2004) concentrate on an industry 
which is characterised by high risk as information is valuable—the biotechnology 
firms.  They find a negative connection between the degree of risk disclosure and the 
bid–ask spread, however, don’t analyse if there is a connection to IPO underpricing. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 I present a literature 
review. Section 3 develops hypotheses. Section four describes the data and 
methodology. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Finally, section six concludes. 
5.3 Literature review 
Recently, there has been a number of studies that uses textual analysis to analyse the 
financial information contents provided by the companies and firms working in the 
public market. When checking the term “text” in Oxford dictionary, the first definition 
is “A book or other written or printed work, regarded in terms of its content rather than 
its physical form” (2015). However, the text in its essence is a conversion of voice and 
sounds people use to communicate into a written format. Although that the tone of 
speech is not captured in this process of conversion, yet the words used would partially 
reflect the sentiment. Humans have been using the concept of the Textual analysis 
very early in the history as part to understand the conveyed message better regardless 
of its format (McKee, 2003). A more structured format of textual analysis emerged 
more than a thousand years ago as people were studying scriptures to understand them 
and to criticise their authenticity (Karcic, 2006). In the modern ages, text mining – a 
term that was more frequently used – was first noticed in mid-1980’s. However, this 
process used to be expensive and cumbersome due to the fact that it could only be 
done by real human reading throughout the text and indexing all words 
(Bhattacharyya, Das, Mitra, Ganguly, Das, Bandyopadhyay and Kim, 2009). 
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However, as the computer started to have more power and to be affordable, textual 
analysis advanced noticeably since then. 
Earlier use of textual analysis was mainly focusing on the analysing the 
political context and not specifically designed to analyse the financial documents. An 
important study by (Loughran and McDonald, 2011) made a major contribution by 
regenerating the dictionaries used to evaluate the sentiment of the documents. In this 
study, authors had examined the dictionaries created by Harvard University. Harvard 
dictionaries categorised words in a way to show their tones. However, the authors 
argue that some of the words are taken out of context when I look into financial text. 
They have reported that almost three-fourths of negative words used in 10 – K based 
on Harvard dictionary are typically not negative financial context. They worked on 
creating word lists containing words that reflect different tones. They have examined 
all the words used in 10-K documents and captured all the words that have been used 
for at least 5%. They have categorised these words into negative and positive lists with 
the financial meaning in mind. They came with a new set of dictionaries that is more 
related to the financial literature. 
To be listed in the US market, a company has to fill and S1 form. S1 form 
contains initial data about the company. This data will be used in the preparation of 
prospectus. In this study by (Loughran and McDonald, 2013), they are measured 
changes in offer price and in S1 language to the final prospectus. They find that higher 
use of certain words in S1 results in upward offer price revisions. Loughran and 
McDonald (2015) have compared the results of the analysing financial documents 
using their word list (hereafter LM) with Diction’s. Diction platform and its word lists 
are widely used in analysing financial documents in literature. However, (Loughran 
and McDonald, 2015) find that about 83% of optimistic words and about 70% of 
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pessimistic words used in the lists are misleading. They have analysed the pre-filing 
K-10 documents using both LM’s and Diction’s word lists. They have reported a 
negative correlation between the optimism word frequency and LM positive words. 
This means that the more optimistic tone of the document using Diction’s, the less 
positive tone using LM positive word list. They ran regressions measuring the effect 
of the four list analysis (Diction’s optimism and pessimism word lists and LM positive 
and negative word lists) on the post-filing return volatility. Using Diction optimism 
word frequency, its coefficient was significant and positive. They argue that this is 
somehow surprising as per previous empirical evidence investors do not value positive 
language in the business text. LM negative word list frequency coefficient was 
insignificant. This is what they have expected as it is consistent with the 
aforementioned previous empirical evidence. Both Diction’s pessimism and LM 
negative frequency coefficients were significant and positive. They refer the ability of 
Diction pessimism word frequency to reasonably explain the pre-filing return 
volatility to the correlation of 0.688 with LM negative word list. 
Kearney and Liu (2014) have surveyed about thirty-eight papers that have 
contributed to the financial textual analysis. The have studied them from three aspects. 
They examine the information sources, content analysis methods and financial models. 
The authors categorised the sources into three main categories. The first category uses 
sources to measure the corporation-expressed sentiment. This mainly includes the 
documents that are released by the corporates such as annual reports, earnings press 
releases and conference calls. I notice that among all the surveyed papers, (Ferris, Hao 
and Liao, 2013) was the only paper that used the IPO prospectuses as an information 
source. The second category was for the information sources used to major the media-
express sentiment. Information sources that fall under this category include news 
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stories, in-depth commentary and analyst reports. The third category was the internet-
expressed sentiment. The information sources included in this category are the 
messages on the Internet such as the messages posted on Yahoo!Finance and Raging 
Bull. 
In terms of the content analysis methods, Kearney and Liu (2014) report that 
the two main methods used for textual analysis are the dictionary-based approach and 
machine learning. However, the dictionary-based approach is the dominated one 
among the surveyed studies. In earlier studies, they have reported the use of DICTION 
and GI/Harvard dictionaries. However, in the most recent studies, they have reported 
a tendency to use a finance specific words dictionaries such as the LM word list. 
Finally, Kearney and Liu (2014) have surveyed the financial models used and 
reported that the most common used is the linear regression model on time series data. 
They have also reported four other less frequently used models such as vector 
autoregression model (VAR), logistic and probit regression, volatility model and 
textual sentiment-based trading model. 
Ferris et al., (2013) studied the level of conservatism in the IPO prospectuses. 
Their sample consists of 1100 IPO prospectuses from the US market over the period 
from 1999 to 2005. In their study, they have used LM word list, Diction dictionary 
and Harvard dictionary. They measured the level of conservatism in an IPO prospectus 
using the negative word list and calculating its percentage to the total words in the 
prospectus. They have documented that a greater conservatism in a prospectus is 
related to an increased and replacing. In addition, they have reported that conservatism 
shows a significant inverse relationship to the industry return on assets for three years 
following the IPO. However, the above applies to the non-technology companies and 
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less or no significance on technology companies. They use a separate analysis for 
technology companies due to the high uncertainty in them. They conclude that lack of 
power of productivity concerns the idea of those companies being fundamentally hard 
to evaluate. 
The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced a rule 
effective from the first of October 1998 for the companies willing to be listed to use 
plain English in their prospectus filings. The mandate states “To enhance the 
readability of the prospectus, you must use plain English principles in the 
organization, language, and design of the front and back cover pages, the summary, 
and the risk factors section” (1998). Loughran and McDonald (2014) have measured 
the change in the effect of the language used in the 10-K, 424 forms and issued 
prospectuses for IPOs that took place for the period between 1994 and 2009. They 
captured six components from the documents to measure the plain English in a 
document. These components are the average sentence length, the average word 
length, use of passive voice, legalese, personal pronouns and other low frequent 
measures such as negative phrases and superfluous. In their study, they have 
normalised all the measures for all the documents (mean of 0 and standard deviation 
of 1). As the measure increases, it implies more compliance with the plain English 
mandate. They have reported that the all the three types of documents have shown a 
reaction to the mandate towards compliance. The measure for the 424 Forms and the 
IPO prospectuses increased more than 3 standard deviations over the following 2 
years. Moreover, the effect on IPO prospectuses was almost immediate as it was 
reported from 1999. 
Demers and Joos (2007) did a study developing an IPO failure prediction 
model that includes accounting information, firm and IPO characteristics. They have 
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documented that their estimated probabilities of failure driven from their textual 
analysis model is significantly and negatively associated with abnormal returns after 
the IPO. Elliott, Rennekamp and White, (2015) measured the effect of using concrete 
language and clear disclosure on the willingness of the investors to invest. They 
reported that investors are more comfortable when more information is provided. 
5.4 Hypothesis Development  
In this chapter, I am examining the effect of the sentiment and tone used in the 
prospectuses writing on the short-run post-IPO performance. I use the spread, IPO 
underpricing, lockup period, idiosyncratic volatility and share price volatility.  
I can categorise the dictionaries into 3 main groups. The first group contains 
the dictionaries that can be used in a conservative context. These dictionaries are 
Negative, Harvard IV, Constraining and Litigious. The second group contains the 
dictionaries that don’t add much information to the context. However, using them at a 
higher rate can indicate a level of hesitance and uncertainty. The group of this category 
contains Superfluous, Modal and Uncertainty. The third group contains the 
dictionaries that can be used in marketing materials. These dictionaries are Interesting 
and Positive. 
When the text used in the prospectus is more of a conservative tone, I would 
expect that the spread charged by the underwriters, underpricing and lockup period 
would be higher due to the fact that the underwriter is presenting more conservative 
information in terms of negative, constraints and litigious information. Ferris et al., 
(2013) reported a positive relationship between the conservatism of the prospectuses 
and underpricing. In terms of performance, I expect the shares to have lower 
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performance and volatility as risk factors are already presented in the prospectus and 
hence, less price correction and volatility are expected. 
For prospectuses with higher usage of words from the second group, would be 
expected to have lower spread. The Higher rate of superfluous words can be an 
indication of a lack of the necessary information which would be a result of less effort 
in the preparation of the IPO and hence, fewer fees charged by the underwriters. 
However, to compensate for the lack of information, underwriters may tend to 
underprice more and apply longer lockup periods. In addition, shares are expected to 
perform less than the market during a higher volatility period. 
The third group is the prospectuses that use more positive tone in their text. 
They show more interesting words in their prospectuses. These kinds of words are 
used to market the IPO and to make it more appealing. Presenting more positive words 
can be an indicative of more effort paid by the underwriters to show the strengths of 
the company. This is expected to be reflected in a higher spread. In addition, 
underpricing and lockup period are expected to be higher to mitigate the risk of share 
prices drop.  
5.5 IPO Spread and tone 
Hanley and Hoberg (2010) assert that a good amount of effort and resources spent by 
the underwriters in the pre-IPO stage. In their words: “Substantial resources are 
expended on due diligence by the underwriter, the issuing firm, and their legal counsel 
to gather information about the firm. While some of this expenditure is due to 
regulatory or liability concerns, it is plausible that greater effort expended in the 
premarket to acquire information about both the issuing company and its competitors. 
If the issuer and underwriter choose to have more accurate pricing in the premarket, 
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they will expend greater effort in acquiring information through enhanced due 
diligence about the issuing firm and its competitors.” (Hanley and Hoberg, 2010, p. 
2826-27). In that case underpricing will be lower and underwriter spread will be 
higher. 
The advantage of expanded data collection in the US before the IPO is that the 
underlying offer price will be a more precise appraisal of the last offer price and 
aftermarket trading price (Hanley and Hobarg, 2010). Since fewer data will be 
assembled from investors during book building, underwriters who conduct a higher 
level of premarket due diligence gain from both lower value changes and lower 
compensation to educated investors through underpricing (Benveniste and Spindt, 
1989). This advantage is balanced by the possible costs of uncovering exclusive data 
to rivals. Further, improved due diligence may turn out to be excessively costly 
exercise, making it impossible to higher lawful expenses and underwriters pay. This 
is especially valid if the underwriter's remuneration can't be raised sufficiently high to 
make up for the extra effort because authors find that underwriters make exactly 7% 
on IPOs (see Chen and Ritter 2000, Abrahamson et al., 2011). But this may not be the 
case in the UK as there is no fee clustering in the London Stock Exchange. I report 
while the average fee in the UK is 6.67%, there is a huge variation in the level of fees. 
For example, underwriters charge from 4.00% to 11.00% in the UK. So it is possible 
that the underwriters who pursue a higher level of diligence charge higher level of 
fees.  
Hanley and Hobarg (2010) assert that the result of more prominent data 
generation in the premarket ought to be more informative substance in the initial 
prospectus. On the other hand, when book building is used the preliminary prospectus 
is likely to contain more standard content following the recent trends of the industry. 
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In the absence of book building in the UK, I expect that UK underwriters will try and 
collect more information regarding the company before IPO. Hence, by decomposing 
the information into positive and negative tones, I will be able to identify how 
information affects the spread and underpricing.  
Issuers and underwriters who are willing to put more resources to get higher 
production of information before the IPO are expected to have better information 
content in the preliminary prospectus. Underpricing will be lower as higher 
information content is presented since the company or the investment banks do not 
need to reward investors who provide information in the book building phase of the 
IPO (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989). Since book building is not used in the UK, the 
tone of the IPO will be reflected in the IPO underpricing and underwriter spread. I 
conjecture that positive tone will reduce the underpricing and increase the spread. 
Conservative and Uncertainty tones reflect a riskier IPO. Underwriters are 
expected to charge higher spread in this case to cover for the anticipated risk. On the 
other hand, when enough data is presented with a positive tone, this indicates more 
due diligence and extra effort paid in data collection and hence, higher spread as well. 
H1: Underwriters charge higher spread for all the tones whether it is 
Conservative, Uncertainty or Positive tone. 
5.6 IPO Underpricing and tone 
A number of theories in IPO pricing state that uncertainty of the company is related to 
IPO underpricing (see Ritter, 1984; Rock, 1986). However, since the IPOs are not 
traded in the market, and there is not much information regarding them it is very hard 
to measure the ex-ante uncertainty and risks surrounding these companies. Though 
inverse issue price, firm age, pre-IPO sales, IPO gross proceeds are all used as a proxy 
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of uncertainty; these measures are subject to limitations, and they could be measuring 
many other things at the same time. Previous literature has used alternative measures 
like standard deviation of aftermarket returns. However, they are not without critic as 
standard deviation is measured in the aftermarket.  
Beatty and Ritter (1986) study have demonstrated a positive association 
between ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the IPO and the expected underpricing. 
According to the previous studies, a higher ex-ante uncertainty of IPO firms should 
result in higher first-day returns. Consistent with the previous studies, Loughran and 
McDonald (2015) report that certain words which represent ex-ante risks of IPOs in 
the Form S-1 are significantly related to IPO underpricing after they control for other 
variables which are found as significant in the previous literature. Since IPO 
prospectus is the document which presents relevant financial and business information 
in the UK, I conjecture that certain risk related words like uncertain, weak modal and 
negative words are positively related to underpricing.   
Underpricing is related to the riskiness of the IPO. Conservative and 
Uncertainty tones reflect a risker IPO and hence a underprice more. While a positive 
tone would indicate a less riskier IPO and hence will underprice less. 
H2: Underwriters will underprice more when underwriters use a Conservative 
or Uncertainty tones while it will underprice less when using a Positive tone. 
5.7 Lockup length and tone 
Lockup is an agreement between the underwriters and insiders of the firm not to sell 
the shares for an agreed period after the IPO. Since there are no rules regarding 
lockups, it is a voluntary agreement. However, almost all the IPOs have lockups. 
Literature shows that lockups reduce the asymmetric information problem and moral 
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hazard problem (Brav and Gompers, 2003, Brau and Fawcett, 2005, Hoque and Lasfer, 
2016). Literature has also proposed that lockup is a mechanism for rent-seeking, 
however, the evidence for this is not very clear (Brav and Gompers, 2003 and Hoque 
and Lasfer, 2016).  
Most of the literature on Lockups on the US where lockup length is 
standardised and found to be 180 days. However, the lockup length in the UK is much 
more heterogeneous, and the length varies. The median lockup length is 365 days, 
with lowest of 90 days and highest of 1080 days. Also, there are few types of Lockups. 
According to Hoque (2011), there are fixed lockup date and relative lockup date. Also, 
there is the gradual release of shares. The varied nature of lockup in the UK in 
comparison to the US makes it more interesting to relate the IPO prospectuses tone to 
the lockup length. It is also interesting to look at it because since lockup length is 
larger in the UK, so more information is produced and disclosed during this time. It 
would be an interesting to examine the relationship between IPO tone and lockup 
length.   
If lockups reduce the asymmetric information problem and provide investors 
with the confidence, the same objectives could be achieved by the tone of the IPO 
prospectuses. Thus I conjecture that that uncertain, weak modal and negative words 
are positively related to lockup length. However, if the lockups reduce the moral 
hazard in the UK, I would expect no relationship between the lockup and IPO tone.  
Underwrites impose a lockup period to show the commitment of the internal 
management and hence mitigate the risk of information asymmetry. As a result, 
Conservative and Uncertainty tones is expected to be related with a higher lockup 
period. While a positive tone would indicate a less lockup period. 
164 
 
H3: Lockup period will be more when underwriters use a Conservative or 
Uncertainty tone and will be less when they use a Positive tone in the prospectuses. 
5.8 Volatility and tone 
There is a huge literature on the connection between disclosure and volatility (see the 
literature review by Healy and Palepu (2001)). Disclosure reduces the volatility 
because more disclosure is likely to reduce the degree of information asymmetry 
between the insiders and the outsiders (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson 1986; Diamond 
and Verrecchia 1991; Easley and O’Hara 2004). Information asymmetry widens the 
adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread required by the market makers and 
thus increases the volatility of security (Kothari, Li and Short, 2009). 
The covariance of the firm’s cash flows with other firms’ cash flow decreases 
with a higher level of disclosures (Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2007). This reduces 
the volatility of the firms which is disclosing more information. Kothari, Li and Short 
(2009) assert that the higher quality of information disclosure improves the investment 
decisions made by managers. The improvement is caused by the reduced uncertainty 
as a result of better information. 
Loughrun and McDonald (2015) assert that certain words such as uncertain, 
weak modal, and negative word frequencies proxy for ex-ante uncertainty about the 
IPO. Beatty and Ritter (1986), in an earlier paper, use two measures of ex-ante risk of 
an IPO: (1) log (1+ the number of different uses of proceeds mentioned in the IPO 
prospectus) and (2) the inverse of IPO gross proceeds. Beatty and Ritter (1986) 
rationalise the use of a number of different uses of IPO proceeds is motivated by the 
SEC regulations. During their sample period, there was a requirement by the SEC for 
the more speculative offerings to provide with the detailed uses of funds that are going 
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to be raised during the IPO. The less risky IPOs are not required to provide such 
information. 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) uncertainty proxies are out of context in our study as 
this paper is using UK data and there are no such requirements in the UK. Firstly, in 
the UK there is no difference in requirements between the established firms and risky 
offering to report the intended use of proceeds. Secondly, as suggested by Loughrun 
and McDonald (2015), amid the Internet bubble, a few extremely risky offerings had 
huge net proceeds from the IPO. Due to differences in regulations imposed by the 
United Kingdom Listing Authorities (UKLA) as compared to the SEC, Beatty and 
Ritter’s measures are not appropriate for our sample. Rather, I use the Loughrun and 
McDonald (2015) tone measures to relate to the share price volatility.  
Since the Conservative and the Uncertainty tones are related with a higher risk, 
they are expected to result in more underpricing and higher volatility and hence higher 
first-day return. While the Positive tone is less received by the investors and is not 
expected to show any impact on the underpricing or the volatitlity on the first-day of 
trading. 
H4: Share price volatility will be higher when underwriters use a Conservative 
or Uncertainty tones and no effect when they use a positive tone in the prospectuses. 
5.9 Idiosyncratic risk and tone 
One of the ways to measure business risk is an idiosyncratic risk. Idiosyncratic risk is 
the residual risk from the market model regression which is not explained by the 
market and specific to a business sector. Lambert et al. , (2007) hypothesise that the 
covariance of the firm’s cash flows with other firms’ cash flow decreases with a higher 
level of disclosures, which reduces the volatility of the firms with more disclosers.  If 
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the covariance of the cash flows between two firms is zero, we are left with the 
idiosyncratic risk because the idiosyncratic risk is uncorrelated across firms. In that 
circumstance, firms with more disclosure have a lower idiosyncratic risk. Kothari, Li 
and Short (2009) assert that the higher quality of information disclosure improves the 
investment decisions made by managers. The improvement is a result of the reduced 
uncertainty as a result of better information. Again, this might be uncorrelated across 
the business or the industry. Since information about the business is reflected in the 
tone of the IPO, I try to relate the information content of the IPO with the idiosyncratic 
risk. To the best of my knowledge, no previous paper related the idiosyncratic risk of 
an IPO with the information content of IPO prospectus. Thus, I conjecture that: 
 With hihger idiosyncratic risk, underwriters are expected to be more 
conservative. On the other hand, a positive tone would indicate less idiosyncratic risk. 
However, Uncertainty tone is not expected to have any effect. 
H5: Idiosyncratic risk is higher when underwriters use a Conservative tone, 
lower when using a Postive tone and will not be affected by the Uncertainty tone in 
the prospectuses. 
Table 5.1 summarise the five hypothesis 
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Table 5.1: Hypothesis summary 
Sentiment H1 Spread 
H2: 
Underpricin
g 
H3: 
Lockup 
Period 
H4: 
Volatility 
H5: 
Idiosyncrat
ic 
Conservative 
Dictionaries 
Negative Higher Higher Higher Higher Higher 
Harvard_I
V Higher Higher Higher Higher Higher 
Constrainin
g Higher Higher Higher Higher Higher 
Litigious Higher Higher Higher Higher Higher 
Uncertainty 
Dictionaries 
Uncertaint
y Higher Higher Higher Higher 
Neutral 
Superfluou
s Higher Higher Higher Higher 
Neutral 
Modal Higher Higher Higher Higher Neutral 
Marketing 
Dictionaries 
Interesting Higher Lower Lower Neutral Lower 
Positive Higher Lower Lower Neutral Lower 
This table shows a summary of the hypotheses I have in this chapter. It shows the expected effect of 
the usage of each of the dictionaries in the prospectuses on short terms variables. 
 
5.10 Data and methodology 
I use the same IPO prospectuses that I used in chapter 1. As per Table 5.3, The median 
of the number of words per prospectus in the main market is 66,662 words while for 
the AIM market it is 27,792 words. I have only included the IPOs that have more than 
2000 words that is less than 10 percent of the median of the AIM market prospectuses 
and hence would not have a comparable data. The total number of prospectuses in our 
sample is 946 where 26 of them were photocopies and required optical character reader 
(OCR) to convert them to text. I used the tool provided by Google Drive to convert 
photocopies in PDF format into text. 
I used the dictionaries developed by (Loughran and McDonald, 2011) in 
addition to Harvard IV dictionary for negative words. 
To analyse each prospectus, I use the AntWordProfiler . For each prospectus, 
I have gathered the following information: 
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 Total number of words in the prospectus 
 The frequency of appearance of each word in the prospectus 
 The number of words appeared in the prospectus that belongs to each of the 
dictionaries. 
 Numerical characters have been excluded from the counting 
The pre-IPO financial data have been collected manually from the 
prospectuses. This includes the Pre-IPO Net Income and the Pre-IPO Sales. I also 
calculate the Overhang using the financial data provided in the prospectuses. The post-
IPO financial data have been collected using DataStream. Market information and 
Indices have been collected using DataStream too.  
Table 5.2: Dictionaries Statistics 
Group Dictionary Number of words 
 All words 84,669 
 Uncategorised words 77,602 
 Categorised words including Harvard IV 7,067 
 Categorised words by (Loughran and McDonald, 2011) 4,118 
Conservative Negative 2,329 
Harvard_IV 4,187 
Constraining 187 
Litigious 886 
Uncertainty Superfluous 56 
Modal 60 
Uncertainty 297 
Marketing Interesting 68 
Positive 354 
 Irr_Verb 158 
This table shows the total number of words in the main dictionary and in each categorised 
dictionary. 
 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) have introduced 9 different dictionaries in 
addition to the Harvard IV negative words dictionary. There is some overlap between 
those dictionaries were some words appear in more than one of them. The dictionaries 
are as follows (Negative, Positive, Uncertainty, Litigious, Constraining, Superfluous, 
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Interesting, Modal, Irregular Verb in addition to Harvard IV Negative). Table 5.2 
shows some statistical information about the dictionaries. 
I can notice from Table 5.2 that the sizes of the dictionaries vary a lot. The 
largest dictionary by far is Harvard IV. LM Negative dictionary is almost half the size 
of Harvard IV. The other LM dictionaries sizes range between few hundred words to 
less than a hundred. 
Following the same methodology used by Loughran and McDonald (2011), I 
have calculated the proportional weight of each dictionary as follows: 
 
ܲݎ݋݌݋ݎݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ ܹ݁݅݃ℎ ݋݂ ܽ ܦ݅ܿݐ݅݋݊ܽݎݕ
=  ෍
ܹ݋ݎ݀௜  ܨݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕ
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܰݑܾ݊݁ݎ ݋݂ ܹ݋ݎ݀ݏ
 
(5.1) 
For all the words from this specific dictionary.  
This model simply calculate the weight of the accumulated frequency of words from 
a certain dictionary to the total number of words in the prospectus. This gives an 
independent weight of the tone used in a prospectus without taking in consideration 
the usage of the same words or terms on the other prospectuses.  
I have also calculated the Time Frequency – Inverse Document Frequency 
(tf.idf) so that the weight of a certain word is in accordance with its importance across 
all the prospectuses under our study. The calculation of the weight of each word is as 
follows: 
 ௜ܹ,௝ = ቐ
(1 + log൫ݐ ௜݂,௝൯)
(1 + log(ܽ))
݈݋݃
ܰ
݀ ௜݂
    ݂݅ ݐ ௜݂,௝ ≥ 1
0                                            ܱݐℎ݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁
 (5.2) 
Where: 
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௜ܹ,௝: the weight of the ݅௧௛ word in the ݆௧௛ document 
ݐ ௜݂,௝: the row word count of the ݅௧௛ word in the ݆௧௛ document 
ܽ : is the average word count in the document 
N: Number of documents 
݀ ௜݂: Number of documents containing at least one occurrence of the ݅௧௛ word 
From this model, it is noticeable from the first part of the equation that the weight of 
the word in a certain prospectus increases as the number of appearances in the 
prospectus increases. However, it is multiplied by the log of the total number of 
documents divided by the number of documents that has at least one appearance of the 
word. This will give more weight to the words that do not appear much as this part 
will exponentially decrease as the number of documents with the same word increases. 
I used the same regressions I used in Chapter 1 and introduced the dictionary 
weight as dependent variables. I introduce the variables one at a time to avoid the 
multicollinearity. 
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Table 5.3: Textual Analysis Statistics 
        Weighted % to Average 
Words 
 All Standard 
Deviation 
Main Standard 
Deviation 
AIM Standard 
Deviation 
Main to 
AIM 
In % 
Main AIM 
Number of prospectuses 946  159  787     
Number of words          
Average 38,818  31,209 74,023  46,763  31,706  20,740  233%   
Median 30,183  66,662  27,792  240%   
Highest 288,796  288,796  157,637  183%   
Lowest 2,198   3,169   2,198  144%   
          
Average Number of words 
from dictionaries 
465 192 627 222 433 167 145%   
          
Dictionaries          
Conservative Negative 376 347 627 537 433 238 145% 0.85% 1.37% 
Harvard_IV 1356 1147 599 1787 269 750 223% 0.81% 0.85% 
Constraining 318 275 693 401 354 202 196% 0.94% 1.12% 
Litigious 411 299 786 443 342 220 230% 1.06% 1.08% 
Uncertainty Superfluous 10 11 586 19 264 7 222% 0.79% 0.83% 
Modal 524 415 184 597 62 297 297% 0.25% 0.19% 
Uncertainty 417 363 410 539 167 260 246% 0.55% 0.53% 
Marketing Positive 207 172 727 245 305 116 238% 0.98% 0.96% 
Interesting 82 99 17 181 9 53 189% 0.02% 0.03% 
 Irr_Verb 325 248 965 380 435 163 222% 1.30% 1.37% 
This table shows statistics of the usage of the dictionaries in prospectuses in our sample. It shows the average number of words used in All the sample, Main 
market and AIM market. Main to AIM in % shows ratio of the average number of the words used in the Main market prospectuses compared to AIM market 
prospectuses in percentage. Weighted % to Average words show the ratio of the average number of the words from each dictionary for a certain market to the 
average number of words of the dictionary of the whole sample. 
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5.11 Empirical Results 
5.12 Descriptive Statistics 
Most of the prospectuses under our study are for IPOs that took place in the 
AIM market. There are 787 prospectuses for AIM market IPOs compared to 159 
prospectuses for the Main market IPOs. A brief statistical information about the textual 
analysis of the prospectus can be found in Table 5.3 
Table 5.3 shows that the average word count of the Main IPO prospectuses is 
more than twice those of the AIM IPO prospectuses. In addition to that, the average 
word count for the categorised words is about 45% more in Main prospectuses 
compared to those in AIM. This implies that text used in Main prospectuses provide 
more information about the companies. 
On the lower part of Table 5.3, I can still notice that the words used from each 
dictionary are higher in Main Market than it is in AIM market. This can be attributed 
to the fact that the word count is higher in the Main Market prospectuses. At the right 
most of the lower part of Table 5.3, the weighted percentage of the average word count 
from each dictionary to the average number of words of the prospectuses from each 
market is shown. It shows that on average, 1.37% of the words used on AIM IPO 
prospectuses are coming from LM negative dictionary compared to only 0.85% from 
the Main market prospectuses. This shows that prospectuses issued in the AIM market 
are showing more conservatism compared to the Main market. Harvard IV dictionary 
is also showing a slightly higher percentage in AIM than Main prospectuses. However, 
Harvard IV dictionary shows a higher Standard Deviation than the Mean. This 
indicates that the range of numbers is large. In other words, it implies that there are 
only a few words from this dictionary compared to a significantly larger usage of the 
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words in some other prospectuses. The third dictionary in the Conservative group is 
LM constraining dictionary. It shows 1.12% in AIM prospectuses compared to 0.94% 
in Main prospectuses. It is expected for the smaller companies to have more 
constraints than larger companies with more facilities. For LM Litigious, AIM 
prospectuses are showing a slightly higher percentage of 1.08 compared to 1.06 in 
Main. This shows that all companies in both markets are putting the same weight on 
litigious words. The percentage use of the other dictionaries is close between the two 
markets except for LM modal where it is slightly higher in Main prospectuses 
compared to AIM prospectuses. Yet, with a higher Standard Deviation than the Mean. 
In this chapter, I have included a few variables in addition to those that I used 
in chapter 1. I have included Overhang, Pre-IPO Net Income and Pre-IPO Sales. First, 
I examined the correlation between them and the Dictionaries Proportional Weights 
and tf.idf Weights as shown in Table 5.4. 
By comparing Panel A to Panel B in Table 5.4, I notice that the tf.idf weights 
have better correlation with the other variables in terms of significance. This is due to 
the fact that the tf.idf puts more weight on the terms that are less frequently used. 
Hence, the usage of such a word will attract more attention from the audience to the 
sentiment of the context. When looking at Panel A, I measure the occurrence of the 
words from a certain dictionary as a proportion of all the words used in a document in 
isolation from the other documents. On the other hand, Time Frequency – Inverse 
Document Frequency put different weights to different words within a certain 
dictionary based on the usage of that word in all the words used in all the documents 
under study.  
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From Panel A, showing the correlation with the proportional weight of the 
different dictionaries, I can notice that there is a positive correlation between 
Log(Proceeds) and Negative, Positive, Uncertainty and Harvard Negative. This shows 
that larger IPOs provide more information in the aforementioned domains. A negative 
correlation can be seen for Litigious and Superfluous in addition to the Irregular Verbs. 
This indicates that larger IPOs show less litigious information that the smaller IPOs as 
a proportional of the whole prospectus.  
175 
 
Table 5.4: Correlation table for the main variables with the different dictionaries weights 
 Proceeds Log 
(Proceeds) 
Spread Idiosyncratic STDev Age in 
Days 
Potential 
Growth 
D1 
Underpricing 
Overhang Pre-IPO Net 
Income 
Pre-IPO 
Log(Sales) 
PrNegative 0.07** 0.152*** 0.068** 0.001 -0.012 -0.035 -0.031 -0.072** 0.006 0.018 0.021 
PrHarvard_IV 0.052 0.118*** -0.013 0.036 -0.005 -0.026 -0.101*** -0.06* 0.01 -0.002 0.127*** 
PrConstraining 0.026 0.109*** -0.051 0.011 -0.006 -0.085** 0.002 -0.028 -0.054* -0.032 0.066 
PrLitigious -0.136*** -0.224*** 0.086*** 0.02 0.044 -0.074* -0.007 0.191*** -0.02 -0.01 -0.051 
PrSuperfluous -0.125*** -0.173*** 0.077** -0.014 0.077** -0.087** 0.006 0.012 -0.027 -0.02 -0.144*** 
PrModal 0.033 -0.004 0.014 -0.03 0.01 -0.121*** -0.022 0.041 -0.065** 0.046 -0.144*** 
PrUncertainty 0.043 0.125*** -0.011 0.031 0.029 -0.05 0.002 0.008 -0.054* -0.007 -0.006 
PrPositive 0.03 0.087*** -0.09*** -0.001 -0.001 0.081** -0.002 -0.075** -0.022 0.018 0.037 
PrInteresting 0.026 0.016 0.011 -0.02 -0.015 0.097** 0.018 -0.005 0.032 -0.025 0.059 
PrIrr_Verb -0.1*** -0.242*** 0.112*** -0.013 -0.005 0.024 -0.079** 0.094*** 0.036 0.021 0.045 
Panel A: Correlation of the main variables with the proportional weight of each dictionary 
 
TFNegative 0.411*** 0.561*** -0.129*** 0.004 -0.025 0.07* 0.018 -0.168*** -0.018 0.064* 0.23*** 
TFHarvard_IV 0.371*** 0.515*** -0.111*** 0.004 -0.028 0.044 0.016 -0.167*** -0.014 0.052 0.177*** 
TFConstraining 0.453*** 0.605*** -0.134*** 0.016 -0.027 0.077** 0.027 -0.171*** -0.003 0.075** 0.306*** 
TFLitigious 0.458*** 0.595*** -0.137*** 0.015 -0.027 0.094** 0.037 -0.159*** 0.014 0.096** 0.275*** 
TFSuperfluous 0.195*** 0.289*** -0.04 -0.022 -0.002 0.033 -0.001 -0.129*** -0.018 0.008 0.108*** 
TFModal 0.239*** 0.361*** -0.061* 0.021 -0.033 0.022 0.03 -0.15*** 0.001 0.012 0.075* 
TFUncertainty 0.314*** 0.452*** -0.087*** 0.021 -0.027 0.072* 0.011 -0.137*** -0.007 0.034 0.166*** 
TFPositive 0.369*** 0.539*** -0.128*** 0.027 -0.036 0.091** 0.025 -0.19*** -0.002 0.068* 0.211*** 
TFInteresting 0.288*** 0.418*** -0.088*** -0.003 -0.013 0.025 0.019 -0.118*** -0.001 0.033 0.09** 
TFIrr_Verb 0.334*** 0.472*** -0.096*** 0.011 -0.039 0.061 0.008 -0.177*** -0.001 0.06 0.237*** 
Panel B: Correlation of the main variables with the time frequency – Inverse document frequency of each dictionary 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table shows the correlation of the different sets of dictionaries weight with the main variables. Proceeds are the total amount raised on IPO. Log proceeds is the log of the 
proceeds raised from the IPO. The spread is the amount charged by the underwriter as a percentage of the IPO proceeds. Idiosyncratic risk shows the firm specific risk. The STDev 
is the standard deviation of share price during the first year of trading. Age in Days is the age of the company in days on the day of IPO. Potential growth is a factor showing if the 
company increased the size of its capital at the years following the IPO. D1 Underpricing is the return on the first day of trading if purchased at the IPO. Overhang is the percentage 
of shares that are not traded. Pro-IPO Net Income is the reported Net Income in the year prior to the IPO. Pre-IPO Log(Sales) is the log of the reported sales in the year prior to the 
IPO. 
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The spread is showing significant correlation with five of the dictionaries in 
Panel A. A positive correlation with Negative, Litigious, Superfluous and Irregular 
Verbs. The highest correlation after the Irregular Verbs is Litigious and Negative with 
a value of 0.086 and 0.068 in the same order. This indicates that underwriters tend to 
charge more as they disclose more litigious and negative information as a proportion 
of the whole prospectus. It also shows a significant positive correlation with the 
Superfluous dictionary. Underwriters use slightly more superfluous words when they 
charge higher fees. 
Age in days before the IPO shows a significant positive correlation with 
Positive and Interesting. This indicates that prospectuses of older companies show 
more positive and interesting words than younger companies. It indicates that older 
companies present more marketing material in their IPO prospectuses compared to the 
younger companies. There is a significant negative correlation with Litigious and 
Constraining. This indicates that older companies have fewer constraints and litigious 
matters to address than other younger companies. Superfluous and Modal are showing 
a negative correlation as well. That indicate that older companies use fewer words 
from them. 
Underpricing is showing a negative correlation with Negative, Positive and 
Harvard IV dictionaries’ proportional weights. This indicates that more positive or 
negative information disclosure in a prospectus will result in less underpricing. 
Moreover, a positive correlation is present with the litigious dictionary. That means 
using more litigious words will result in more underpricing.  
Overhang variable shows a negative correlation with Uncertainty, 
Constraining and Modal. This indicates that as a percentage of offered shares 
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decreases, the proportion of Uncertainty, Constraining and Modal words decreases as 
well. This is due to the fact that the owners are still holding more of the shares which 
show more trust from their side on the firm. 
The Pre-IPO sales variable shows a positive correlation with Positive, 
Interesting, and Harvard Negative words. For the companies that have reported higher 
Pre-IPO sales, their prospectuses show slightly more positive and interesting words. 
In addition, it shows negative correlations with Litigious, Superfluous and Modal. 
When looking to Panel B, I notice that Log(Proceeds) shows high positive 
significant correlation with all the dictionaries. The positive correlation indicates that 
more information is provided for the larger IPOs. The spread is also showing a high 
negative significant correlation with all the dictionaries except for the Superfluous and 
less significance for Modal. This indicates that Underwriters charge more fees when 
disclosing less information. Age in Days is showing a positive correlation with 
Negative, Positive Uncertainty, Litigious and Constraining. This shows that older 
companies show more information than younger ones. 
Underpricing is significantly negatively correlated with all the dictionaries. 
This supports the literature that reported that underwriters compensate for the lack of 
information by underpricing more. Pre-IPO Sales is significantly and positively 
correlated to all dictionaries. This shows that a firm that reports pre-IPO sales are 
disclosing more information than other companies who did not report in per-IPO sales. 
To further examine the effect of the sentiment used in the prospectus on the spread 
charged by the underwriters, I ran the same regression model used in Chapter 1 with 
different dictionaries at a time. 
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From Table 5.5 I can notice that the coefficients of all the dictionaries are 
positive. This shows different results compared to what is reported in the correlation 
in Table 5.4. This can be resulted due to the fact that different segments have different 
correlation across the sample. To investigate this further, I ran all the regressions for 
the different markets, and different IPO proceed sizes as shown in Table 5.6.  
5.13 Spread and tone 
From Table 5.6, when looking at All Market, I can notice that the coefficients 
of all the dictionaries are positive. Only the Superfluous dictionary shows to be 
nonsignificant. The highest coefficient is those of the Interesting and Constraining 
dictionaries. However, I can notice this is significant and positive only on AIM market 
and Less than 16.6M and slightly less significant for the 16.6M – 66.6M. From Table 
5.7, though the correlation is 99% significant and negative for the whole market with 
a value of -0.134, Constraining is showing to be 90% significant for IPOs with 
proceeds less than 16.6M with a value of 0.07. As a result, this indicates that the 
negative value with All Market is mainly coming from the insignificant negative 
correlation reported for the Main Market and larger IPOs. With respect to the 
Interesting, Table 5.7 shows that the correlation is only significant for the segment of 
the sample of the IPOs size between 16.6M – 66.M with a level of significant of 95% 
and a value of 0.165. From Table 5.6, we can notice that all the significant coefficients 
have a positive value which support our first hypothesis (H1). We can notice that the 
significant is more in AIM Market and the less than 16.6M which compromise most 
of the IPOs in our sample and hence All Market shows some significance as well. 
I have also shown the same for the correlation in Table 5.7.
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Table 5.5: Spread Regression for all Market showing the effect of the tf.idf 
  TFNegative TFHarvard_IV TFConstraining TFLitigious TFSuperfluous TFModal TFUncertainty TFPositive TFInteresting TFIrr_Verb 
TFNegative  0.03** 
(2.46) 
         
TFHarvard_IV   0.02** 
(2.21) 
        
TFConstraining    0.27*** 
(3.43) 
       
TFLitigious     0.15*** 
(3.49) 
      
TFSuperfluous      0.45 
(1.41) 
     
TFModal       0.15*** 
(3.49) 
    
TFUncertainty        0.08* 
(1.77) 
   
TFPositive         0.12** 
(2.48) 
  
TFInteresting          0.38** 
(2.43) 
 
TFIrr_Verb           0.22** 
(2.01) 
Log(proceeds) -3.23*** 
(-17.69) 
-3.38*** 
(-17.54) 
-3.34*** 
(-17.63) 
-3.49*** 
(-17.73) 
-3.47*** 
(-17.87) 
-3.25*** 
(-17.75) 
-3.47*** 
(-17.87) 
-3.31*** 
(-17.59) 
-3.35*** 
(-17.76) 
-3.31*** 
(-17.87) 
-3.33*** 
(-17.6) 
Market Dummy -1.72*** 
(-4.68) 
-1.57*** 
(-4.23) 
-1.6*** 
(-4.3) 
-1.51*** 
(-4.07) 
-1.49*** 
(-4.01) 
-1.64*** 
(-4.42) 
-1.49*** 
(-4.01) 
-1.65*** 
(-4.47) 
-1.52*** 
(-4.03) 
-1.6*** 
(-4.34) 
-1.64*** 
(-4.43) 
Multi-bookrunner 0.63 
(1.41) 
0.4 
(0.89) 
0.46 
(1.01) 
0.26 
(0.57) 
0.3 
(0.65) 
0.56 
(1.25) 
0.3 
(0.65) 
0.49 
(1.08) 
0.54 
(1.22) 
0.56 
(1.25) 
0.51 
(1.14) 
Prestigious 0.79*** 
(3.51) 
0.78*** 
(3.49) 
0.79*** 
(3.51) 
0.78*** 
(3.46) 
0.78*** 
(3.48) 
0.81*** 
(3.59) 
0.78*** 
(3.48) 
0.8*** 
(3.57) 
0.76*** 
(3.36) 
0.76*** 
(3.39) 
0.8*** 
(3.56) 
Day 1 Return -0.01** 
(-2.09) 
-0.01* 
(-1.96) 
-0.01* 
(-1.95) 
-0.01* 
(-1.92) 
-0.01* 
(-1.94) 
-0.01** 
(-1.99) 
-0.01* 
(-1.94) 
-0.01** 
(-2.05) 
-0.01* 
(-1.81) 
-0.01** 
(-1.98) 
-0.01* 
(-1.93) 
Log(Lockup) 0.73 
(1.12) 
0.83 
(1.28) 
0.8 
(1.23) 
0.87 
(1.33) 
0.9 
(1.39) 
0.72 
(1.11) 
0.9 
(1.39) 
0.8 
(1.22) 
0.8 
(1.22) 
0.82 
(1.26) 
0.8 
(1.22) 
Constant 5.67*** 
(3.15) 
5.19*** 
(2.88) 
5.27*** 
(2.92) 
5*** 
(2.78) 
4.76*** 
(2.64) 
5.59*** 
(3.11) 
4.76*** 
(2.64) 
5.38*** 
(2.98) 
5.11*** 
(2.83) 
5.23*** 
(2.9) 
5.25*** 
(2.9) 
Observations 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 
Adjusted R Square 0.3372 0.3332 0.3331 0.3323 0.3375 0.3311 0.3331 0.3311 0.3302 0.3317 0.3375 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table summarises 11 OLS Regressions of the spread where each one is presented in one of the columns. The first column shows the regression without introducing any of the dictionaries weight 
variables. The following columns show regressions after introducing the dictionaries one at a time. The control Variables are the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Market dummy is 0 for the 
Main market and 1 for AIM market, Multi-bookrunner is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has more than 1 bookrunner and 0 if only one bookrunner. Prestigious is a dummy with a value of 1 if the 
IPO has a prestigious underwriter and 0 otherwise, D1 Underpricing is the return on the first day of trading if purchased at the IPO. Log(Lockup) is the log of lockup period. I also controlled for years but 
are not reported here in this table. 
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Table 5.6: Summary of dictionary tf.idf weight coefficient for 70 Spread regressions 
 All Market Main Market AIM Market Less than 16.6M 16.6M – 66.6M 66.6M – 333.4M More than 
333.4M 
TFNegative 0.03** 
(2.46) 
0.01 
(0.51) 
0.05*** 
(2.88) 
0.04** 
(2.22) 
0.03** 
(2.02) 
-0.01 
(-0.25) 
-0.06 
(-1.15) 
TFHarvard_IV 0.02** 
(2.21) 
0.01 
(1) 
0.03** 
(2.32) 
0.03* 
(1.74) 
0.03** 
(2.12) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
-0.04 
(-1.1) 
TFConstraining 0.27*** 
(3.43) 
-0.06 
(-0.58) 
0.39*** 
(4.06) 
0.41*** 
(3.19) 
0.11 
(1.09) 
-0.11 
(-1.04) 
-0.37 
(-0.73) 
TFLitigious 0.15*** 
(3.49) 
0.03 
(0.54) 
0.2*** 
(3.73) 
0.21*** 
(2.98) 
0.02 
(0.34) 
0.04 
(0.68) 
-0.13 
(-0.57) 
TFSuperfluous 0.45 
(1.41) 
0.61* 
(1.78) 
0.51 
(1.28) 
0.62 
(1.34) 
0.3 
(0.76) 
0.82 
(1.49) 
-3.36 
(-0.64) 
TFModal 0.15*** 
(3.49) 
0.03 
(0.54) 
0.2*** 
(3.73) 
0.21*** 
(2.98) 
0.02 
(0.34) 
0.04 
(0.68) 
-0.13 
(-0.57) 
TFUncertainty 0.08* 
(1.77) 
-0.01 
(-0.09) 
0.1** 
(2.04) 
0.09 
(1.37) 
0.14*** 
(2.65) 
-0.11 
(-1.61) 
-0.35 
(-0.96) 
TFPositive 0.12** 
(2.48) 
0.06 
(1.19) 
0.14** 
(2.46) 
0.16** 
(2.47) 
0.06 
(1.01) 
0.07 
(0.91) 
-0.53 
(-0.6) 
TFInteresting 0.38** 
(2.43) 
0.24 
(1.63) 
0.53** 
(2.57) 
0.52** 
(2.23) 
0.31* 
(1.78) 
0.14 
(0.47) 
-0.81 
(-0.44) 
TFIrr_Verb 0.22** 
(2.01) 
-0.06 
(-0.36) 
0.31** 
(2.42) 
0.31** 
(2.06) 
0.21 
(1.37) 
-0.15 
(-0.8) 
-0.63 
(-0.92) 
Observations 945 158 787 675 162 90 18 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table summarises 70 OLS Regressions of the spread. Only the coefficient of the dictionary weight and its level of significance is reported here in this table. 
The control Variables are the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Prestigious is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has a prestigious underwriter and 0 
otherwise, Log(Lockup) is the log of lockup period, Market dummy is 0 for the Main market and 1 for AIM market and year dummy variable.  
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Table 5.7: Spread Correlation with dictionaries for All Sample, Main, AIM and different IPO Proceed sizes 
spread All Market Main Market AIM Market 
Less than 
16.6M 16.6M – 66.6M 
66.6M – 
333.4M 
More than 
333.4M 
TFNegative -0.129*** -0.052 -0.046 0.027 0.161** 0.124 -0.059 
TFHarvard_iv -0.111*** -0.01 -0.036 0.022 0.17** 0.148 0.074 
TFConstraining -0.134*** -0.121 -0.036 0.07* 0.106 0.068 -0.145 
TFLitigious -0.137*** -0.083 -0.04 0.077** 0.052 0.145 -0.191 
TFSuperfluous -0.04 0.152* 0.004 0.031 0.089 0.24** 0.33 
TFModal -0.061* -0.06 -0.008 0.022 0.206*** 0.046 0.055 
TFUncertainity -0.087*** -0.065 -0.019 0.034 0.198** 0.042 0.056 
TFPositive -0.128*** 0.03 -0.038 0.012 0.107 0.158 0.299 
TFInteresting -0.088*** 0.056 -0.024 0.019 0.165** 0.082 0.247 
TFIrr_verb -0.096*** -0.08 -0.024 0.034 0.123 -0.004 0.276 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table shows the correlation of the spread with different sets of the time frequency – inverse document frequency weighted dictionaries for different markets 
and different sizes in terms of IPO proceeds. 
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From both Table 5.6 and Table 5.7, I can notice that the usage of superfluous 
words in the prospectus is related to a higher spread charged by the underwriters in 
the Main Market. This indicates that underwriters who charge higher fees would use 
more superfluous words to justify their fees. 
Although AIM Market does not show any significant correlation in Table 5.7, 
yet, the regression reported in Table 5.6 shows significant coefficients across a number 
of dictionaries. The highest four coefficients in value are those of Interesting, 
Constraining, Irregular Verbs, Litigious and Modal with values of 0.53, 0.41, 0.31, 
0.21 and 0.21, respectively.  This indicates that the underwriters in AIM Market put 
their utmost effort towards disclosing the legal and constraints that would face the 
company so that the prospectus would be more interesting. Regressions in Table 5.6 
for the segment of IPOs with proceeds less than 16.6M are showing very close results 
to those of the AIM Market. This is due to the fact the most of the IPOs in the AIM 
Market fall in this segment. However, Table 5.7 shows significance in the correlation 
with both Litigious and Constraining. 
Moving to the next segment where IPO proceed is between 16.6M – 66.6M, I 
can see that there are four dictionaries showing a level of significance. Interesting 
words is showing a significant coefficient of 0.31 and a significant correlation of 0.24 
as shown in Table 5.7. In addition, Uncertainty is also showing a significant and 
positive coefficient of 0.14 and 0.198 of significant correlation in Table 5.7. This 
indicates that underwriters are charging higher fees for IPOs with a higher level of 
uncertainty. The other 2 dictionaries are the Negative and Harvard IV dictionaries. 
From Table 5.6 I can notice that the coefficient values for those 2 dictionaries are 
close. A coefficient of 0.03 for both in Table 5.6 and 0.161 and 0.17 of correlation in 
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Table 5.7 for Negative and Harvard IV in this order. None of the remaining regressions 
in Table 5.6 for 66M – 333.4M and More than 333.4M show any significance. 
I have introduced the tf.idf weight variables for all the dictionaries on the non-
linear spread regression model: 
 
ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀ =  
1
ܾଵ +  ܾଶ log(݌ݎ݋ܿ݁݁݀ݏ)
+ ܾଷ ݐ݂݀݅ܿݐ݅݋݊ܽݎݕ ݓ݁݅݃ℎݐ
+ ܾସ ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ + ܾସ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊ ܵݐ݀݁ݒ + ߝ௜ 
(5.3) 
 
From the Table 5.8, I can notice that for All IPOs, AIM and Less than 16.6M 
of proceeds that the coefficient of all the dictionary is significant and positive. This 
indicates that underwriters charge higher fees when they report more information. 
However, I can notice that Superfluous dictionary coefficient has the highest value. 
This indicates that underwriters will use more superfluous words in the prospectuses 
to justify the higher spread they are charging. The next higher coefficient is coming 
from the Interesting dictionary. This shows that prospectuses with marketing tone will 
cost the companies more in terms of spread. This also supports our first hypothesis 
(H1) 
I also ran the regression for all the segments of our sample. From Table 5.9 I 
can see that for All Market, AIM Market and Less than 16.6M all have significant and 
negative coefficients for Irregular Verbs and Positive dictionary. From Table 5.9 I can 
notice that Positive dictionary coefficient high level of significance is present across 
all the segment less than 66.6M. The coefficients’ values are higher for the larger IPOs 
than the smaller ones. This indicates that positive words used in the prospectus have 
better reception from the audience in larger IPOs rather than smaller IPOs. Main 
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Market and 16.6M - 66.6M is showing significance for Constraining dictionaries. In 
addition, the Main Market is also showing significance for Litigious, Modal and 
Negative dictionaries. This indicates that mainly in the Main Market, underwriters 
would underprice more when providing less information about constraints, negative 
information and litigious data. 
5.14 Underpricing and tone 
In Table 5.10 I am examining the effect of the dictionaries weight over 
underpricing for prestigious and non-prestigious underwriters. Panel A – shows the 
proportional weight variables coefficients. For the IPOs with prestigious underwriters, 
I can see that the highest significance is for the Litigious dictionary. With a positive 
coefficient, I can say that IPO with higher Litigious words tend to be underpriced 
more. On the other hand, Negative and Positive are both showing significant negative 
coefficients. 
For the non-prestigious underwriters, I can notice that, in addition to Litigious, 
their IPOs are more affected by the Modal dictionary. 
Panel B – shows the tf.idf weight variables coefficients. For the IPOs with 
prestigious underwriters, I can notice that as the prospectus is showing more 
conservatism, underpricing gets less. This is explained by the significant negative 
coefficient of Negative, Harvard IV and Constraining. Positive and Interesting 
dictionaries weight coefficients are also significant and negative. This shows that for 
a prestigious underwriter, when they show interesting words of the IPO, then, they 
have priced it closer to the market value and hence it will be less underpriced. 
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Table 5.8: Summary of Nonlinear Spread Regression - Dictionary weight coefficient for 70 regressions 
 
All Market Main Market AIM Market Less than 16.6M 16.6M – 66.6M 66.6M – 333.4M More than 
333.4M 
TFNegative 0.021*** 
(2.96) 
0.004 
(0.45) 
0.035*** 
(3.4) 
0.049*** 
(3.51) 
0.02** 
(2.06) 
0.024* 
(1.7) 
-0.003 
(-0.14) 
TFHarvard_iv 0.016*** 
(3.02) 
0.006 
(0.95) 
0.024*** 
(3.21) 
0.032*** 
(3.14) 
0.016** 
(2.18) 
0.022* 
(1.98) 
0.005 
(0.38) 
TFConstraining 0.139*** 
(3.05) 
-0.028 
(-0.42) 
0.246*** 
(3.73) 
0.422*** 
(4.41) 
0.097 
(1.31) 
0.085 
(0.98) 
-0.053 
(-0.31) 
TFLitigious 0.066*** 
(2.66) 
0.005 
(0.14) 
0.116*** 
(3.14) 
0.215*** 
(3.97) 
0.023 
(0.58) 
0.078* 
(1.67) 
-0.048 
(-0.58) 
TFSuperfluous 0.691** 
(2.47) 
0.83** 
(2.55) 
0.749** 
(2.04) 
0.901** 
(2.02) 
0.344 
(1.03) 
1.397** 
(2.53) 
1.355* 
(1.93) 
TFModal 0.322*** 
(2.76) 
0.023 
(0.12) 
0.396*** 
(2.75) 
0.412** 
(2.3) 
0.426*** 
(2.72) 
0.219 
(0.77) 
0.12 
(0.26) 
TFUncertainty 0.091*** 
(3.14) 
0.009 
(0.21) 
0.125*** 
(3.3) 
0.155*** 
(3.1) 
0.1** 
(2.59) 
0.056 
(0.91) 
0.028 
(0.31) 
TFPositive 0.082*** 
(2.69) 
0.061 
(1.36) 
0.125*** 
(2.86) 
0.153*** 
(2.8) 
0.06 
(1.29) 
0.135** 
(2.03) 
0.114 
(0.92) 
TFInteresting 0.333*** 
(2.62) 
0.194 
(1.4) 
0.493*** 
(2.7) 
0.553** 
(2.49) 
0.305** 
(2.05) 
0.285 
(1.01) 
0.429 
(1.11) 
TFIrr_Verb 0.211*** 
(2.82) 
-0.014 
(-0.13) 
0.305*** 
(3.08) 
0.384*** 
(3.05) 
0.17 
(1.51) 
0.055 
(0.3) 
0.258 
(1.1) 
Sample size 946 159 787 675 162 90 19 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table summarises 70 Nonlinear Regressions of the spread on different IPO sizes in terms of IPO proceeds. Only the coefficient of the dictionary weight and 
its level of significance is reported here in this table. The control Variables are the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Prestigious is a dummy with a value 
of 1 if the IPO has a prestigious underwriter and 0 otherwise, Log(Lockup) is the log of lockup period, Market dummy is 0 for the Main market and 1 for AIM 
market and year dummy variable. 
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Table 5.9: Summary of dictionary tf.idf weight coefficient for 70 Underpricing regressions 
 All Market Main Market AIM Market Less than 16.6M 16.6M – 66.6M 66.6M – 333.4M More than 
333.4M 
TFNegative -0.33 
(-1.59) 
-1.21** 
(-1.99) 
-0.09 
(-0.38) 
-0.39 
(-1.36) 
-1.03* 
(-1.67) 
-0.07 
(-0.18) 
0.01 
(1.13) 
TFHarvard_IV -0.28* 
(-1.87) 
-0.84* 
(-1.81) 
-0.16 
(-0.99) 
-0.34* 
(-1.69) 
-0.72 
(-1.59) 
-0.07 
(-0.21) 
0.01 
(0.43) 
TFConstraining -2.19 
(-1.49) 
-11.4** 
(-2.49) 
0.09 
(0.06) 
-1.36 
(-0.66) 
-9.17** 
(-2.05) 
-2.54 
(-1.09) 
0.01 
(1.19) 
TFLitigious -0.97 
(-1.27) 
-4* 
(-1.72) 
-0.1 
(-0.12) 
-1.04 
(-0.95) 
-3.9 
(-1.64) 
-0.6 
(-0.51) 
0.01 
(0.97) 
TFSuperfluous -13.03** 
(-2.19) 
-29.94 
(-1.64) 
-10.19* 
(-1.66) 
-12.65* 
(-1.73) 
-25.85 
(-1.45) 
-19.01 
(-1.44) 
-0.04 
(-0.23) 
TFModal -0.97 
(-1.27) 
-4* 
(-1.72) 
-0.1 
(-0.12) 
-1.04 
(-0.95) 
-3.9 
(-1.64) 
-0.6 
(-0.51) 
0.01 
(0.97) 
TFUncertainty -0.57 
(-0.73) 
-4.55 
(-1.4) 
-0.08 
(-0.11) 
-0.96 
(-1.01) 
-1.97 
(-0.79) 
1.49 
(0.92) 
0.01 
(0.75) 
TFPositive -2.8*** 
(-3.32) 
-5.33** 
(-2.1) 
-2.12** 
(-2.46) 
-3.08*** 
(-3.02) 
-6.44** 
(-2.46) 
0.38 
(0.23) 
0.01 
(0.26) 
TFInteresting -3.79 
(-1.3) 
-12.14 
(-1.58) 
-0.59 
(-0.18) 
-1.47 
(-0.4) 
-11.79 
(-1.49) 
-9.23 
(-1.43) 
0.01 
(0.22) 
TFIrr_Verb -4.65** 
(-2.28) 
-10.05 
(-1.31) 
-3.98** 
(-1.99) 
-5.52** 
(-2.32) 
-9.78 
(-1.39) 
-0.56 
(-0.12) 
-0.01 
(-0.11) 
Observations 945 158 787 675 162 90 18 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table summarises 70 OLS Regressions of the Underpricing on different IPO sizes in terms of IPO proceeds. Only the coefficient of the dictionary weight and 
its level of significance is reported here in this table. The control Variables are the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Prestigious is a dummy with a value 
of 1 if the IPO has a prestigious underwriter and 0 otherwise, Log(Lockup) is the log of lockup period, Market dummy is 0 for the Main market and 1 for AIM 
market and year dummy variable. 
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Table 5.10: Summary of Underpricing regressions showing dictionary coefficients for prestigious and non-prestigious underwriters 
Prestigious PrNegative PrHarvard_iv PrConstraining PrLitigious PrSuperfluous PrModal PrUncertainty PrPositive PrInteresting PrIrr_Verb 
Coef. -2539.115** 
(-2.01) 
-184.955 
(-0.34) 
1012.192 
(1.11) 
4138.239*** 
(3.71) 
-12414.24 
(-0.72) 
-798.71 
(-0.78) 
-150.335 
(-0.11) 
-3637.12** 
(-2.08) 
-128.869 
(-0.07) 
1524.941 
(0.69) 
A.R2 0.034 0.0254 0.0278 0.0546 0.0263 0.0265 0.0252 0.0346 0.0251 0.0262 
Prob F 0.0011 0.0058 0.0036 0 0.0049 0.0047 0.0061 0.001 0.0061 0.005 
           
Non-Prestigious 
          
Coef. -48.175 
(-0.05) 
-101.512 
(-0.23) 
-99.014 
(-0.13) 
2915.94*** 
(3.87) 
3349.19 
(0.25) 
1717.7** 
(2.35) 
1528.19 
(1.48) 
-27.849 
(-0.02) 
-72.51 
(-0.05) 
3152.388* 
(1.75) 
A.R2 0.2256 0.2257 0.2256 0.2485 0.2257 0.2342 0.2291 0.2256 0.2256 0.2304 
Prob F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Panel A: Dictionary proportional weight variables coefficient for prestigious and non-prestigious underwriters 
           
Prestigious TFNegative TFHarvard_iv TFConstraining TFLitigious TFSuperfluous TFModal TFUncertainty TFPositive TFInteresting TFIrr_Verb 
Coef. -0.464* 
(-1.9) 
-0.36* 
(-1.94) 
-3.575** 
(-2.06) 
-1.496 
(-1.58) 
-13.796 
(-1.56) 
-7.919* 
(-1.87) 
-1.205 
(-1.16) 
-2.725** 
(-2.53) 
-6.399* 
(-1.77) 
-4.794* 
(-1.71) 
A.R2 0.033 0.0334 0.0344 0.0306 0.0305 0.0328 0.0281 0.039 0.032 0.0316 
Prob F 0.0013 0.0012 0.001 0.0021 0.0022 0.0014 0.0034 0.0004 0.0016 0.0018 
           
Non-Prestigious 
          
Coef. -0.601** 
(-2.49) 
-0.439** 
(-2.55) 
-3.594** 
(-2.16) 
-1.882** 
(-2.09) 
-13.425* 
(-1.95) 
-6.692** 
(-2.31) 
-1.558* 
(-1.92) 
-3.299*** 
(-3.19) 
-2.558 
(-0.59) 
-6.228*** 
(-2.89) 
A.R2 0.2353 0.2357 0.2329 0.2325 0.2315 0.2339 0.2314 0.2413 0.2262 0.2385 
Prob F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Panel B: Dictionary tf.idf weight variables coefficient for prestigious and non-prestigious underwriters 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table summarises 40 OLS Regressions of the spread. Only the coefficient of the dictionary weight and its level of significance is reported here in this table. 
The control Variables are the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Prestigious is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has a prestigious underwriter and 0 
otherwise, Log(Lockup) is the log of lockup period, Market dummy is 0 for the Main market and 1 for AIM market and year dummy variable.  
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For the non-prestigious underwriters, Table 5.10 also shows that conservatism 
yields in less underwriting. In comparison to the prestigious underwriters, I can see 
that litigious is significant for the non-prestigious underwriters’ IPOs. All other 
variables are showing significant and negative coefficients. From the previous 
underpricing tables, it can be noticed that for most of the significant coefficients, the 
value is negative. This goes in line with our hypothesis (H2) for the Postive tone part. 
However, we can not accept the hypothesis (H2) as values of the Conservative and 
Uncertainty tones are negative as well. In this case, the negative relationship has to do 
with the level of exposure where more information availability would reduce the 
underpricing. 
5.15 Lockup length and tone 
Table 5.11 shows the results of the Log(Lockup) regression of All Market 
introducing the dictionaries tf.idf weight as follows: 
 
ܮ݋݃ܮ݋ܿ݇ݑ݌ܲ݁ݎ݅݋݀
= ߚଵݐ݂݀݅ܿݐ݅݋݊ܽݎݕ ݓ݁݅݃ℎݐ +  ߚଶܮ݋݃ ܲݎ݋ܿ݁݁݀ݏ௜
+ ߚଷܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ௜ + ߚସܯݑ݈ݐ݅ܤ݋݋݇ݎݑ ௜
+ ߚହܲݎ݁ݏݐ݅݃݅݋ݑݏ௜ + ߚ଺ܦ1 ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃௜
+ ቌ ෍ ߚ௝ܻ݁ܽݎ௝
ଶ଴ଵଶ
௝ୀଵଽଽଽ
ቍ +  ߝ௜ 
(5.4) 
I can see the coefficient is low in value. However, it is showing a high 
significance for the Litigious dictionary with a negative coefficient. This means that 
IPOs with more litigious language in their IPO prospectus will get less lockup period. 
The same applies on Uncertainty, Interesting, Constraining and Negative dictionaries 
with lower coefficient values. 
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To further examine the effect of the prospectus language on lockup period, I 
ran 70 regressions for each of the dictionaries weight for the different sample 
segments. As I can see in Table 5.12, Litigious and Uncertainty disclosure show a 
significant negative coefficient of a low value for All Market and AIM Market. The 
Interesting dictionary is showing significance with a negative coefficient on All 
Market and 66.6M – 333.4M of proceeds segment. 
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Table 5.11: Lockup period regression showing the effect of the dictionary weight variable 
    TFNegative TFHarvard_IV TFConstraining TFLitigious TFSuperfluous TFModal TFUncertainty TFPositive TFInteresting TFIrr_Verb 
TFNegative   -0.001* 
(-1.93) 
 
      
  
TFHarvard_IV    -0.001 
(-1.52) 
      
  
TFConstraining       -0.007* 
(-1.84) 
              
TFLitigious    
 
 -0.005** 
(-2.30) 
    
  
TFSuperfluous    
 
  0.006 
(0.36) 
   
  
TFModal    
 
   -0.006 
(-0.77) 
  
  
TFUncertainty    
 
    -0.004* 
(-1.72) 
 
  
TFPositive    
 
     -0.003 
(-1.21) 
  
TFInteresting    
 
      -0.014* 
(-1.76) 
 
TFIrr_Verb    
 
      
 
-0.008 
(-1.52) 
Log(proceeds) -0.004 
(-0.44) 
0.002 
(0.23) 
1.2E-4 
(0.01) 
0.003 
(0.31) 
0.004 
(0.41) 
-0.004 
(-0.47) 
-0.003 
(-0.28) 
0 
(0.01) 
-0.001 
(-0.1) 
-0.001 
(-0.08) 
0 
(-0.01) 
Market Dummy 0.063*** 
(3.39) 
0.057*** 
(3.02) 
0.058*** 
(3.11) 
0.057*** 
(3.03) 
0.055*** 
(2.92) 
0.064*** 
(3.41) 
0.062*** 
(3.32) 
0.059*** 
(3.18) 
0.058*** 
(3.03) 
0.058*** 
(3.13) 
0.059*** 
(3.19) 
Multi-bookrunner -
0.155*** 
(-7.16) 
-0.146*** 
(-6.56) 
-0.149*** 
(-6.74) 
-0.145*** 
(-6.46) 
-0.143*** 
(-6.44) 
-0.156*** 
(-7.15) 
-0.153*** 
(-7.00) 
-0.148*** 
(-6.69) 
-0.153*** 
(-7.02) 
-0.152*** 
(-7) 
-0.15*** 
(-6.86) 
prestigious -0.006 
(-0.5) 
-0.005 
(-0.47) 
-0.006 
(-0.49) 
-0.005 
(-0.46) 
-0.005 
(-0.47) 
-0.005 
(-0.48) 
-0.006 
(-0.54) 
-0.006 
(-0.55) 
-0.005 
(-0.43) 
-0.005 
(-0.41) 
-0.006 
(-0.53) 
Underpricing -8.1E-05 
(-0.91) 
-9E-05 
(-1.02) 
-8.9E-05 
(-1.01) 
-8.9E-05 
(-1.01) 
-9E-05 
(-1.02) 
-7.9E-05 
(-0.89) 
-8.5E-05 
(-0.96) 
-8.5E-05 
(-0.96) 
-9.3E-05 
(-1.04) 
-8.8E-05 
(-0.99) 
-9.1E-05 
(-1.03) 
  
 
 
 
      
  
Constant 2.593*** 
(79.96) 
2.601*** 
(79.6) 
2.6*** 
(79.35) 
2.601*** 
(79.48) 
2.608*** 
(78.91) 
2.591*** 
(79.3) 
2.596*** 
(79.13) 
2.598*** 
(79.81) 
2.602*** 
(77.97) 
2.6*** 
(79.63) 
2.602*** 
(78.8) 
Observations 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 
Adjusted R Square 0.1184 0.121 0.1197 0.1207 0.1225 0.1176 0.118 0.1203 0.1189 0.1204 0.1197 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table summarises 11 OLS Regressions of the Lockup period where each one is presented in one of the columns. The first column shows the regression without introducing any of the dictionaries weight 
variables. The following columns show regressions after introducing the dictionaries one at a time. The control Variables are the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Market dummy is 0 for the Main 
market and 1 for AIM market, Multi-bookrunner is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has more than 1 bookrunner and 0 if only one bookrunner. Prestigious is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has 
a prestigious underwriter and 0 otherwise, D1 Underpricing is the return on the first day of trading if purchased at the IPO. Log(Lockup) is the log of lockup period. I also controlled for years but are not 
reported here in this table. 
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Table 5.12: Summary of Lockup Period Regression - Dictionary weight coefficient for 70 regressions 
  All Market Main Market AIM Market Less than 16.6M 16.6M – 66.6M 66.6M – 333.4M More than 
333.4M 
TFNegative -0.001* 
(-1.93) 
-0.001 
(-0.6) 
-0.001* 
(-1.93) 
-0.001 
(-1.16) 
-0.001 
(-0.52) 
-0.002 
(-0.97) 
-0.002 
(-1.39) 
TFHarvard_IV -0.001 
(-1.52) 
-0.001 
(-0.64) 
-0.001 
(-1.51) 
-3.9E-4 
(-0.69) 
-4.5E-4 
(-0.57) 
-0.001 
(-0.9) 
-0.001 
(-1.61) 
TFConstrainin
g 
-0.007* 
(-1.84) 
-0.009 
(-0.96) 
-0.006 
(-1.32) 
0.002 
(0.42) 
-0.008 
(-1.03) 
-0.018 
(-1.66) 
-0.015 
(-0.86) 
TFLitigious -0.005** 
(-2.3) 
-0.001 
(-0.3) 
-0.005** 
(-2.19) 
-0.005 
(-1.45) 
-0.004 
(-1.04) 
-0.001 
(-0.23) 
-0.006 
(-0.86) 
TFSuperfluous 0.006 
(0.36) 
0.047 
(1.35) 
-0.004 
(-0.23) 
0.002 
(0.1) 
0.025 
(0.79) 
-0.005 
(-0.07) 
-0.094*** 
(-6.37) 
TFModal -0.006 
(-0.77) 
0.009 
(0.4) 
-0.008 
(-1) 
-0.003 
(-0.32) 
-0.006 
(-0.38) 
-0.005 
(-0.15) 
-0.067 
(-1.75) 
TFUncertainty -0.004* 
(-1.72) 
-0.002 
(-0.29) 
-0.004* 
(-1.88) 
-0.002 
(-0.81) 
-0.002 
(-0.4) 
-0.008 
(-1.05) 
-0.014 
(-1.97) 
TFPositive -0.003 
(-1.21) 
-0.001 
(-0.17) 
-0.003 
(-1.3) 
-0.002 
(-0.62) 
0.002 
(0.34) 
-0.008 
(-1) 
-0.019** 
(-4.95) 
TFInteresting -0.014* 
(-1.76) 
-0.011 
(-0.74) 
-0.015 
(-1.59) 
-0.005 
(-0.51) 
-0.007 
(-0.51) 
-0.073** 
(-2.45) 
-0.059* 
(-2.42) 
TFIrr_Verb -0.008 
(-1.52) 
-0.016 
(-1.08) 
-0.009 
(-1.58) 
-0.005 
(-0.78) 
-0.009 
(-0.72) 
-0.022 
(-1.05) 
-0.026 
(-2.26) 
Observations 945 158 787 675 162 90 18 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table summarises 70 OLS Regressions of the Lockup period on different IPO sizes in terms of IPO proceeds. Only the coefficient of the dictionary weight 
and its level of significance is reported here in this table. The control Variables are the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Prestigious is a dummy with a 
value of 1 if the IPO has a prestigious underwriter and 0 otherwise, Log(Lockup) is the log of lockup period, Market dummy is 0 for the Main market and 1 for 
AIM market and year dummy variable. 
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Table 5.13: Underpricing Regression for All Market showing the effect of the tf.idf 
  TFNegative TFHarvard_IV TFConstraining TFLitigious TFSuperfluous TFModal TFUncertainty TFPositive TFInteresting TFIrr_Verb 
TFNegative  -0.33 
(-1.59) 
         
TFHarvard_IV   -0.28* 
(-1.87) 
        
TFConstraining    -2.19 
(-1.49) 
       
TFLitigious     -0.97 
(-1.27) 
      
TFSuperfluous      -13.03** 
(-2.19) 
     
TFModal       -0.97 
(-1.27) 
    
TFUncertainty        -0.57 
(-0.73) 
   
TFPositive         -2.8*** 
(-3.32) 
  
TFInteresting          -3.79 
(-1.3) 
 
TFIrr_Verb           -4.65** 
(-2.28) 
Log(proceeds) -17.04*** 
(-5.05) 
-15.08*** 
(-4.2) 
-15.1*** 
(-4.28) 
-14.87*** 
(-4.04) 
-15.37*** 
(-4.24) 
-16.25*** 
(-4.79) 
-15.37*** 
(-4.24) 
-16.39*** 
(-4.69) 
-13.77*** 
(-3.93) 
-16.13*** 
(-4.67) 
-14.77*** 
(-4.2) 
Market Dummy -19.73*** 
(-2.89) 
-21.57*** 
(-3.12) 
-21.71*** 
(-3.15) 
-21.5*** 
(-3.11) 
-21.35*** 
(-3.08) 
-21.83*** 
(-3.18) 
-21.35*** 
(-3.08) 
-20.29*** 
(-2.96) 
-24.7*** 
(-3.56) 
-20.92*** 
(-3.04) 
-21.49*** 
(-3.14) 
Multi-
bookrunner 
-6.17 
(-0.77) 
-3.16 
(-0.38) 
-3.2 
(-0.39) 
-2.93 
(-0.35) 
-3.64 
(-0.44) 
-4.19 
(-0.52) 
-3.64 
(-0.44) 
-4.99 
(-0.61) 
-3.66 
(-0.46) 
-5.25 
(-0.65) 
-3.39 
(-0.42) 
Prestigious -1.49 
(-0.35) 
-1.38 
(-0.33) 
-1.45 
(-0.34) 
-1.36 
(-0.32) 
-1.4 
(-0.33) 
-2 
(-0.47) 
-1.4 
(-0.33) 
-1.57 
(-0.37) 
-0.62 
(-0.15) 
-1.19 
(-0.28) 
-1.7 
(-0.4) 
Constant 52.83*** 
(4.44) 
55.29*** 
(4.61) 
56*** 
(4.67) 
55.32*** 
(4.61) 
55.89*** 
(4.6) 
55.7*** 
(4.66) 
55.89*** 
(4.6) 
53.68*** 
(4.49) 
61.88*** 
(5.1) 
54.71*** 
(4.57) 
57.9*** 
(4.79) 
Observations 946 946 946 946 946 946 946 946 946 946 946 
Adjusted R 
Square 
0.0469 0.0485 0.0494 0.0481 0.0475 0.0507 0.0475 0.0464 0.0571 0.0476 0.0512 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table summarises 11 OLS Regressions of Underpricing where each one is presented in one of the columns. The first column shows the regression without introducing any of the dictionaries weight 
variables. The following columns show regressions after introducing the dictionaries one at a time. The control Variables are the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Market dummy is 0 for the 
Main market and 1 for AIM market, Multi-bookrunner is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has more than 1 bookrunner and 0 if only one bookrunner. Prestigious is a dummy with a value of 1 if the 
IPO has a prestigious underwriter and 0 otherwise, D1 Underpricing is the return on the first day of trading if purchased at the IPO. Log(Lockup) is the log of lockup period. I also controlled for years but 
are not reported here in this table. 
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Table 5.13 shows the Underpricing regression model I used in Chapter 2 
introducing the dictionaries one at a time. The table shows that the coefficient is 
negative for all the dictionaries. This is in line with the unilateral correlation of the 
Underpricing variable showed in Table 5.4. This supports the literature that 
Underpricing is less observed as more information is provided. Positive dictionary 
coefficient shows a value of -2.8 with high significance. Superfluous dictionary 
coefficient is showing the highest value of 13.03 followed by the dictionary of the 
Irregular Verbs and then Harvard IV with a value of -0.28. This indicates that the 
prospectus tone is not representing the the risk as it is not being reflected in a higher 
lockup period. This is too an indication that the tone indicate higher level of 
information exposure and hence lower lockup period. We can not accept the third 
hypothesis (H3). 
5.16 Volatility and tone 
From Table 5.14 It is noticeable that non of the dictionaries coefficient is 
significant. So is the case for the subsegment of the sample. We can not find a 
relationship between the prospectus tone and the volatility after the IPO. We can not 
accept our fourth hypothesis (H4). 
5.17 Idiosyncratic and tone 
From Table 5.15 It is also noticeable that non of the dictionaries coefficient is 
significant. So is the case for the subsegment of the sample. We can not find a 
relatsionship between the prospectus tone and the company specifc risk. We can not 
accept our fifth hypothesis (H5). 
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Table 5.14: Share Volatility Regression for all Market showing the effect of the tf.idf 
Share Volatility   TFNegative TFHarvard_IV TFConstraining TFLitigious TFSuperfluous TFModal TFUncertainty TFPositive TFInteresting TFIrr_Verb 
TFNegative   0.723 
(0.11) 
                  
TFHarvard_IV   
 
-0.134 
(-0.03) 
        
TFConstraining   
  
9.048 
(0.2) 
       
TFLitigious   
   
-3.114 
(-0.13) 
      
TFSuperfluous   
    
135.214 
(0.72) 
     
TFModal   
     
-26.733 
(-0.3) 
    
TFUncertainty   
     
 2.568 
(0.11) 
   
TFPositive   
     
 
 
-9.062 
(-0.34) 
  
TFInteresting   
     
 
  
22.167 
(0.24) 
 
TFIrr_Verb   
     
 
   
-27.349 
(-0.42) 
Log(proceeds) -50.809 
(-0.47) 
-54.985 
(-0.48) 
-49.913 
(-0.45) 
-59.637 
(-0.51) 
-45.561 
(-0.4) 
-58.212 
(-0.54) 
-44.518 
(-0.41) 
-53.722 
(-0.48) 
-40.884 
(-0.37) 
-55.963 
(-0.51) 
-38.001 
(-0.34) 
Market Dummy 150.207 
(0.7) 
154.11 
(0.7) 
149.271 
(0.68) 
157.342 
(0.72) 
145.238 
(0.66) 
173.289 
(0.79) 
144.942 
(0.67) 
152.639 
(0.7) 
133.731 
(0.6) 
156.907 
(0.72) 
139.737 
(0.64) 
Multi-bookrunner -70.889 
(-0.27) 
-76.81 
(-0.29) 
-69.592 
(-0.26) 
-83.246 
(-0.31) 
-63.697 
(-0.24) 
-91.89 
(-0.35) 
-61.332 
(-0.24) 
-75.838 
(-0.29) 
-63.964 
(-0.25) 
-75.012 
(-0.29) 
-56.046 
(-0.21) 
Prestigious 178.517 
(1.35) 
178.322 
(1.35) 
178.529 
(1.35) 
178.027 
(1.35) 
178.753 
(1.35) 
183.891 
(1.39) 
176.217 
(1.33) 
178.929 
(1.35) 
181.223 
(1.37) 
176.853 
(1.34) 
177.186 
(1.34) 
Day 1 Return -0.225 
(-0.22) 
-0.219 
(-0.21) 
-0.227 
(-0.22) 
-0.215 
(-0.21) 
-0.232 
(-0.22) 
-0.173 
(-0.17) 
-0.246 
(-0.24) 
-0.223 
(-0.22) 
-0.264 
(-0.26) 
-0.214 
(-0.21) 
-0.259 
(-0.25) 
Log(Lockup) -226.244 
(-0.59) 
-223.577 
(-0.58) 
-226.787 
(-0.59) 
-221.746 
(-0.58) 
-229.943 
(-0.6) 
-229.467 
(-0.6) 
-229.176 
(-0.6) 
-223.96 
(-0.59) 
-231.419 
(-0.61) 
-220.925 
(-0.58) 
-234.36 
(-0.61) 
Constant 2205.638** 
(2.08) 
2193.02** 
(2.06) 
2208.657** 
(2.07) 
2183.143** 
(2.05) 
2225.36** 
(2.08) 
2181.263** 
(2.06) 
2230.865** 
(2.1) 
2195.679** 
(2.06) 
2250.414** 
(2.11) 
2180.252** 
(2.05) 
2258.284** 
(2.12) 
Observations 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 
Adjusted R Square 0.0158 0.0147 0.0147 0.0148 0.0147 0.0153 0.0148 0.0147 0.0148 0.0148 0.0149 
Prob > F 0.0193 0.0274 0.0275 0.0272 0.0274 0.024 0.0268 0.0274 0.0267 0.0271 0.0262 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table summarises 11 OLS Regressions of the Share volatility where each one is presented in one of the columns. The first column shows the regression without introducing any of the dictionaries weight 
variables. The following columns show regressions after introducing the dictionaries one at a time. The control Variables are the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Market dummy is 0 for the Main 
market and 1 for AIM market, Multi-bookrunner is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has more than 1 bookrunner and 0 if only one bookrunner. Prestigious is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has 
a prestigious underwriter and 0 otherwise, D1 Underpricing is the return on the first day of trading if purchased at the IPO. Log(Lockup) is the log of lockup period. I also controlled for years but are not 
reported here in this table. 
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Table 5.15: Idiosyncratic Regression for all Market showing the effect of the tf.idf 
Idiosyncratic   TFNegative TFHarvard_IV TFConstraining TFLitigious TFSuperfluous TFModal TFUncertainty TFPositive TFInteresting TFIrr_Verb 
TFNegative   -0.195 
(-0.79) 
                  
TFHarvard_IV   
 
-0.124 
(-0.7) 
        
TFConstraining   
  
-0.5 
(-0.29) 
       
TFLitigious   
   
-0.135 
(-0.15) 
      
TFSuperfluous   
    
-8.308 
(-1.17) 
     
TFModal   
     
0.315 
(0.09) 
    
TFUncertainty   
      
-0.033 
(-0.04) 
   
TFPositive   
       
0.563 
(0.56) 
  
TFInteresting   
        
-0.252 
(-0.07) 
 
TFIrr_Verb   
         
-0.982 
(-0.4) 
Log(proceeds) 0.408 
(0.1) 
1.534 
(0.36) 
1.24 
(0.29) 
0.895 
(0.2) 
0.634 
(0.15) 
0.862 
(0.21) 
0.334 
(0.08) 
0.445 
(0.11) 
-0.21 
(-0.05) 
0.466 
(0.11) 
0.867 
(0.21) 
Market Dummy -0.076 
(-0.01) 
-1.129 
(-0.14) 
-0.945 
(-0.11) 
-0.471 
(-0.06) 
-0.291 
(-0.04) 
-1.494 
(-0.18) 
-0.014 
(0) 
-0.108 
(-0.01) 
0.948 
(0.11) 
-0.152 
(-0.02) 
-0.452 
(-0.05) 
Multi-bookrunner -3.036 
(-0.31) 
-1.439 
(-0.14) 
-1.83 
(-0.18) 
-2.353 
(-0.23) 
-2.725 
(-0.27) 
-1.745 
(-0.18) 
-3.148 
(-0.32) 
-2.972 
(-0.3) 
-3.466 
(-0.35) 
-2.989 
(-0.3) 
-2.503 
(-0.25) 
Prestigious -1.985 
(-0.4) 
-1.932 
(-0.39) 
-1.974 
(-0.39) 
-1.958 
(-0.39) 
-1.975 
(-0.39) 
-2.315 
(-0.46) 
-1.958 
(-0.39) 
-1.99 
(-0.4) 
-2.153 
(-0.43) 
-1.966 
(-0.39) 
-2.033 
(-0.41) 
Day 1 Return 0.001 
(0.02) 
-0.001 
(-0.02) 
-0.001 
(-0.02) 
0 
(0.01) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
-0.002 
(-0.06) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
0.003 
(0.08) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
0 
(-0.01) 
Log(Lockup) 2.983 
(0.21) 
2.263 
(0.16) 
2.479 
(0.17) 
2.734 
(0.19) 
2.823 
(0.19) 
3.181 
(0.22) 
3.017 
(0.21) 
2.953 
(0.2) 
3.304 
(0.23) 
2.922 
(0.2) 
2.691 
(0.19) 
Constant -5.698 
(-0.14) 
-2.294 
(-0.06) 
-2.894 
(-0.07) 
-4.455 
(-0.11) 
-4.845 
(-0.12) 
-4.2 
(-0.1) 
-5.995 
(-0.15) 
-5.569 
(-0.14) 
-8.482 
(-0.21) 
-5.409 
(-0.13) 
-3.808 
(-0.09) 
Observations 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 
Adjusted R Square 0.0164 0.016 0.0159 0.0155 0.0154 0.0168 0.0154 0.0154 0.0157 0.0154 0.0155 
Prob > F 0.0163 0.0198 0.0206 0.0229 0.0232 0.0162 0.0233 0.0234 0.0215 0.0233 0.0224 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table summarises 11 OLS Regressions of the Idiosyncratic risk where each one is presented in one of the columns. The first column shows the regression without introducing any of the dictionaries 
weight variables. The following columns show regressions after introducing the dictionaries one at a time. The control Variables are the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Market dummy is 0 
for the Main market and 1 for AIM market, Multi-bookrunner is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has more than 1 bookrunner and 0 if only one bookrunner. Prestigious is a dummy with a value of 
1 if the IPO has a prestigious underwriter and 0 otherwise, D1 Underpricing is the return on the first day of trading if purchased at the IPO. Log(Lockup) is the log of lockup period. I also controlled for 
years but are not reported here in this table. 
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5.18 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I measure the IPO tone using textual analysis and relate it to a number 
of short-run IPO dynamics such as IPO underpricing, spread, lockup length, volatility 
and idiosyncratic risk using hand-collected data from London Stock Exchange. 
Though there have been a few studies on textual analysis and IPO short-run dynamics 
in the US, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to analyse IPO dynamics 
using textual analysis in the UK.  
The UK IPO market structure is different from the US in a number of ways. In 
the US, book building is the preferred method while in the UK, placements and open 
offer are the methods in use. IPO gross spreads are clustered at 7% in the US. In 
comparison, there is a large variation in IPO spread in the UK, ranging from 4-11%. 
Lockup contracts are standardised at 180 days in the US, while heterogeneous in the 
UK. Also, price support is very common in the US, but not in the UK. Because of 
these differences, I believe, UK serves as an out of sample test on the issues tested in 
the US using textual data from IPO prospectuses.  
 I found a significant relationship with IPO tone and spread implying that 
underwriters charge more for more disclosures. I also find a significant relationship 
between IPO tone and underpricing and IPO tone and lockup length. These findings 
imply certain words in the IPO prospectuses reduce information asymmetry, 
particularly the negative words. These findings are in line with the earlier works done 
by using information asymmetry as a major reason for underpricing. To the best of our 
knowledge, there is no study which relates IPO tone with lockup length. I found that 
certain words significantly related to the lockup length. This is consistent with the 
earlier work done on lockups in the US and the UK (e.g. , Brav and Gompers, 2003, 
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in the US; Hoque, 2011, in the UK) However, I did not find any relationship between 
IPO tone and volatility or idiosyncratic risk.  I propose few reasons for that. When 
shares start trading after the IPO, may be new information become more important 
than the information from prospectuses. Also, the volatility and idiosyncratic risks 
might not be good measures of ex-ante uncertainty of IPO risk.  These issues are 
agendas for future research.  
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Chapter 6 
6. Long-run IPO dynamics and value of textual analysis 
6.1 Abstract 
I examined some of the puzzles in the IPO literature with the help of information from 
prospectuses. I used Loughrun and McDonald (2011) modified word list to relate to 
IPO lockup expiration, long-run IPO return and survival of the IPOs. Though previous 
literature has use IPO tone measures to relate it to various short-run measures, I am 
the first to relate it to various long-run issues in the IPO literature. Our tone measures 
show a significant relationship with the survival of the firms and time till dead. I 
showed that the information disclosed at the time of IPO is still valid for predicting 
the survival of IPO firms. However, I do not find much correlation with the IPO tone 
measured and lockup expiration returns and long-run IPO performance. This might be 
the result of the methodological controversies of measuring the long-run performance 
of the IPO. 
Keywords: London Stock Exchange, Textual analysis, Lockup expiration returns, 
long-run IPO performance, survival analysis. 
JEL Code: G14, G24, G30, G32 
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6.2 Introduction 
The first section of this chapter is the abstract of the work presented in this chapter. 
The second section is an introduction. Then on the third section the literature is 
discussed which include the hypotheses development. Data and methodology come on 
the fourth section then on the fifth chapter I discussed the results. I concluded in the 
sixth section. 
In the past 40 years, lots of research has been done on various issues of IPOs. Yet, 
there are some puzzles remain with respect to long-run performance and design of 
lockups. There has been a number of theories to explain long-run underperformance. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995, 2000), Baker and Wurgler (2000) and Hirshleifer (2001) 
put forward behavioural explanations, Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) put prospect theory 
as an explanation of long-run underperformance. Long-run underperformance may 
arise from a combination of a number of factors such as extreme differences of 
heterogeneous beliefs among investors, short selling is expensive for this small floats 
on many IPOs (see Ritter and Welch (2002) for a review). Still, it is not clear the 
reasons for underperformance. Also, the drop in price around the lockup expiration 
date is another puzzling issue in the IPO literature. Though there have been theories 
of asymmetric information and moral hazard (Brav and Gompers, 2003 and Hoque 
and Lasfer, 2016) to explain the existence and length of lockup, the evidence is not 
conclusive. In this chapter, I examine some of the puzzling issues over the long-run in 
the IPO literature using textual tones. 
Survival of the IPOs is another important issue that has been examined in the 
literature. For example, Espenlaub et al. (2012) examine whether the IPOs that join 
the Alternative Investment Market with more prestigious underwriters survives longer 
and they find evidence in support of that. Joining the market with prestigious 
underwriter could mitigate the information asymmetry, or it might be possible that 
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prestigious underwriters bring good quality IPOs. Ahmad and Jelic (2014) analyse the 
impact of lockup agreements on the survival of UK Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
during the time 1990–2011. Hensler et al., (1997) examine the effects of several firm 
characteristics and IPO characteristics on the survival of IPO firms by using an 
accelerated failure time (AFT) model. They find that survival time decreases with the 
increases of the number of risk factors mentioned in the prospectus. Demers and Joos 
(2007) develop an IPO failure risk model by incorporating accounting and other deal 
specific characteristics.  
Textual analysis has been utilised in an increasing number of papers and 
research in Accounting and Finance to quantify the tone and sentiment of corporate 
news releases, Management discussions and analysis (MD&A), yearly reports (10K 
reports), daily paper articles, and investor message sheets. Examples incorporate 
Engelberg (2008), Li (2008), and Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008), 
Tetlock (2007) Antweiler and Frank (2004). The outcomes in these studies could be 
summarised as negative words could be a successful method for measuring tone as 
negative words demonstrate a critical relationship with financial variables.  
Different papers look at the tone of different documents with the finance 
related variables. For example, Kothari, Li, and Short (2008) relate the tone of daily 
paper articles on the cost of capital, return variability, and forecasts from analysts. 
Henry (2008), Engelberg (2008), and Demers and Vega (2008) relates news 
discharges with firm income, earnings drift, or stock returns. Some papers relate the 
information content of IPO prospectus with the share returns, price variability and 
trading volume (e.g., Loughrun and McDonald (2013) Li (2008, 2009), Feldman et al. 
(2008), Hanley and Hoberg (2010)).  
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In this chapter, I examine the effect of the text used in the IPO prospectuses on 
the long-run IPO dynamics of the newly listed companies on the London Stock 
Exchange. In particular, I use the lockup expiration returns, long-run 
underperformance and survival of the IPOs to test for the long-run effect. I do so to 
shed light on the puzzles that remain in the IPO literature in the long-run.  
All previous studies that relate textual analysis with IPO concepts are based on 
IPO short-run dynamics with the tone measure of IPO prospectus. To the best of our 
knowledge, there is no study which relates the tone measures of IPO prospectus with 
the long-run IPO dynamics such as lockup expiration returns, long-run 
underperformance and survival of the IPOs. I use the UK data to examine the 
information content of an IPO prospectus. I fill this gap in the literature.  
The UK and US IPO markets are very different. For example, the US market 
uses book building method and the UK uses open offers and placing method. In the 
book building procedure, information is gathered from the investors and reliance on 
the underwriters is less. On the other hand, open offers and placing method rely 
heavily on the underwriters’ due diligence. Hence, methods of IPO (e.g., book building 
versus open offer and placing) has direct implications on the underperformance and 
survival of IPOs.  Lockup length in the US is very standardised, and the median lockup 
length is 180 days, and most of the IPOs has 180 days of lockups (Field and Hanka, 
2001; Brav and Gompers, 2003). In the UK, the lockup length is very diverse and 
heterogeneous (Hoque, 2011). The average lockup length in the UK is 365 days, and 
the highest is 1080 days. Also, there are few different types of lockups, absolute versus 
relative date, one versus gradual release of the shares (Hoque, 2011). Since the US 
lockup length is shorter, not much information is produced during the lockup length. 
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However, in the UK more information is produced and disclosed as the lockup lengths 
are longer. Thus the longer length of the lockups in the UK might have implications 
on the IPO prospectuses. Also, there is a quiet period in the US which is 40 days after 
the IPO (before 2002, it was 25 days). There is no quiet period in the UK.  During the 
longer lockup periods, since more information is produced and disclosed after the IPO, 
asymmetric information is less of a problem in the UK. Hence, the tone measure at the 
time of IPO may be not related to the lockup expiration returns in the UK.   
I do not find any relationship between IPO tone measures and lockup 
expiration returns (with the exception that Fama-French model return is negatively 
related to the positive tone measures). This might be related to the unique market 
settings in the UK. The lockup length is longer in the UK as I find that the average 
lockup length is 388 days with a minimum of 85 days and maximum of 1260 days. 
This is consistent with the previous evidence in the UK (e.g., Hoque 2011). Since 
much information is produced and disclosed during this time period, may be the 
information disclosed in the IPO prospectus become stale. The prestigious underwriter 
is negatively related to the lockup expiration return. This implies that prestigious 
underwriters mitigate the information asymmetry more as compared to the IPO tone 
reflected at the time of IPO. 
I find very little significance when I use the IPO tone measures to explain the 
long-run returns in case of univariate regressions. However, in the multivariate setting 
they disappear.  However, spread and underpricing are both negatively related to the 
long-term returns. Higher the spread lower the long-term returns. This might be 
consistent with the notion that bookrunners charge higher fees for the highly risky 
companies and they underperform in the long-run. This is consistent our previous 
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findings. I find that the higher the underpricing, the lower the long-run returns. This is 
consistent with the previous literature on long-run returns (Hoque and Lasfer, 2015). 
This is also consistent with the fact that IPOs are underpriced initially and as the 
divergence of the opinions decrease valuations are corrected, and hence they show 
underperformance (Morris, 1996).  
I find a significant relationship with the IPO prospectus tone measure and 
survival of the UK IPOs. I use time till dead and dead dummy to relate it to the IPO 
prospectus tones. Our Tobit regression on time till dead and Logit and Cox hazard 
model on dead dummy show that IPO prospectus tone measures are significantly 
related to the survival of the firms. I also find that time till dead is negatively related 
to spread and multi bookrunners. It shows that risky companies would have paid 
higher fees and hence they survive less time and also risky companies would have 
come to the market with multiple bookrunners. The higher the lockup period, the 
higher the time companies survive. This is consistent with the previous paper by 
Ahmad and Jelic (2014). 
I contributed to the IPO literature in various ways. There has been a 
longstanding puzzle in the IPO literature regarding underperformance, survival and 
lockup expiration returns. This chapter tries to explain the underperformance, lockup 
expiration returns a survival of IPOs with the tones from prospectuses. This is related 
to the literature on tones of IPOs and 10-K using the US data (see Loughrun and 
McDonald, 2011, Hanley and Hoberg, 2010). However, no one tried to relate the IPO 
tone measures with the long-run puzzles in the literature. I also tested whether the 
lockup expiration return is related to the asymmetric information problem using the 
IPO tone. Previous papers find that lockups serve to mitigate the information 
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asymmetry and they reduce moral hazard problems. Using the tone information from 
IPO prospectuses, I did not find much evidence that IPO lockup expiration returns are 
driven by information asymmetry. This chapter is related to a number of lockup papers 
in the US (Field and Hanka, 2001, Brav and Gompers, 2003, Brau et al., 2005) and the 
UK (Hoque, 2011, Hoque, 2015, Hoque and Lasfer, 2016). 
I marry two streams of literature in the IPO. The first one is the survival of the 
IPOs and the second one is IPO tone measures. Demers and Joos (2007) developed an 
IPO failure risk model by incorporating accounting and other deal specific 
characteristics. While they use several accounting variables at the time of IPOs to 
distinguish between delisted and non-delisted IPO firms I used the IPO tone measure 
from prospectus to do examine whether the IPO prospectus tone could be related to 
the survival of IPOs.  Hensler et al., (1997) measure the variable risk from Jay Ritter’s 
website which is mentioned as a risk. The risk variable is simply the count of risk 
factors reported in the prospectus. If there is no specific risk factor section, the variable 
risk is zero. However, the measure of the risk factor is problematic as it just counts the 
number of risk factors. I used the Loughrun and McDonald (2011) dictionary measures 
in the prospectus to relate it to the survival firms of the IPOs. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 I present a literature 
review and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. 
Section 4 presents the empirical results. Finally, section five concludes.     
6.3 Literature review and Hypotheses development 
6.4 IPO lockup expiration and tone 
Field and Hanka (2001) find a statistically significant -1.5% drop in share price around 
lockup expiration date using US data over the 1988-1997 period. This drop is much 
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larger for venture capital (VC) backed firms as compared to non-VC-backed firms. 
This constitutes a puzzle as the number of shares locked up and the lockup date are a 
well-known event then I do not expect any market reaction to that. However, since 
then a number of studies have examined the reasons for a significant price drop around 
the IPO lockup expiration (e.g., Field and Hanka (2001), Hoque (2011), Hoque 
(2014)).  
The role of lockups in IPO procedure has been examined by several papers 
such as Brav and Gompers (2003) and Brau, Lambson and McQueen (2005). Brav and 
Gompers (2003) propose three contending hypotheses (i) lockups signal firms’ 
quality, (ii) lockups are commitment device, and (iii) lockups are rent-seeking 
mechanisms by underwriters. Their results give backing that lockups are commitment 
device, however, dismiss that they serve as a signal of firm quality and they are rent-
seeking mechanisms. They find that of firms’ lockup insider holdings for more time if 
the potential for moral hazard is high. Hoque (2014) also provide support for this. Brau 
et al. (2005) revisited these findings and gave backing to that lockups are commitment 
device, and they are signals of firm quality. They demonstrate that Brav and Gompers 
(2003) confirmation of an opposite relationship amongst straightforwardness and 
lockup length underpins the signal of firm quality as well as the commitment 
hypothesis. Later on, Yung and Zender (2010) provide some clarification with respect 
to the opposing finding in Brav and Gompers (2003) and Brau et al. (2005). Yung and 
Zender (2010) classify the IPO firms as dominated by moral hazard and some 
dominated by information asymmetry. The firms who joins the market with 
prestigious underwriters mitigate the information asymmetry, hence, they have a high 
moral hazard. The firms who comes to the market with other underwriters are subject 
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to high information asymmetry. They provide empirical support that lockups mitigate 
asymmetric information for some firms and moral hazard for some firms. 
In line with Yung and Zender (2010), Hoque (2014) analyses the role of 
asymmetric information and moral hazard on IPO underpricing and lockups using the 
data from the UK market where the lockup lengths are longer and more diverse. The 
study document that high information asymmetry is related to underpricing while the 
lockup length and lockup expiration return is related to moral hazard. Hoque (2014) 
compares high information asymmetry firms (small firms, IPOs underwritten by low-
ranked underwriters and AIM firms) with high potential for moral hazard firms (high 
director ownership firms), he is able to determine if lockups are more closely 
associated with information asymmetry or moral hazard. Furthermore, the study 
documents that the relationship between director ownership and lockup expiration 
returns and lockup length in non-linear.  
Information asymmetries are high at the time of IPO because little is known 
about these new companies. In order to reduce the information asymmetry amongst 
managers and shareholders, lockup contracts do not permit managers to sell their 
holdings during or before the lockup lapses. As such, lockup contracts exist so that the 
insiders can’t exploit outside shareholders (Brav and Gompers, 2003). Lockup 
contracts secure the general investors as Ibbotson and Ritter (1995) contended that 
investors are ready to pay more for a firm with longer lockup as any negative data 
being withheld will be reflected in price before the lockup termination. Firms 
characterised with higher information asymmetry and with higher ex-ante uncertainty 
will have strict lockup contracts imposed on them (Goergen, Renneboog and Khurshed 
(2006)). Brau et al. (2005) build up a model which says that more transparent firms 
208 
 
have a higher probability that the mimickers will be identified, and hence they can 
afford a shorter lockup. Transparency and information asymmetry is inversely related 
so very transparent firms will have less strict lockups too. More transparent firms will 
disclose more information in the IPO prospectuses as well. Thus transparency is 
directly related to the IPO tone. Hence, I expect that longer lockups and lower lockup 
expiration returns are related to the IPO tone at the time of IPO. 
Ex-ante, it is difficult for investors to differentiate between a good firm and a 
bad firm (the Lemon’s problem) based on the limited information available at the time 
of IPO. Good quality firms need to do something which is difficult or very costly for 
a bad firm to replicate. In other words, good firms need to send some signals which 
are hard for bad firms to replicate. Leland and Pyle (1977) develop up such a model 
where insiders hold a large holding in their firm and remain undiversified which would 
send a signal about the quality of the firm. Insiders of good quality firms can hold on 
to their shares which are difficult to do for the insiders of a bad quality firm.  In 
accordance with this, Courteau (1995) extends the Leland and Pyle (1977) model 
where lockups are used by insiders in the IPOs lockups to signal the quality of their 
firms. Additionally, Brau and Fawcett (2006) survey evidence demonstrate that more 
than 77% of the CFOs concurred or firmly concurred that “insiders commit to a long 
lockup” was a positive sign. If the IPO tone reflects the quality of the firm, it should 
be related to the lockup length and lockup expiration returns. 
Riskier IPOs that are associated with Conservative or Uncertainty tones are 
expected to underperform on the long-run. While less resier IPOs are expected to 
deliver better return on the long-run. Hence, my first hypothesis is: 
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H1: Lockup expiration return is negatively related to the use of Conservative 
and Uncertainty tones and will be positively related when Positive tone are used in the 
prospectuses. 
6.5 Long-run IPO performance and tone 
In an early study, Brav and Gompers (1997) examine the long-run underperformance 
of 934 VC-backed   IPOs from 1972-1992 and 3,407 non-VC-backed IPOs from 1975-
1992. They observe that VC-backed IPOs performed better than non-VC-backed IPOs 
by utilising equally weighted returns. Krishnan et al. (2011) provide support that VC-
backed firms perform better than other firms. Contrasting findings have been reported 
by Levis (2011) in the context of UK IPOs. Value weighting essentially lessens the 
difference and considerably diminishes underperformance for non-VC-supported 
IPOs. In tests utilising a few benchmarks and the Fama-French (1993) three-factor 
model, VC-backed organisations don't fundamentally fail to meet expectations, while 
the non-VC-sponsored firms do. Levis (2011) report that private equity backed firms 
performed better than the VC backed and other firms. The main theme across these 
papers is that venture capitalists know better than the general investors about the firm 
as they are often repeated investors. This is the reasons that they may mitigate 
information asymmetry to some extent.   
There has been a methodology debate on the long-run performance of IPOs. 
Brav and Gompers (1997) conclude that underperformance, notwithstanding, is not an 
IPO impact. Comparative size and book-to-business sector firms that have not issued 
equity performs as badly as IPOs. While the studies based on event studies report 
underperformance, the studies based on Fam-French calendar time portfolios did not 
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report underperformance. This has been termed as pseudo market timing by Schultz 
(2003). 
Espenlaub, Gregory and Tonks (2000) reconsider the long-term returns of 
IPOs in the UK utilising information of firms over the period 1985-92, in which they 
examine IPO underperformance by applying various techniques including a calendar 
time approach. They find that, while using an event study methodology produces 
significant underperformance after the 3-year post-IPO period irrespective of the 
models used (e.g., market adjusted, market model adjusted or raw returns). Hoque and 
Lasfer (2015) find that for the IPOs, where insiders are net buyers, they underperform 
whereas where insiders are net seller over-perform. This is true for any benchmark 
used and irrespective of event studies or calendar time approach. However, Espenlaub 
et al. (2000) report that underperformance is less severe in 5-year post-IPO period and 
depends largely on the model used. The underperformance would be less severe if they 
used the calendar time regressions.  
Carter et al. (1998) use the underwriter’s reputation to check whether the IPOs 
that join the market with more prestigious underwriters perform better that who join 
with the other underwriters. As expected, Carter et al. (1998) find that the 
underperformance of IPO stocks in respect to the market over a three-year holding 
period is less extreme for IPOs that join the market with more prestigious underwriters. 
Consistent with earlier studies (e.g., Carter and Manster, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 
1991), they likewise find that IPOs managed by more prestigious underwriters are 
connected with less short-run underpricing.  Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) and Ritter 
(1991) report the similar patterns for IPOs with prestigious underwriters. Again, the 
main theme across these papers is that prestigious underwriters mitigate the 
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asymmetric information to a certain extent, and hence they perform better than the 
IPOs underwritten by other underwriters.   
 Boehmer, Boehmer and Fishe (2006) investigate distributions to institutional 
and retail investors in 441 IPOs. Notwithstanding the understood positive first-day 
returns, they demonstrate that institutional investors additionally get more assignments 
in IPOs with better long-term returns. This is in line with prior studies which find that 
in good IPOs institutional investors get better allocations than the retail investors 
(Hanley, 1993, Aggarwal et al., 2002). Boehmer et al. (2006) observe that underlying 
institutional flips anticipate future returns, proposing that in any event an institutional 
investor hold profitable private data about IPO firms. These papers assert that 
institutional investors are better informed than the general investors about the firm as 
they are often repeated investors. This is the reasons that when they buy shares in an 
IPO, the IPO is a good quality one and hence it performs better than other issues.  
There have been many reasons proposed for the underperformance of IPOs in 
the long-run. For example, the arguments in Miller (1977) and Morris (1996) which 
state that the heterogeneous beliefs among the investors and short selling are very 
costly if not impossible to limit the arbitrage in the small public floats. This 
heterogeneous belief may be mitigated to some extent with the specific wording and 
tone measures in the prospectus. Also the use of ambiguous and uncertain words may 
push the heterogeneous beliefs further. Eckbo and Norli (2001) argue that IPOs 
underperform in the long-run because they are low risk. I used the risk words by using 
the Loughrun and McDonald (2011) modified dictionary to examine whether the 
prospectus tone is related to the long-run IPO performance.  
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Prospectuses with a Conservative or Uncertainty tones indicate a more risky 
IPO, hence, the return on the long-run is expected to be lower. On theo ther hand, 
when the tone of the prospectus is Positive, it would be expected that return over the 
long-run woud be better. The second hypothesis is: 
H2: long-run return is negatively related to the use of Conservative or 
Uncertainty tones and is positively related when Positive tone are used in the 
prospectuses. 
  
6.6 Survival of IPOs and tone 
Espenlaub et al., (2012) examine IPO survival in the Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM), where the nominated adviser plays a pivotal role in looking after the IPOs. 
They find that Nomad reputation significantly affects IPO survival. Initial public 
offerings managed by reputable Nomads survive longer by around two years than 
those sponsored by other Nomads. However, they do not find any differences in 
survival rates of AIM IPOs and to those of North American IPOs. Underwriter 
reputation is used in the IPO literature in a number of studies to mitigate the 
information asymmetry of the newly listed firms (Beatty and Ritter, 1986, Carter and 
Manaster, 1990). While Espenlaub et al., (2012) use the nomad reputation as a measure 
of information asymmetry and relate it to the survival of IPO firms, I used the tone of 
the IPO prospectus. Audtrestsch et al. (2005) examine the impact of ownership for 
young and high-tech firms by utilising a unique dataset of 341 firms traded on the 
Neuer Markt, the German equivalent of the NASDAQ. Their finding is in contrast to 
the expectation and also with previous studies on more conventional firms. In 
particular, they find that possession by CEOs has no impact on firm survival. Their 
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finding is not consistent with the moral hazard behaviours on the part of the owners 
and managers.  
Ahmad and Jelic (2014) analyse the impact of lockup agreements on the 
survival of IPOs using the data from London Stock exchange during 1990–2011. Their 
cox hazard model demonstrates a significant impact of lockup length on the post-IPO 
survival.  Their finding suggests that an IPO survival time increases by 27% if the 
median lockup length increases by a year.  This is consistent with the signalling story 
commitment hypotheses of Brav and Gompers (2003). Moreover, Ahmad and Jelic 
(2014) report that the delisting rates for IPOs with shorter lockups are significantly 
higher than the delisting rates for IPOs with longer lockups regardless of the reasons 
for delisting. Information asymmetry is reduced to some extent by imposing a longer 
lockup. Their results highlight the significance of lockup agreements on the resulting 
survival of recently joined firms and bring confidence among the investors to invest 
in the newly listed firms. Also, this has an implication in terms of the IPO market 
development in terms of the listing and regulation standards of the UK IPO market. 
Chadha (2003) analyse a small number of US IPOs that delist because of 
performance related reasons within 3 years after IPO. Her paper reveals insight into 
the intentions of the managers and owners taking their firm public. Managers are better 
informed about the firms and their trades reflect information in the market (Seyhun, 
1986). Chadha (2003) look at the insider trade from the beginning till the end of IPOs 
to examine the hypotheses that Insiders offer overvalued shares intentionally. Lee 
(1997) examine insider trading around seasoned equity offering to examine whether 
they issue overvalued shares. Chadha (2003) examines the conduct and the trading of 
insiders at the offer stage like Hoque and Lasfer (2009), after the lockup expiration 
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(Field and Hanka, 2001), and preceding delisting (Seyhun and Bradely, 1997). Chadha 
(2003) did not find any evidence that proposes that insiders purposely issue overvalued 
shares. Insiders trading behaviour at the offer and after the lockup termination does 
not offer any confirmation of insiders methodically abusing their private information 
to pick up to the detriment of outside investors like Hoque and Lasfer (2015). Also, 
her findings demonstrate that insiders of delisted IPOs do not sell shares before the 
firm delists. This is consistent with the notion that managers are over optimistic and 
overconfident.  On the other hand, it is likewise predictable with the conduct of 
managers being unique in relation to that of enlisted directors. Generally speaking, the 
outcomes provide support for either the “hubris” theory or the “entrepreneurial pride” 
clarification (Heaton, 2002); they are to a great extent conflicting with the “windows 
of opportunity” explanation (Loughrun and Ritter, 1995, 2002). 
Hensler et al., (1997) examine the effects of several firm characteristics and 
IPO characteristics on the survival of IPO firms by using an accelerated failure time 
(AFT) model. The results show that large IPOs, old firms, firms which underprice 
more and firms with increased level of IPO activity in the aftermarket, firms with 
higher level of insider ownership survives longer. Large firms and old firms are firms 
with less information asymmetry (Ritter, 1984). They also find that survival time 
decreases with the increase of general market level at the time of offering and number 
of risk characteristics. There are differences in industry origin in terms of survival 
rates of the IPOs. The IPO survives shorter if the firm is in from certain industries such 
as computer and data, restaurant, wholesale industry, and airline and survives longer 
if the IPO is from optical or drug industries. Possibly, the degree of information 
asymmetry is different in different industries. High tech industry is characterised with 
high information asymmetry. Demers and Joos (2007) develop an IPO failure risk 
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model by incorporating accounting and other deal specific characteristics. They 
document statistically different failure rates between tech and non-tech IPOs, which 
is in line with Hensler et al., (1997) finding of industry differences in survival.  While 
they use several accounting variables at the time of IPOs to distinguish between 
delisted and non-delisted IPO firms I use the IPO tone measure from prospectus to do 
that.  Hensler et al., (1997) measure the variable risk from Jay Ritter’s website which 
is mentioned as a risk. The risk variable is the count of risk factors reported in the 
prospectus. If there is no specific risk factor section, the variable risk is zero. However, 
the measure of the risk factor is problematic as it just counts the number of risk factors. 
I used the Loughrun and McDonald (2011) dictionary measures in the prospectus to 
relate it to the survival firms of the IPOs.  
When the tone of thep prospectus is either Conservative or Uncertain, survival 
rate is expected to be lower. On the other hand, if the tone of the prospectus is Positive, 
that would indicated a less riskier IPO and hence higher survival rate. Thus I 
hypothesise that: 
H3: Survival rate is negatively related to Conservative or Uncertainty tones 
and is positively related to Positive tones in the prospectuses.  
6.7 Data and methodology  
I use the same IPO prospectuses that I used in first two chapters. As per Table 5.3, The 
median of the number of words per prospectus in the main market is 66,662 words 
while for the AIM market it is 27,792 words. I have only included the IPOs that have 
more than 2000 words that is less than 10 percent of the median of the AIM market 
prospectuses and hence would not have a comparable data. I have a total number of 
946 prospectuses in our sample. 26 of the prospectuses in our sample where 
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photocopies that required optical character reader (OCR) to convert them to text. I 
used the tool provided by Google Drive to convert them photocopies to text. 
I used the dictionaries developed by (Loughran and McDonald, 2011) in 
addition to Harvard IV dictionary for negative words. I analysed each prospectus using 
AntWordProfiler software. More details about the dictionaries, calculating the 
prospectuses weights and the software can be found in section 5.5. 
Lockup length and lockup expiration date have been collected manually from 
the prospectuses. The share prices, indices data and bankruptcy dates were collected 
from DataStream. I got Fama-French Daily Factors from the website of the Business 
School of the University of Exeter. 
To test my hypothesis, I have used a number of methodologies. First, to study 
the return around the lockup expiry date, I used 2 methods to calculate the abnormal 
returns. I used both the market model and Fama-French 4-Factor. 
For the market model, I run an OLS regression using the daily return for each 
company as the dependent variable and index return as the independent variable as 
follows: 
 
 ܴ௦ = ߙ +  ߚ ܴ௜ + ߝ௜ (6.1) 
Where: 
ܴ௦ : Daily return on share price 
ܴ௜ : Daily return on index 
ߙ : Intercept 
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ߚ : Slope 
I ran the regression for the period starting from the date of the IPO until the 
starting date of the event window. After getting the coefficients of the intercept and 
the slope of each regression, I calculated the expected return during the event window. 
Then I calculated the daily abnormal return as the excess return over the expected 
return as follows: 
 ܣܴ = ܴ௦ − ܧ(ܴ) (6.2) 
Where: 
ܣܴ : Abnormal Return 
ܧ(ܴ) : Expected return using the regression coefficients 
Then I calculated the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the period as the 
numerical sum of the daily return during the event study window. 
I also examined the same using Fama-French 4-Factor Model. 
 
ܴ௦  −  ௙ܴ =  ߙ + ߚଵ൫ܴ௠ − ௙ܴ൯ +  ߚଶܵܯܤ + ߚଷܪܯܮ +  ߚସܷܯܦ
+ ߝ௜ 
(6.3) 
 
 
Where: 
ܴ௦ : Daily return on share price 
௙ܴ : Risk free rate of return 
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ߙ : Intercept 
ߚ : Coefficient Multiplier 
SMB : Small minus Big – The difference in return between small cap 
companies to large cap companies. 
HML: High minus Low – The difference in return between growth companies 
to value companies. 
UMD: Up minus Down – The difference in return between winner companies 
and loser companies. 
First, I run an OLS regression for each company using the four factors to find 
the intercept and the coefficients multipliers. Then I do the same as what I did for the 
market model by calculating the expected return for every day during the event study 
window. Then I calculate the abnormal return as the difference between the actual 
return and the expected return. 
For studying the bankruptcy, I used a number of methods. First, I ran an OLS 
regression. 
 
ܮ݋݃(݈݈ܶ݅݉݁ܶ݅ܦ݁ܽ݀)
=  ߙ + ߚଵܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௜ +  ߚଶܮ݋݃ ܲݎ݋ܿ݁݁݀ݏ௜
+  ߚଷܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ௜ + ߚସܯݑ݈ݐ݅ܤ݋݋݇ݎݑ݊݊݁ݎ௜
+ ߚହܲݎ݁ݏݐ݅݃݅݋ݑݏ௜ + ߚ଺ܦ1 ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃௜
+  ߚ଻ܮ݋݃ܮ݋ܿ݇ݑ݌ܲ݁ݎ݅݋݀௜  ቌ ෍ ߚ௝ܻ݁ܽݎ௝
ଶ଴ଵଶ
௝ୀଵଽଽଽ
ቍ +  ߝ௜ 
(6.4) 
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Then I ran a logit regression using Dead Dummy. Finally, I used Cox 
Proportional Hazard Model using Dead Dummy and Days Till Dead in days as the 
period. 
For long period return, I have calculated the Buy-And-Hold Abnormal Return 
(BHAR). First, I calculated the monthly return on both the share prices and the index. 
Then I calculated the difference between the share return and index return. Finally, I 
calculated the compounded rate of return over the holding period. 
6.8 Results: 
6.9 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.1, panel A shows the word count statistics. I can notice that After Harvard 
Negative list, Modal dictionary has highest frequency use per prospectus with a mean 
of 524 words. Uncertainty and Litigious come after with a mean of 411 and 416 words. 
On the other hand, the Superfluous dictionary is the most rarely used dictionary among 
the others by far with a mean of 10 words per prospectus. Interesting dictionary comes 
after with 82 words. This will give Superfluous and Interesting more weight when 
used. Their effect will be even more when using the tf.idf weight. 
Panel B shows the proportional weight of each dictionary. Again, with Harvard 
Negative List aside, Modal dictionary shows the highest mean. Litigious and 
Uncertainty dictionaries come after with Litigious showing a slightly more weight that 
Uncertainty. With respect to the dictionaries with the least proportional weight, 
Superfluous and Interesting are again the least ones.  
Panel C shows the Time-Frequency Inverse-Time-Frequency weight statistics. 
After Harvard Negative list, the mean of Negative dictionary comes way ahead of the 
other dictionaries with 15.24. Next to it comes Litigious, Positive and Uncertainty with 
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4.80, 4.65 and 3.55 in the same order. From the other end, Superfluous and Interesting 
are keeping their position as the lowest weight. 
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Table 6.1: Dictionaries Statistical Data 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Negative 375.826 346.519 3 2823 
Harvard_iv 1356.205 1147.381 45 10052 
Constraining 318.081 274.685 8 1979 
Litigious 411.262 298.681 16 2304 
Superfluous 10.124 10.576 0 184 
Modal 524.104 415.045 18 2554 
Uncertainty 416.911 363.423 12 2619 
Positive 207.449 171.990 9 1018 
Interesting 82.171 99.425 0 1083 
Irr_verb 324.720 247.997 12 2269 
Panel A: Words count in prospectuses 
PrNegative 0.009 0.002 0.001 0.019 
PrHarvard_iv 0.034 0.005 0.014 0.060 
PrConstraining 0.008 0.003 0.002 0.040 
PrLitigious 0.011 0.003 0.003 0.029 
PrSuperfluous 2.7E-4 1.7E-4 0.000 0.001 
PrModal 0.014 0.003 0.004 0.023 
PrUncertainty 0.010 0.002 0.003 0.018 
PrPositive 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.016 
PrInteresting 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.013 
PrIrr_Verb 0.009 0.001 0.003 0.018 
Panel B: Words proportional weight for each dictionary 
TFNegative 15.244 13.329 0.063 102 
TFHarvard_iv 20.865 17.231 0.542 129 
TFConstraining 2.551 1.993 0.003 12 
TFLitigious 4.803 3.623 0.042 25.1 
TFSuperfluous 0.275 0.347 0.000 2.75 
TFModal 1.005 0.803 0.016 4.61 
TFUncertainty 3.555 3.241 0.020 20.9 
TFPositive 4.657 2.916 0.067 17.2 
TFInteresting 0.797 0.743 0.000 7.6 
TFIrr_Verb 1.848 1.203 0.040 7.68 
Panel C: Words tf.idf weight for each dictionary 
Observations 946    
This table has 3 sections. Panel A shows statistics of the number of words from each dictionary in 
the prospectuses in our sample. Panel B shows statistics of the proportional weight of each dictionary. 
Panel C shows statistics of the Time Frequency – Inverse Document Frequency weight for each 
dictionary. 
 
Table 6.2 shows the lockup period and the return on CAR at the lockup expiry 
date. First, I can notice that for the companies that imposed a lockup period from our 
sample, their lockup periods vary from 85 days to about three and a half years. With a 
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mean of 391 days. This is driven by the high frequency of companies using 365 days 
as the lockup period. The second and third parts of the table show the CAR over 3 
different periods using Market Model and Fama-French 4-Factor model. I can notice 
that the results are close for both models. 
Table 6.2: Lockup Period and Cumulative Abnormal Return at Lockup period 
expiration date 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Lockup period in days 945 388.268 135.556 85 1260 
Market Model CAR0_2 776 0.003 0.080 -0.605 0.690 
Market Model CAR0_5 776 0.005 0.103 -0.640 0.688 
Market Model CAR0_10 775 0.005 0.139 -1.496 0.805 
Fama-French CAR0_2 776 0.003 0.081 -0.609 0.689 
Fama-French CAR0_5 776 0.006 0.105 -0.629 0.687 
Fama-French CAR0_10 775 0.006 0.145 -1.569 0.793 
This table shows statistics of Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) over 2, 5 and 10 days from the 
lockup period expiration date. There are three sections in this table. The first table shows statistics of 
the lockup period for the companies in our sample. The second section shows CAR calculated using 
Market Model. The third section shows CAR calculated using Fama-French 4-Factor model. 
 
Table 6.3 shows the Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) over 4 holding 
periods. I can notice that the BHAR over 1 year shows an increase in return and 
standard deviation. It shows the highest mean of returns. For BHAR for 2 and 3 years 
holding periods, the mean of return shows a drop from 23.6% to 7.7% and 3.5% in the 
same order. However, the standard deviation is still high with 1.8 and 2.5. 
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Table 6.3: Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) for 6-Month, 1-Year, 2-Year and 
3-Year 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
BHAR 6 
Months 
925 0.022 -0.0411 0.508 -0.908 5.913 
BHAR 1 
Year 
924 0.030 -0.1035 0.821 -1.034 9.001 
BHAR 2 
Years 
883 0.008 -0.254 1.155 -0.993 20.983 
BHAR 3 
Years 
835 0.025 -0.3176 1.529 -0.995 29.343 
 Panel A: Abnormal Return using Index 
BHAR 6 
Months 
833 0.057 -0.0152 0.589 -0.912 8.569 
BHAR 1 
Year 
833 0.087 -0.0561 0.984 -0.983 12.112 
BHAR 2 
Years 
833 0.095 -0.2329 1.355 -0.982 22.623 
BHAR 3 
Years 
833 0.161 -0.3306 1.844 -0.997 29.807 
 Panel B: Abnormal Return Using Expected Return 
 This table shows statistics of the Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) over 4 different periods 
(6 months, 1 year, 2 years and 3 years). BHAR is calculated starting from the IPO date. In Panel 
A, BHAR is calculated as the difference between the share price return and the index return. In 
Panel B, BHAR is calculated using the difference between share price return and the expected 
share price return. 
 
6.10 IPO lockup expiration return analysis 
From Table 6.4, Panel A, I can notice that none of the correlations between the 
reported abnormal returns with the proportional dictionaries weights is significant. 
This applies to both the Market Model variables and the Fama-French Model. 
However, Panel B shows a significant correlation between Time Frequency – Inverse 
Time-Frequency Superfluous dictionary weight and the Cumulative Abnormal Return 
for the periods (0 – 5) and (0 – 10) for both models. It shows to be more significant 
for the period (0 – 10). The negative sign indicates that showing a tone of presenting 
extra data in the prospectuses is correlated with less cumulative abnormal return 
following the lockup expiration date.  
  
224 
 
Table 6.4: Correlation between (market model and Fama-French variables around the 
expiry date with different dictionaries’ weights and variables) 
 
MAR0 MCAR0-2 MCAR0-5 MCAR0-10 FFAR0 FFCAR0-2 FFCAR0-5 FFCAR0-10 
PrNegative 0.01 -0.036 -0.048 0.009 0.029 -0.026 -0.028 0.021 
PrHarvard_i
v 
-0.003 -0.042 -0.047 -0.003 -0.027 -0.043 -0.047 -0.003 
PrConstraini
ng 
0.039 0.009 0.003 0.025 -0.012 0.002 -0.004 0.018 
PrLitigious 0.015 -0.039 -0.007 0.042 0.056 -0.038 -0.005 0.038 
PrSuperfluou
s 
0.004 -0.022 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.019 -0.025 -0.028 
PrModal -0.018 -0.049 -0.031 0.008 0.007 -0.052 -0.024 0.018 
PrUncertaint
y 
-0.015 -0.031 -0.014 0.028 0.022 -0.032 -0.002 0.038 
PrPositive -0.023 -0.032 -0.049 -0.032 0.001 -0.034 -0.059 -0.043 
PrInteresting 0 0.01 0.001 0.001 -0.006 0.014 0.004 0.001 
PrIrr_Verb -0.001 -0.034 -0.007 0.021 -0.046 -0.029 0.005 0.022 
 
Panel A: Correlation with Proportional Weight Dictionaries 
 
TFNegative -0.018 -0.029 -0.051 -0.024 -0.013 -0.025 -0.044 -0.016 
TFHarvard_i
v 
-0.012 -0.023 -0.043 -0.02 -0.024 -0.02 -0.037 -0.012 
TFConstraini
ng 
-0.006 -0.005 -0.015 -0.009 0.01 0.001 -0.007 0.001 
TFLitigious 0.003 -0.02 -0.019 -0.016 0.012 -0.012 -0.01 -0.008 
TFSuperfluo
us 
-0.038 -0.037 -0.061* -0.106*** -0.031 -0.042 -0.064* -0.107*** 
TFModal -0.027 -0.029 -0.051 -0.033 -0.037 -0.028 -0.039 -0.022 
TFUncertain
ty 
-0.028 -0.024 -0.036 -0.022 -0.026 -0.024 -0.027 -0.013 
TFPositive -0.008 -0.042 -0.059* -0.045 -0.037 -0.042 -0.058 -0.043 
TFInterestin
g 
-0.007 -0.005 -0.018 -0.025 -0.02 -0.004 -0.012 -0.019 
TFIrr_Verb -0.018 -0.047 -0.045 -0.028 -0.063* -0.046 -0.037 -0.022 
 
Panel B: Correlation with Time Frequency – Inverse Document Time-Frequency Weight Dictionaries 
 
log(proceeds
) 
-0.049 -0.051 -0.051 -0.061* -0.047 -0.051 -0.051 -0.059 
Spread 0.064* 0.062* 0.053 0.069* 0.031 0.068* 0.066* 0.076** 
Prestigious 0.004 0.062* 0.08** 0.051 -0.014 0.072** 0.085** 0.058 
STDev 0.016 0.016 0.01 -0.014 0.023 0.033 0.035 0.005 
Age in days 0.02 0.014 -0.01 -0.008 -0.031 0.006 -0.019 -0.017 
Potential 
Growth 
-0.006 0.001 -0.009 -0.016 -0.001 0 -0.011 -0.015 
Log(Lockup) 0.22*** -0.012 -0.02 -0.023 -0.011 -0.014 -0.025 -0.029 
Underpricing -0.018 -0.033 0.012 0.023 0.074** -0.033 0.009 0.025 
Sales -0.001 0.007 0.006 -0.012 -0.001 0.004 -0.002 -0.018 
Overhang 0.047 0.044 -0.035 -0.007 -0.001 0.049 -0.032 -0.005 
Net Income -0.003 -0.123*** -0.104** -0.042 -0.144*** -0.124*** -0.095** -0.029 
Post-IPO 
EPS 
-0.025 -0.042 0.011 -0.014 -0.023 -0.038 0.007 -0.026 
 
Panel C: Correlation with Other Variables 
 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table shows the correlation of the abnormal return. MAR0 is the Abnormal Return calculated using the Market Model 
calculated at the day of the lockup period expiration date. MCAR is the Cumulative Abnormal Return calculated using Market 
Model for periods of (2, 5 and 10 days). FFAR0 is the Abnormal Return calculated using Fama-French 4-Factor model. FFAR 
is the Cumulative Abnormal Return calculated using Fama-French 4-Factor Model. This table has three sections. In Panel A, 
it shows the correlation with the dictionaries proportional weights. In Panel B, it shows the correlations with the time-
frequency – inverse document frequency dictionaries’ weights. In Panel C it shows the correlations with other variables. 
Proceeds is the money raised in the IPO. The spread is the amount charged by the underwriter as a percentage of the IPO 
proceeds. Prestigious is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has a prestigious underwriter and 0 otherwise. STDev is the 
standard deviation of share price during the first year of trading. Age in Days is the age of the company on the day of the IPO 
in days. Potential growth is a factor showing if the company increased the size of its capital at the years following the IPO. 
Lockup is the lockup period in days. the underpricing factor is calculated as the return on trading. If IPO was underpriced, the 
underpricing factor is positive, if it is overpriced, the underpricing factor is negative, and if fair price, the underpricing factor 
is 0. Sales is the reported sales the year prior to the IPO. The Overhang is the percentage of shares that are not traded. Net 
Income is the reported net income the year prior to the IPO. Post IPO EPS is the reported Earnings Per Share the year prior to 
the IPO. 
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On the other hand, from Panel C, I can notice a positive correlation with the 
underwriters’ prestigious dummy variable. This indicates that the IPOs undertaken by 
prestigious underwriters shows a slightly higher abnormal return after the lockup 
expiration date. In addition, for the IPOs where the underwriters charged higher spread 
fees, show slightly higher abnormal returns for both models.  
The length of the lockup period is showing a positive correlation in terms of 
Log(Lockup) and the Market Model Abnormal Average Return on the expiration date. 
This indicates that the longer the lockup period, the higher the abnormal average return 
on the lockup period expiration date. As the lockup period is getting higher, the 
shareholders will take more action changing their positions and gaining more return 
compared to the shorter lockup periods. 
The Underpricing variable is showing a significant positive correlation with 
Fama-French Abnormal Average Return on the expiration return. This indicates that 
the IPOs that are more underpriced tend to be slightly generating a more abnormal 
return on the lockup expiration date. 
Finally, from the table, I can notice that the companies that have reported 
higher net income for the year prior to the IPO have reported less abnormal returns. 
This indicates that the companies that have been reporting positive net income before 
going public are more stable and hence show less abnormal returns during the event 
of the lockup expiration. 
I ran regressions for all the variables from both models with different 
dictionaries. i have noticed that the tone of the prospectus does not show a significant 
relationship with the event study variables around the lockup period expiration date. 
This indicates that the effect of the prospectus tone decays over the period. Table 6.5 
226 
 
shows the regressions model coefficients of the Market Model CAR (0 – 5). I can 
notice that prestigious dummy variable is showing significance with a positive 
coefficient. This goes in line with the results from the correlation in Table 6.4. IPOs 
undertaken by prestigious underwriters show higher abnormal return during the lockup 
expiration date. 
227 
 
Table 6.5: Regression of Market Model CAR 0-5 with Proportional Weight Dictionaries 
MM CAR 0-5  PrNegative PrHarvard_iv PrConstraining PrLitigious PrSuperfluous PrModal PrUncertainty PrPositive PrInteresting PrIrr_Verb 
PrNegative   -2.418 
(-1.33) 
                  
PrHarvard_iv     -0.815 
(-1.1) 
                
PrConstraining       0.399 
(0.33) 
              
PrLitigious         -0.575 
(-0.41) 
            
PrSuperfluous           -21.314 
(-0.97) 
          
PrModal             -0.93 
(-0.71) 
        
PrUncertainty               -0.087 
(-0.05) 
      
PrPositive                 -3.089 
(-1.33) 
    
PrInteresting                   -0.546 
(-0.22) 
  
PrIrr_Verb                     -1.717 
(-0.56) 
Spread 0.001 
(0.76) 
0.001 
(0.87) 
0.001 
(0.74) 
0.001 
(0.77) 
0.001 
(0.74) 
0.001 
(0.74) 
0.001 
(0.75) 
0.001 
(0.76) 
0.001 
(0.72) 
0.001 
(0.76) 
0.001 
(0.75) 
Log(proceeds) -0.012 
(-1.51) 
-0.011 
(-1.36) 
-0.011 
(-1.39) 
-0.012 
(-1.54) 
-0.012 
(-1.54) 
-0.013 
(-1.59) 
-0.012 
(-1.5) 
-0.012 
(-1.51) 
-0.012 
(-1.48) 
-0.012 
(-1.51) 
-0.013 
(-1.58) 
Market Dummy -0.002 
(-0.16) 
-0.003 
(-0.22) 
-0.001 
(-0.09) 
-0.003 
(-0.2) 
-0.002 
(-0.12) 
-0.003 
(-0.18) 
-0.002 
(-0.12) 
-0.002 
(-0.16) 
-0.002 
(-0.15) 
-0.002 
(-0.16) 
-0.002 
(-0.16) 
Multi-bookrunner 0.022 
(1.1) 
0.021 
(1.07) 
0.022 
(1.1) 
0.021 
(1.07) 
0.022 
(1.11) 
0.021 
(1.06) 
0.022 
(1.14) 
0.022 
(1.1) 
0.02 
(1) 
0.021 
(1.09) 
0.021 
(1.08) 
Prestigious 0.02** 
(2.45) 
0.021** 
(2.53) 
0.02** 
(2.51) 
0.02** 
(2.44) 
0.02** 
(2.45) 
0.02** 
(2.48) 
0.02** 
(2.45) 
0.02** 
(2.45) 
0.02** 
(2.49) 
0.02** 
(2.46) 
0.02** 
(2.45) 
Underpricing -1.5E-5 
(-0.2) 
-1.1E-5 
(-0.14) 
-1.8E-5 
(-0.23) 
-1.6E-5 
(-0.2) 
-9.3E-6 
(-0.12) 
-1.5E-5 
(-0.2) 
-8.3E--6 
(-0.1) 
-1.5E-5 
(-0.19) 
-2.3E-5 
(-0.3) 
-1.7E-5 
(-0.21) 
-1.3E-5 
(-0.16) 
Log(Lockup) -0.027 
(-0.72) 
-0.031 
(-0.84) 
-0.026 
(-0.7) 
-0.028 
(-0.74) 
-0.027 
(-0.71) 
-0.028 
(-0.74) 
-0.027 
(-0.71) 
-0.027 
(-0.72) 
-0.026 
(-0.71) 
-0.027 
(-0.72) 
-0.027 
(-0.73) 
Constant 0.089 
(0.87) 
0.118 
(1.13) 
0.113 
(1.08) 
0.09 
(0.88) 
0.094 
(0.91) 
0.098 
(0.95) 
0.099 
(0.96) 
0.09 
(0.86) 
0.106 
(1.03) 
0.091 
(0.89) 
0.106 
(0.99) 
Observations 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 
Prob > F 0.4578 0.4132 0.4461 0.5151 0.5112 0.4624 0.4898 0.5218 0.4124 0.5189 0.5023 
Adj R-squared 0 0.001 0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0011 0 -0.0006 -0.0013 0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0009 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table summarises 11 OLS Regressions of the Cumulative Abnormal Return for 5 days calculated using Market Model where each one is presented in one of the columns. The first column shows the regression without introducing 
any of the dictionaries weight variables. The following columns show regressions after introducing the dictionaries one at a time. The control Variables are the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Market dummy is 0 for the 
Main market and 1 for AIM market, Multi-bookrunner is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has more than 1 bookrunner and 0 if only one bookrunner. Prestigious is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has a prestigious 
underwriter and 0 otherwise, D1 Underpricing is the return on the first day of trading if purchased at the IPO. Log(Lockup) is the log of lockup period. I also controlled for years but are not reported here in this table. 
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Table 6.6: Regression of Fama-French Model CAR 0-5 with Proportional Wight Dictionaries 
FF CAR 0-5  PrNegative PrHarvard_iv PrConstraining PrLitigious PrSuperfluous PrModal PrUncertainty PrPositive PrInteresting PrIrr_Verb 
PrNegative   -1.363 
(-0.73) 
                  
PrHarvard_iv     -0.815 
(-1.08) 
                
PrConstraining       0.233 
(0.19) 
              
PrLitigious         -0.44 
(-0.31) 
            
PrSuperfluous           -26.411 
(-1.18) 
          
PrModal             -0.509 
(-0.38) 
        
PrUncertainty               0.854 
(0.44) 
      
PrPositive                 -3.972* 
(-1.68) 
    
PrInteresting                   -0.338 
(-0.13) 
  
PrIrr_Verb                     -0.692 
(-0.22) 
Spread 0.002 
(1.22) 
0.002 
(1.28) 
0.001 
(1.21) 
0.002 
(1.23) 
0.001 
(1.21) 
0.001 
(1.2) 
0.001 
(1.22) 
0.002 
(1.24) 
0.001 
(1.17) 
0.002 
(1.23) 
0.001 
(1.22) 
Log(proceeds) -0.011 
(-1.35) 
-0.01 
(-1.27) 
-0.01 
(-1.24) 
-0.011 
(-1.37) 
-0.011 
(-1.37) 
-0.012 
(-1.46) 
-0.011 
(-1.35) 
-0.011 
(-1.37) 
-0.011 
(-1.32) 
-0.011 
(-1.36) 
-0.011 
(-1.37) 
Market Dummy -0.002 
(-0.1) 
-0.002 
(-0.14) 
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
-0.002 
(-0.13) 
-0.001 
(-0.07) 
-0.002 
(-0.13) 
-0.001 
(-0.09) 
-0.001 
(-0.09) 
-0.001 
(-0.1) 
-0.002 
(-0.11) 
-0.002 
(-0.1) 
Multi-bookrunners 0.016 
(0.81) 
0.016 
(0.78) 
0.016 
(0.81) 
0.016 
(0.78) 
0.016 
(0.81) 
0.015 
(0.75) 
0.016 
(0.82) 
0.016 
(0.79) 
0.013 
(0.67) 
0.016 
(0.8) 
0.016 
(0.8) 
Prestigious 0.021** 
(2.57) 
0.022*** 
(2.61) 
0.022*** 
(2.63) 
0.021** 
(2.56) 
0.021** 
(2.57) 
0.022*** 
(2.61) 
0.021** 
(2.57) 
0.021** 
(2.56) 
0.022*** 
(2.62) 
0.021** 
(2.57) 
0.021** 
(2.57) 
Underpricing -2.7E-5 
(-0.34) 
-2.4E-5 
(-0.3) 
-2.9E-5 
(-0.37) 
-2.7E-5 
(-0.34) 
-2.2E-5 
(-0.27) 
-2.7E-5 
(-0.33) 
-2.3E-5 
(-0.28) 
-3.1E-5 
(-0.38) 
-3.7E-5 
(-0.46) 
-2.8E-5 
(-0.34) 
-2.6E-5 
(-0.32) 
Log(Lockup) -0.035 
(-0.93) 
-0.038 
(-0.99) 
-0.035 
(-0.91) 
-0.036 
(-0.94) 
-0.035 
(-0.92) 
-0.036 
(-0.96) 
-0.035 
(-0.92) 
-0.035 
(-0.91) 
-0.035 
(-0.92) 
-0.035 
(-0.93) 
-0.035 
(-0.93) 
Constant 0.125 
(1.19) 
0.141 
(1.32) 
0.148 
(1.39) 
0.125 
(1.19) 
0.128 
(1.22) 
0.136 
(1.29) 
0.13 
(1.23) 
0.116 
(1.08) 
0.146 
(1.39) 
0.126 
(1.2) 
0.131 
(1.21) 
Observations 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 
Prob > F 0.1213 0.139 0.1221 0.1539 0.152 0.1162 0.1505 0.1491 0.0852 0.1544 0.1535 
Adj R-squared 0.0098 0.0092 0.01 0.0086 0.0086 0.0103 0.0087 0.0088 0.0122 0.0085 0.0086 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table summarises 11 OLS Regressions of the Cumulative Abnormal Return for 5 days calculated using Fama-French 4-Factor Model where each one is presented in one of the columns. The first column shows the regression 
without introducing any of the dictionaries weight variables. The following columns show regressions after introducing the dictionaries one at a time. The control Variables are the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Market 
dummy is 0 for the Main market and 1 for AIM market, Multi-bookrunner is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has more than 1 bookrunner and 0 if only one bookrunner. Prestigious is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has a 
prestigious underwriter and 0 otherwise, D1 Underpricing is the return on the first day of trading if purchased at the IPO. Log(Lockup) is the log of lockup period. I also controlled for years but are not reported here in this table. 
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The same applies to Table 6.6. With Fama-French Model, the regression showed 
significance with a negative coefficient of the Proportional weight of the positive 
dictionary. The more positive tone of the prospectus, the less abnormal return during 
the lockup expiration date period. From the above tables, I cannot accept our first 
hypothesis (H1). Positive, Conservative and Uncertainty do not show a significant 
relationship with lockup expiration return. Only Superfluous tone shows a negative 
coefficient and hence less lockup expiration return as the prospectus uses superfluous 
tone. 
6.11 Long-run IPO performance analysis 
From Table 6.7 I can see that none of the regressions of the Buy and Hold Abnormal 
Return (BHAR) in panel A with the proportional weight dictionaries shows any 
significance. However, in panel B, for 6 months holding period, the Interesting 
dictionary is showing a level of significance with a negative coefficient. This shows 
that the use of this dictionary in the prospectuses will reduce the return over the 
holding period. As I calculate the return from the IPO dates, this indicates that more 
interesting words will result in less underpricing and hence less return. The 
Superfluous dictionary is showing significance with 1 year holding period with a 
positive coefficient. This shows that prospectuses that use more superfluous words 
result in higher abnormal holding return over 1 year period. 
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Table 6.7: Correlation of different Buy and Hold Abnormal Return BHAR with 4 
different holding periods with different dictionaries’ weight and variables 
 
BHAR 6 Months BHAR 1 Year BHAR 2 Years BHAR 3 Years 
PrNegative 0.002 0.01 -0.008 -0.018 
PrHarvard_iv 0.002 0.01 0.009 0.022 
PrConstraining 0.018 -0.001 0.002 0.001 
PrLitigious -0.004 -0.006 -0.03 -0.05 
PrSuperfluous -0.004 0.012 -0.016 -0.03 
PrModal 0.046 0.028 0.018 0.01 
PrUncertainty 0.015 0.022 0.015 0.014 
PrPositive 0.023 0.008 0.023 -0.012 
PrInteresting 0.005 -0.018 0.013 0.012 
PrIrr_Verb -0.018 0.011 0.005 -0.001 
Panel A: Correlation with Proportional Weight Dictionaries 
 
TFNegative -0.032 0.029 0.016 0.01 
TFHarvard_iv -0.037 0.026 0.008 0.006 
TFConstraining -0.026 0.028 0.019 0.013 
TFLitigious -0.036 0.031 0.023 0.002 
TFSuperfluous 0.014 0.059* 0.049 0.031 
TFModal -0.045 0.012 -0.003 0.008 
TFUncertainty -0.031 0.024 0.013 0.024 
TFPositive -0.04 0.004 0.001 -0.003 
TFInteresting -0.071** -0.03 -0.039 -0.032 
TFIrr_Verb -0.039 0.017 0.014 0.034 
Panel B: Correlation with Time Frequency – Inverse Document Frequency Weight 
Dictionaries 
Log(proceeds) 0.039 0.022 0.037 0.021 
Spread -0.145*** -0.095*** -0.096*** -0.075** 
Prestigious -0.028 -0.045 -0.001 0.025 
STDev -0.017 0.004 -0.01 -0.001 
Age in days 0.03 0.044 0.052 0.042 
Potential Growth 0.009 0.031 0.057 0.052 
Log(Lockup) 0.043 0.038 0.012 -0.014 
Underpricing 0.022 -0.048 -0.075** -0.045 
Sales -0.005 0.013 0.070* 0.109*** 
Overhang -0.07** -0.062* -0.069** -0.059* 
Net Income 0 -0.005 -0.003 -0.009 
Post-IPO EPS 0.016 0.047 0.036 0.071* 
Panel C: Correlation with Different Variables 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table shows the correlation of Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) over 4 different periods (6 months, 1 year, 2 
years and 3 years). BHAR is calculated starting from the IPO date. This table has three sections. In Panel A, it shows the 
correlation with the dictionaries proportional weights. In Panel B, it shows the correlations with the time-frequency – inverse 
document frequency dictionaries’ weights. In Panel C it shows the correlations with other variables. Proceeds is the money 
raised in the IPO. The spread is the amount charged by the underwriter as a percentage of the IPO proceeds. Prestigious is a 
dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has a prestigious underwriter and 0 otherwise. STDev is the standard deviation of share 
price during the first year of trading. Age in Days is the age of the company on the day of the IPO in days. Potential growth 
is a factor showing if the company increased the size of its capital at the years following the IPO. Lockup is the lockup period 
in days. the underpricing factor is calculated as the return on trading. If IPO was underpriced, the underpricing factor is 
positive, if it is overpriced, the underpricing factor is negative, and if fair price, the underpricing factor is 0. Sales is the 
reported sales the year prior to the IPO. The Overhang is the percentage of shares that are not traded. Net Income is the 
reported net income the year prior to the IPO. Post IPO EPS is the reported Earnings Per Share the year prior to the IPO. 
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From Panel C, I can notice that Spread is showing significance across all 
holding periods. The coefficient is negative which means that prospectuses with 
underwriters charging higher fees will result in less abnormal return. As I was 
calculating the return from the IPO issuing price, this indicates that they are more 
accurately priced and hence less underpriced. The absolute coefficient value is 
decreasing as the holding period increases. Though it is expected for an underpriced 
share to generate a higher return, yet, Underpricing is showing negative coefficients 
and only significant of 2 years holding period. The same applies to Overhang. The 
higher the overhang shares, the less the abnormal holding period return. 
Table 6.8 shows univariate regressions of BHAR with different holding 
periods and different dictionaries’ weights. It shows significance with a negative 
correlation between 6 months holding period and Interesting tf.idf dictionary. It means 
that more interesting words used in the prospectus will result in less return over a 
holding period of 6 months. Over the 1-year holding period, the superfluous dictionary 
is showing some significance with a positive coefficient. More superfluous words 
result in higher abnormal return over a holding period of 1 year. Results shown in 
Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 do not show high significance for most of the tested variables. 
However, 2 variables showing significance (for 6-month and 1-year holding periods), 
yet, they do not give support to our second hypothesis (H2). For 6-month I notice that 
a positive tone represented by the Interesting dictionary has a negative relationship 
with the return. For the 1-year holding period, superfluous tone shows a positive 
relationship with the return.
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Table 6.8: Univariate regressions of Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) with different holding periods with different dictionaries’ 
weights 
 
BHAR 6 Months BHAR 1 Year BHAR 2 Years BHAR 3 Years  
Proportional tf.idf Proportional tf.idf Proportional tf.idf Proportional tf.idf 
Negative 0.417 
(0.06) 
-0.001 
(-0.97) 
3.501 
(0.29) 
0.002 
(0.89) 
-4.091 
(-0.24) 
0.001 
(0.46) 
-12.295 
(-0.52) 
0.001 
(0.28) 
Harvard_iv 0.209 
(0.07) 
-0.001 
(-1.13) 
1.583 
(0.31) 
0.001 
(0.78) 
1.918 
(0.26) 
0.001 
(0.24) 
6.334 
(0.64) 
0.001 
(0.17) 
Constraining 2.946 
(0.54) 
-0.007 
(-0.8) 
-0.377 
(-0.04) 
0.012 
(0.86) 
0.645 
(0.05) 
0.011 
(0.55) 
0.575 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.36) 
Litigious -0.642 
(-0.11) 
-0.005 
(-1.11) 
-1.701 
(-0.18) 
0.007 
(0.93) 
-12.143 
(-0.9) 
0.007 
(0.68) 
-26.867 
(-1.45) 
0.001 
(0.05) 
Superfluous -11.542 
(-0.12) 
0.02 
(0.42) 
55.124 
(0.35) 
0.14* 
(1.8) 
-107.169 
(-0.48) 
0.162 
(1.44) 
-263.121 
(-0.86) 
0.138 
(0.89) 
Modal 7.996 
(1.41) 
-0.029 
(-1.38) 
7.818 
(0.85) 
0.013 
(0.37) 
6.972 
(0.53) 
-0.004 
(-0.07) 
5.309 
(0.29) 
0.016 
(0.24) 
Uncertainty 3.444 
(0.45) 
-0.005 
(-0.95) 
8.288 
(0.67) 
0.006 
(0.74) 
7.727 
(0.43) 
0.005 
(0.38) 
10.179 
(0.41) 
0.012 
(0.7) 
Positive 7.152 
(0.69) 
-0.007 
(-1.21) 
4.22 
(0.25) 
0.001 
(0.13) 
16.448 
(0.69) 
0 
(0.02) 
-11.318 
(-0.35) 
-0.002 
(-0.1) 
Interesting 1.565 
(0.15) 
-0.048** 
(-2.15) 
-9.306 
(-0.54) 
-0.033 
(-0.92) 
9.558 
(0.39) 
-0.06 
(-1.16) 
11.939 
(0.36) 
-0.067 
(-0.93) 
Irr_verb -6.899 
(-0.54) 
-0.016 
(-1.17) 
6.717 
(0.33) 
0.012 
(0.51) 
4.247 
(0.14) 
0.014 
(0.42) 
-1.102 
(-0.03) 
0.046 
(0.98) 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table shows a summary of the univariate regressions of the Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) over 4 different periods (6 months, 1 year, 2 years and 3 years) and both 
the proportional weight and time-frequency – inverse document frequency of all the dictionaries. 
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Table 6.9 Shows regressions of BHAR with different holding periods returns 
with different variables. I can notice that spread is showing high significance. The 
negative coefficients indicate that IPOs with higher spread yield lower returns. This is 
the case over all the holding periods reported in the table. Underpricing is also showing 
some significance, however, with a very small coefficient value. 
Table 6.9: Regression of Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) with different 
holding periods 
 6 Month 
Holding 
Period 
1 Year 
Holding 
Period 
2 Year 
Holding 
Period 
3 Year 
Holding 
Period 
Spread -0.02*** 
(-3.72) 
-0.027*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.037*** 
(-2.76) 
-0.052*** 
(-2.75) 
Log(proceeds) 0 
(-0.01) 
-0.038 
(-0.67) 
-0.069 
(-0.83) 
-0.147 
(-1.28) 
Market Dummy 0.003 
(0.05) 
-0.007 
(-0.07) 
-0.107 
(-0.74) 
-0.184 
(-0.94) 
Multi-bookrunner 0.031 
(0.42) 
0.164 
(1.39) 
0.185 
(1.09) 
0.04 
(0.17) 
Prestigious -0.047 
(-1.25) 
-0.074 
(-1.21) 
-0.041 
(-0.47) 
0.076 
(0.64) 
Underpricing 0 
(0.55) 
-0.001 
(-1.34) 
-0.001** 
(-2.15) 
-0.001 
(-1.39) 
Log(Lockup) 0.192 
(1.47) 
0.27 
(1.27) 
0.183 
(0.6) 
-0.087 
(-0.21) 
Constant -0.155 
(-0.43) 
-0.096 
(-0.17) 
0.325 
(0.39) 
0.841 
(0.75) 
Observations 924 923 883 835 
Prob > F 0.0289 0.0714 0.1332 0.7001 
Adj R-squared 0.0148 0.0108 0.0081 -0.0045 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table shows 4 OLS Regressions of the Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) over 4 different periods 
(6 months, 1 year, 2 years and 3 years). The control Variables are the spread is the amount charged by the underwriter 
as a percentage of the IPO proceeds, the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Market dummy is 0 for the 
Main market and 1 for AIM market, Multi-bookrunner is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has more than 1 
bookrunner and 0 if only one bookrunner. Prestigious is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has a prestigious 
underwriter and 0 otherwise, D1 Underpricing is the return on the first day of trading if purchased at the IPO. 
Log(Lockup) is the log of lockup period. I also controlled for years but are not reported here in this table. 
 
In Table 6.10 I have introduced the tf.idf dictionaries’ weights to the 2 years 
holding period return regression. None of the deaconries’ weights coefficients showed 
any significance. I did the same for the different holding periods and got the same 
results.
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Table 6.10: Introducing different dictionaries weights variables to (BHAR) over 2 years holding period regression 
  TFNegative TFHarvard_iv TFConstraining TFLitigious TFSuperfluous TFModal TFUncertainty TFPositive TFInteresting TFIrr_Verb 
TFNegative   0.001 
(0.34) 
                  
TFHarvard_iv     0 
(0.06) 
                
TFConstraining       0.014 
(0.45) 
              
TFLitigious         0.009 
(0.54) 
            
TFSuperfluous           0.172 
(1.39) 
          
TFModal             -0.011 
(-0.18) 
        
TFUncertainty               0.006 
(0.36) 
      
TFPositive                 -0.006 
(-0.34) 
    
TFInteresting                   -0.092 
(-1.53) 
  
TFIrr_Verb                     0.014 
(0.32) 
Spread -0.037*** 
(-2.76) 
-0.038*** 
(-2.78) 
-0.037*** 
(-2.75) 
-0.038*** 
(-2.79) 
-0.038*** 
(-2.8) 
-0.039*** 
(-2.85) 
-0.037*** 
(-2.73) 
-0.038*** 
(-2.78) 
-0.037*** 
(-2.72) 
-0.035*** 
(-2.6) 
-0.038*** 
(-2.77) 
Log(proceeds) -0.069 
(-0.83) 
-0.079 
(-0.9) 
-0.071 
(-0.81) 
-0.085 
(-0.94) 
-0.087 
(-0.97) 
-0.082 
(-0.98) 
-0.066 
(-0.78) 
-0.077 
(-0.9) 
-0.061 
(-0.71) 
-0.042 
(-0.49) 
-0.077 
(-0.89) 
Market Dummy -0.107 
(-0.74) 
-0.1 
(-0.68) 
-0.106 
(-0.73) 
-0.098 
(-0.67) 
-0.095 
(-0.65) 
-0.082 
(-0.56) 
-0.109 
(-0.75) 
-0.102 
(-0.71) 
-0.117 
(-0.79) 
-0.131 
(-0.9) 
-0.102 
(-0.71) 
Multi-bookrunner 0.185 
(1.09) 
0.172 
(0.99) 
0.183 
(1.06) 
0.165 
(0.94) 
0.163 
(0.94) 
0.155 
(0.91) 
0.189 
(1.1) 
0.172 
(1) 
0.189 
(1.11) 
0.203 
(1.2) 
0.177 
(1.03) 
Prestigious -0.041 
(-0.47) 
-0.042 
(-0.48) 
-0.041 
(-0.47) 
-0.042 
(-0.48) 
-0.042 
(-0.48) 
-0.032 
(-0.37) 
-0.043 
(-0.49) 
-0.04 
(-0.46) 
-0.04 
(-0.46) 
-0.036 
(-0.41) 
-0.04 
(-0.46) 
Underpricing -0.001** 
(-2.15) 
-0.001** 
(-2.13) 
-0.001** 
(-2.14) 
-0.001** 
(-2.12) 
-0.001** 
(-2.13) 
-0.001** 
(-2.05) 
-0.001** 
(-2.16) 
-0.001** 
(-2.14) 
-0.001** 
(-2.17) 
-0.001** 
(-2.22) 
-0.001** 
(-2.12) 
Log(Lockup) 0.183 
(0.6) 
0.195 
(0.63) 
0.184 
(0.6) 
0.202 
(0.66) 
0.204 
(0.66) 
0.192 
(0.63) 
0.179 
(0.59) 
0.193 
(0.63) 
0.176 
(0.58) 
0.142 
(0.46) 
0.19 
(0.62) 
Constant 0.325 
(0.39) 
0.285 
(0.34) 
0.319 
(0.38) 
0.262 
(0.31) 
0.247 
(0.29) 
0.269 
(0.32) 
0.339 
(0.41) 
0.291 
(0.35) 
0.36 
(0.43) 
0.464 
(0.56) 
0.293 
(0.35) 
Observations 883 883 883 883 883 883 883 883 883 883 883 
Prob > F 0.1332 0.165 0.1688 0.1622 0.1593 0.1141 0.1678 0.1646 0.1651 0.1043 0.1656 
Adj R-squared 0.0081 0.0071 0.007 0.0072 0.0073 0.0092 0.007 0.0071 0.0071 0.0097 0.0071 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table summarises 11 OLS Regressions of the Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) over 2 years calculated using Index Return where each one is presented in one of the columns. The first column shows the regression 
without introducing any of the dictionaries weight variables. The following columns show regressions after introducing the dictionaries one at a time. The control Variables are the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Market 
dummy is 0 for the Main market and 1 for AIM market, Multi-bookrunner is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has more than 1 bookrunner and 0 if only one bookrunner. Prestigious is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has a 
prestigious underwriter and 0 otherwise, D1 Underpricing is the return on the first day of trading if purchased at the IPO. Log(Lockup) is the log of lockup period. I also controlled for years but are not reported here in this table. 
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6.12 Survival of IPOs analysis 
From Table 6.11, I have the correlation between the dead dummy and the log(Days 
Till Dead) and the dictionaries’ weights. Proportional Negative and Uncertainty are 
showing significant negative correlations. This shows that the exposure of negative 
and uncertainty information in the prospectus reduces the chances for the company to 
go dead. However, as the Log(Days Till Dead) variable in this table is only calculated 
for the companies that went dead, the negative correlation indicates that more negative 
tones in the prospectus will result in a shorter life for the company. For the dead 
dummy variable, litigious and Interesting dictionaries are showing a positive 
correlation. This means that exposure of more litigious and using more interesting 
language is correlated with the survival of the companies. On the other hand, Litigious 
is showing a negative correlation with Log(Days Till Dead). This indicates that more 
litigious language in the prospectus though it indicates a higher surviving chance, yet, 
it shows a shorter life among the dead companies. Significant negative correlation with 
Log(Days Till Dead) is also observed for Superfluous and Modal. 
From Panel B, the Dead dummy is showing significant negative correlation 
with all the tf.idf weight dictionaries. This indicates higher survival probability in 
correlation with more exposure of information. However, among the bankrupted 
companies, more exposure results in shorter life till dead. 
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Table 6.11: Correlation of Bankruptcy variables with different dictionaries weights 
and variables 
 
Dead Dummy Log(DaysTDead) 
PrNegative -0.123*** -0.204*** 
PrHarvard_iv -0.002 -0.082 
PrConstraining 0.024 -0.015 
PrLitigious 0.084*** -0.146*** 
PrSuperfluous 0.038 -0.118** 
PrModal -0.014 -0.113** 
PrUncertainty -0.176*** -0.161*** 
PrPositive 0.001 0.074 
PrInteresting 0.074** 0.02 
PrIrr_Verb 0.179*** 0.032 
Panel A: Correlation with Proportional Weight Dictionaries 
TFNegative -0.268*** -0.146*** 
TFHarvard_iv -0.267*** -0.126** 
TFConstraining -0.235*** -0.169*** 
TFLitigious -0.236*** -0.171*** 
TFSuperfluous -0.173*** -0.01 
TFModal -0.251*** -0.085* 
TFUncertainty -0.283*** -0.137*** 
TFPositive -0.197*** -0.1** 
TFInteresting -0.166*** -0.03 
TFIrr_Verb -0.256*** -0.058 
Panel B: Correlation with tf.idf Weight Dictionaries 
Log(proceeds) -0.219*** -0.004 
Spread 0.073** -0.09* 
Prestigious -0.008 0.062 
STDev 0.042 0.021 
Age in Days -0.04 0.095* 
Log(Lockup) 
 
0.088* 
Underpricing 0.03 -0.084* 
Sales -0.055 -0.202*** 
Overhang 0.061* -0.009 
Net Income -0.038 -0.148** 
Post-IPO EPS 0.054 0.084 
Panel C: Correlation with Other Variables 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table shows the correlation of the abnormal return. MAR0 is the Abnormal Return calculated using the 
Market Model calculated at the day of the lockup period expiration date. MCAR is the Cumulative Abnormal 
Return calculated using Market Model for periods of (2, 5 and 10 days). FFAR0 is the Abnormal Return 
calculated using Fama-French 4-Factor model. FFAR is the Cumulative Abnormal Return calculated using 
Fama-French 4-Factor Model. This table has three sections. In Panel A, it shows the correlation with the 
dictionaries proportional weights. In Panel B, it shows the correlations with the time-frequency – inverse 
document frequency dictionaries’ weights. In Panel C it shows the correlations with other variables. Proceeds 
is the money raised in the IPO. The spread is the amount charged by the underwriter as a percentage of the IPO 
proceeds. Prestigious is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has a prestigious underwriter and 0 otherwise. 
STDev is the standard deviation of share price during the first year of trading. Age in Days is the age of the 
company on the day of the IPO in days. Potential growth is a factor showing if the company increased the size 
of its capital at the years following the IPO. Lockup is the lockup period in days. the underpricing factor is 
calculated as the return on trading. If IPO was underpriced, the underpricing factor is positive, if it is overpriced, 
the underpricing factor is negative, and if fair price, the underpricing factor is 0. Sales is the reported sales the 
year prior to the IPO. Net Income is the reported net income the year prior to the IPO. Post IPO EPS is the 
reported Earnings Per Share the year prior to the IPO. 
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Panel C shows correlations with other variables. Log(Proceeds) is negatively 
correlated with the dead dummy. This shows that companies with larger IPOs have a 
higher probability to survive than those with smaller IPOs. Spread on the other hand 
is positively correlated with the dead dummy variable. This shows that underwriters 
charged slightly more fees to the companies that went dead. This could be an 
indication that the underwriters would charge more if a higher risk is anticipated. The 
Overhang variable is also showing a positive correlation with the Dead dummy 
variable. This indicates that the more shares kept by the shareholders, the higher the 
probability of going dead. 
For Log(Days Till Dead) which in this table only measures the age in days for 
the companies that went dead, I can see a significant negative correlation with the 
Spread, Underpricing, Reported Sales before the IPO and the reported Net Income the 
year before the IPO. The negative correlation with the spread supports and goes in line 
with the discussion of the correlation between the dead dummy variable and the 
spread. In addition to that, the negative correlation with underpricing would also 
indicate that underwriters would underprice more if more risk is anticipated. 
Among the companies that went dead, the companies that reported higher sales 
and higher net income for the year prior to the IPO had a shorter life. This will be an 
area to study their methods of reporting their sales and income and the level of 
discretionary measures in a different research.  
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Table 6.12: Regression of Log(TimeTillDead) with Proportional Weight Dictionaries 
  PrNegative PrHarvard_iv PrConstraining PrLitigious PrSuperfluous PrModal PrUncertainty PrPositive PrInteresting PrIrr_Verb 
PrNegative   -30.815** 
(-1.99) 
                  
PrHarvard_iv     -2.816 
(-0.43) 
                
PrConstraining       15.179 
(1.21) 
              
PrLitigious         -12.254 
(-1.09) 
            
PrSuperfluous           -346.526** 
(-2.02) 
          
PrModal             -0.858 
(-0.08) 
        
PrUncertainty               -2.927 
(-0.19) 
      
PrPositive                 5.019 
(0.27) 
    
PrInteresting                   -5.122 
(-0.27) 
  
PrIrr_Verb                     39.771* 
(1.85) 
Spread -0.024** 
(-2.58) 
-0.023** 
(-2.49) 
-0.024** 
(-2.58) 
-0.024*** 
(-2.63) 
-0.024** 
(-2.6) 
-0.024** 
(-2.6) 
-0.024** 
(-2.57) 
-0.024** 
(-2.58) 
-0.024** 
(-2.57) 
-0.023** 
(-2.51) 
-0.023** 
(-2.5) 
Log(proceeds) -0.07 
(-1.11) 
-0.057 
(-0.92) 
-0.066 
(-1.03) 
-0.079 
(-1.25) 
-0.086 
(-1.34) 
-0.082 
(-1.3) 
-0.07 
(-1.11) 
-0.07 
(-1.12) 
-0.07 
(-1.12) 
-0.07 
(-1.12) 
-0.053 
(-0.84) 
Market Dummy -0.078 
(-0.7) 
-0.081 
(-0.73) 
-0.073 
(-0.65) 
-0.094 
(-0.84) 
-0.079 
(-0.71) 
-0.073 
(-0.66) 
-0.079 
(-0.7) 
-0.08 
(-0.71) 
-0.078 
(-0.7) 
-0.08 
(-0.72) 
-0.069 
(-0.62) 
Multi-bookrunner -0.501** 
(-2.36) 
-0.474** 
(-2.24) 
-0.505** 
(-2.38) 
-0.499** 
(-2.35) 
-0.516** 
(-2.43) 
-0.514** 
(-2.44) 
-0.501** 
(-2.36) 
-0.5** 
(-2.35) 
-0.5** 
(-2.35) 
-0.497** 
(-2.33) 
-0.514** 
(-2.43) 
Prestigious -0.022 
(-0.35) 
-0.004 
(-0.07) 
-0.02 
(-0.32) 
-0.022 
(-0.36) 
-0.022 
(-0.35) 
-0.017 
(-0.27) 
-0.022 
(-0.35) 
-0.021 
(-0.34) 
-0.022 
(-0.35) 
-0.021 
(-0.34) 
-0.011 
(-0.19) 
Underpricing -0.001 
(-1.59) 
-0.001 
(-1.44) 
-0.001 
(-1.59) 
-0.001 
(-1.6) 
-0.001 
(-1.32) 
-0.001 
(-1.53) 
-0.001 
(-1.57) 
-0.001 
(-1.55) 
-0.001 
(-1.55) 
-0.001 
(-1.61) 
-0.001* 
(-1.81) 
Log(Lockup) 0.384 
(1.65) 
0.357 
(1.54) 
0.382 
(1.64) 
0.386* 
(1.66) 
0.365 
(1.56) 
0.393* 
(1.7) 
0.384 
(1.65) 
0.383 
(1.64) 
0.378 
(1.62) 
0.385* 
(1.65) 
0.44* 
(1.88) 
Age in Days 1.34E-05 
(1.08) 
1.11E-05 
(0.9) 
1.33E-05 
(1.07) 
1.38E-05 
(1.12) 
1.33E-05 
(1.07) 
1.3E-5 
(1.05) 
1.33E-05 
(1.06) 
1.32E-05 
(1.06) 
1.3E-5 
(1.04) 
1.35E-05 
(1.09) 
1.12E-05 
(0.9) 
Constant 6.485*** 
(10.11) 
6.76*** 
(10.35) 
6.578*** 
(9.71) 
6.378*** 
(9.86) 
6.671*** 
(10.05) 
6.562*** 
(10.26) 
6.497*** 
(9.85) 
6.514*** 
(9.86) 
6.47*** 
(10.03) 
6.493*** 
(10.1) 
5.962*** 
(8.53) 
Observations 314 314 314 314 314 314 314 314 314 314 314 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Adj R-squared 0.1819 0.19 0.1797 0.1832 0.1824 0.1903 0.1792 0.1792 0.1793 0.1793 0.1885 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table summarises 11 OLS Regressions of the log of time till dead in days where each one is presented in one of the columns. The first column shows the regression without introducing any of the dictionaries 
weight variables. The following columns show regressions after introducing the dictionaries one at a time. The control Variables are the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Market dummy is 0 for the Main 
market and 1 for AIM market, Multi-bookrunner is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has more than 1 bookrunner and 0 if only one bookrunner. Prestigious is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has a prestigious 
underwriter and 0 otherwise, D1 Underpricing is the return on the first day of trading if purchased at the IPO. Log(Lockup) is the log of lockup period. I also controlled for years but are not reported here in this table. 
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Table 6.12 shows Logit Regression of Dead Dummy Variable with 
proportional weight dictionaries. I noticed from the table that Negative and 
Superfluous dictionaries have negative coefficients. This shows that these dictionaries 
have a negative relationship with the age of the company till it becomes dead. The 
Spread also shows a negative coefficient here which shows that underwriters charge 
slightly higher for the companies that have higher anticipated risk. 
Multi-bookrunner dummy variable is showing a negative coefficient. This 
indicates that among the companies that went dead, the IPOs that has a multi-
bookrunners have a shorter life. However, the prestigious dummy is showing 
insignificant here. 
Table 6.13 shows similar data as Table 6.12 but with tf.idf weight dictionaries. 
None of the dictionaries shows significance in the reported regressions. 
From Table 6.14 I noticed that Uncertainty has a significant negative 
coefficient. This means that the company is less likely to go dead as the tone on the 
prospectus is showing more uncertainty data. On the other hand, I can notice 
significant positive coefficients for litigious, constraining and less significant for 
Harvard Negative List. This shows that the likelihood for a company to go dead 
increases as the weight of the litigious or constraining tone of the prospectus goes 
higher. The same applies to the Harvard Negative List with less significance. This 
support our third hypothesis (H3) for the conservative tone part. I can notice that 
survival rate is less when the tone of the prospectus is more conservative. However, 
uncertainty is showing a negative coefficient which implies higher survival rate. On 
the other hand, positive tone does not show any significance here. 
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In addition to the tone of the prospectus, I also noticed that the coefficients of 
Log(proceeds) and Multi-bookrunners dummies are significant and negative. This 
shows that IPOs with higher proceeds and with multi-bookrunners are less likely to go 
dead that IPOs with smaller proceeds and one bookrunner.
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Table 6.13: Regression of Log(TimeTillDead) with tf.idf Weight Dictionaries 
  TFNegative TFHarvard_iv TFConstraining TFLitigious TFSuperfluous TFModal TFUncertainty TFPositive TFInteresting TFIrr_Verb 
TFNegative   0.002 
(0.45) 
                  
TFHarvard_iv     0.001 
(0.36) 
                
TFConstraining       0.014 
(0.5) 
              
TFLitigious         -0.003 
(-0.17) 
            
TFSuperfluous           0.113 
(1.04) 
          
TFModal             0.01 
(0.17) 
        
TFUncertainty               0.007 
(0.37) 
      
TFPositive                 -0.011 
(-0.82) 
    
TFInteresting                   0.046 
(0.97) 
  
TFIrr_Verb                     0.03 
(0.74) 
Spread -0.024** 
(-2.58) 
-0.024** 
(-2.61) 
-0.024** 
(-2.6) 
-0.024*** 
(-2.62) 
-0.023** 
(-2.52) 
-0.023** 
(-2.55) 
-0.024** 
(-2.58) 
-0.024** 
(-2.6) 
-0.023** 
(-2.48) 
-0.024*** 
(-2.64) 
-0.024*** 
(-2.62) 
Log(proceeds) -0.07 
(-1.11) 
-0.081 
(-1.2) 
-0.078 
(-1.17) 
-0.084 
(-1.22) 
-0.066 
(-0.97) 
-0.073 
(-1.16) 
-0.072 
(-1.12) 
-0.078 
(-1.17) 
-0.054 
(-0.82) 
-0.082 
(-1.28) 
-0.084 
(-1.28) 
Market Dummy -0.078 
(-0.7) 
-0.071 
(-0.63) 
-0.074 
(-0.66) 
-0.07 
(-0.62) 
-0.081 
(-0.72) 
-0.062 
(-0.55) 
-0.076 
(-0.67) 
-0.074 
(-0.66) 
-0.094 
(-0.83) 
-0.076 
(-0.68) 
-0.067 
(-0.6) 
Multi-bookrunner -0.501** 
(-2.36) 
-0.53** 
(-2.39) 
-0.517** 
(-2.39) 
-0.534** 
(-2.4) 
-0.49** 
(-2.2) 
-0.525** 
(-2.46) 
-0.505** 
(-2.36) 
-0.521** 
(-2.38) 
-0.49** 
(-2.31) 
-0.527** 
(-2.46) 
-0.515** 
(-2.42) 
Prestigious -0.022 
(-0.35) 
-0.023 
(-0.37) 
-0.022 
(-0.36) 
-0.021 
(-0.34) 
-0.021 
(-0.34) 
-0.024 
(-0.38) 
-0.021 
(-0.34) 
-0.021 
(-0.34) 
-0.019 
(-0.31) 
-0.024 
(-0.38) 
-0.021 
(-0.34) 
Underpricing -0.001 
(-1.59) 
-0.001 
(-1.56) 
-0.001 
(-1.55) 
-0.001 
(-1.56) 
-0.001 
(-1.59) 
-0.001 
(-1.47) 
-0.001 
(-1.56) 
-0.001 
(-1.57) 
-0.001* 
(-1.68) 
-0.001 
(-1.54) 
-0.001 
(-1.51) 
Log(Lockup) 0.384 
(1.65) 
0.4* 
(1.7) 
0.392* 
(1.68) 
0.406* 
(1.71) 
0.377 
(1.59) 
0.386* 
(1.66) 
0.386* 
(1.65) 
0.399* 
(1.69) 
0.367 
(1.57) 
0.395* 
(1.7) 
0.399* 
(1.71) 
Age in Days 1.34E-05 
(1.08) 
1.37E-05 
(1.1) 
1.36E-05 
(1.1) 
1.35E-05 
(1.09) 
1.34E-05 
(1.08) 
1.39E-05 
(1.12) 
1.34E-05 
(1.08) 
1.33E-05 
(1.07) 
1.33E-05 
(1.07) 
1.38E-05 
(1.11) 
1.3E-5 
(1.05) 
Constant 6.485*** 
(10.11) 
6.434*** 
(9.86) 
6.455*** 
(9.97) 
6.419*** 
(9.78) 
6.511*** 
(9.87) 
6.459*** 
(10.06) 
6.474*** 
(10.01) 
6.44*** 
(9.85) 
6.561*** 
(10.12) 
6.448*** 
(10.03) 
6.416*** 
(9.89) 
Observations 314 314 314 314 314 314 314 314 314 314 314 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Adj R-squared 0.1819 0.1797 0.1795 0.1798 0.1792 0.1821 0.1792 0.1795 0.181 0.1817 0.1806 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table summarises 11 OLS Regressions of the log of time till dead in days where each one is presented in one of the columns. The first column shows the regression without introducing any of the dictionaries 
weight variables. The following columns show regressions after introducing the dictionaries one at a time. The control Variables are the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Market dummy is 0 for the Main 
market and 1 for AIM market, Multi-bookrunner is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has more than 1 bookrunner and 0 if only one bookrunner. Prestigious is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has a prestigious 
underwriter and 0 otherwise, D1 Underpricing is the return on the first day of trading if purchased at the IPO. Log(Lockup) is the log of lockup period. I also controlled for years but are not reported here in this table. 
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Table 6.14: Logit Regression of Dead Dummy with proportional weight dictionaries 
  
PrNegative PrHarvard_iv PrConstraining PrLitigious PrSuperfluous PrModal PrUncertainty PrPositive PrInteresting PrIrr_Verb 
PrNegative   -10.004 
(-0.29) 
                  
PrHarvard_iv     24.733* 
(1.74) 
                
PrConstraining       49.784** 
(2.09) 
              
PrLitigious         61.193** 
(2.25) 
            
PrSuperfluous           -0.551 
(0) 
          
PrModal             17.227 
(0.69) 
        
PrUncertainty               -74.803** 
(-2.03) 
      
PrPositive                 -3.367 
(-0.08) 
    
PrInteresting                   41.146 
(0.9) 
  
PrIrr_Verb                     191.26*** 
(3.31) 
Spread 0.005 
(0.22) 
0.006 
(0.24) 
0.005 
(0.23) 
0.005 
(0.22) 
0.007 
(0.31) 
0.005 
(0.22) 
0.006 
(0.24) 
0.003 
(0.13) 
0.005 
(0.22) 
0.004 
(0.18) 
0.007 
(0.28) 
Log(proceeds) -0.528*** 
(-3.43) 
-0.524*** 
(-3.4) 
-0.553*** 
(-3.57) 
-0.574*** 
(-3.69) 
-0.494*** 
(-3.2) 
-0.528*** 
(-3.41) 
-0.526*** 
(-3.42) 
-0.522*** 
(-3.38) 
-0.527*** 
(-3.43) 
-0.528*** 
(-3.43) 
-0.451*** 
(-2.89) 
Market Dummy -0.068 
(-0.25) 
-0.069 
(-0.26) 
-0.104 
(-0.39) 
-0.153 
(-0.56) 
-0.13 
(-0.48) 
-0.068 
(-0.25) 
-0.071 
(-0.26) 
-0.081 
(-0.3) 
-0.068 
(-0.25) 
-0.059 
(-0.22) 
-0.057 
(-0.21) 
Multi-bookrunner -0.705* 
(-1.77) 
-0.706* 
(-1.78) 
-0.712* 
(-1.79) 
-0.76* 
(-1.89) 
-0.706* 
(-1.78) 
-0.705* 
(-1.77) 
-0.707* 
(-1.78) 
-0.706* 
(-1.77) 
-0.706* 
(-1.77) 
-0.713* 
(-1.79) 
-0.687* 
(-1.7) 
Prestigious 0.166 
(1.05) 
0.169 
(1.06) 
0.144 
(0.9) 
0.149 
(0.93) 
0.174 
(1.09) 
0.166 
(1.05) 
0.17 
(1.07) 
0.165 
(1.04) 
0.167 
(1.05) 
0.159 
(1) 
0.174 
(1.09) 
Underpricing -0.002 
(-1.22) 
-0.002 
(-1.21) 
-0.001 
(-1.21) 
-0.002 
(-1.26) 
-0.002 
(-1.6) 
-0.002 
(-1.22) 
-0.002 
(-1.25) 
-0.001 
(-1.06) 
-0.002 
(-1.22) 
-0.001 
(-1.2) 
-0.002 
(-1.38) 
Log(Lockup) 0.315 
(0.57) 
0.304 
(0.55) 
0.314 
(0.56) 
0.265 
(0.48) 
0.35 
(0.63) 
0.315 
(0.57) 
0.322 
(0.58) 
0.263 
(0.47) 
0.317 
(0.57) 
0.324 
(0.58) 
0.463 
(0.82) 
Constant -0.084 
(-0.06) 
0.011 
(0.01) 
-0.819 
(-0.52) 
-0.228 
(-0.15) 
-0.767 
(-0.5) 
-0.084 
(-0.06) 
-0.309 
(-0.2) 
0.703 
(0.45) 
-0.072 
(-0.05) 
-0.192 
(-0.13) 
-2.188 
(-1.33) 
Observations 918 918 918 918 918 918 918 918 918 918 918 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.0983 0.0983 0.1007 0.1017 0.1023 0.0983 0.0986 0.1016 0.0983 0.0989 0.1073 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table summarises 11 Logit Regressions of the log of Dead Dummy where each one is presented in one of the columns. The first column shows the regression without introducing any of the dictionaries weight 
variables. The following columns show regressions after introducing the dictionaries one at a time. The control Variables are the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Market dummy is 0 for the Main market 
and 1 for AIM market, Multi-bookrunner is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has more than 1 bookrunner and 0 if only one bookrunner. Prestigious is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has a prestigious 
underwriter and 0 otherwise, D1 Underpricing is the return on the first day of trading if purchased at the IPO. Log(Lockup) is the log of lockup period. I also controlled for years but are not reported here in this table. 
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Table 6.15 shows the same regressions using the tf.idf weights. Here I noticed 
that all the coefficients of the dictionaries weight that show significance are all 
negative. This includes Negative, Uncertainty, Modal, Harvard Negative List and less 
significance for Superfluous. For those dictionaries, the regressions show that the 
more usage of these dictionaries in the prospectuses the less likely it is for the company 
to go dead. 
Table 6.16 Shows the Cox Proportional Hazard Model using Dead Dummy 
Variable and DaysTillDead variable. In this table, I have used a censored data which 
only uses companies that went dead during the time of the study. From the first 
column, I can see the regression without the inclusion of any of the dictionaries 
weights. From this regression, I can notice that the coefficient of Spread variable is in 
advantage of the company as its value is less than 1. This indicates that the higher the 
charged fees, the higher chance for the company to survive. However, Multi-
bookrunner variable coefficient is showing a value that is larger than 1. This indicates 
that companies that have multi-bookrunners are more likely to go dead. In the other 
columns, I have introduced different proportional weights for different dictionaries. 
They all were insignificant except for Superfluous. The coefficient value is higher than 
1. This shows that prospectuses with more superfluous content have a higher 
likelihood to go dead. I have also run the regression with the tf.idf where none of the 
coefficients of the dictionaries’ weights was significant. 
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Table 6.15: Logit Regression of Dead Dummy with tf.idf weight dictionaries 
  
TFNegative TFHarvard_iv TFConstraining TFLitigious TFSuperfluous TFModal TFUncertainty TFPositive TFInteresting TFIrr_Verb 
TFNegative   -0.022** 
(-2.4) 
                  
TFHarvard_iv     -0.019*** 
(-2.81) 
                
TFConstraining       -0.009 
(-0.14) 
              
TFLitigious         -0.033 
(-1.02) 
            
TFSuperfluous           -0.466* 
(-1.85) 
          
TFModal             -0.412*** 
(-3.33) 
        
TFUncertainty               -0.132*** 
(-3.58) 
      
TFPositive                 -0.019 
(-0.58) 
    
TFInteresting                   -0.152 
(-1.31) 
  
TFIrr_Verb                     -0.225** 
(-2.55) 
Spread 0.005 
(0.22) 
0.012 
(0.5) 
0.012 
(0.51) 
0.006 
(0.23) 
0.009 
(0.37) 
0.008 
(0.34) 
0.011 
(0.47) 
0.014 
(0.57) 
0.007 
(0.27) 
0.008 
(0.34) 
0.012 
(0.48) 
Log(proceeds) -0.528*** 
(-3.43) 
-0.393** 
(-2.41) 
-0.394** 
(-2.44) 
-0.519*** 
(-3.11) 
-0.465*** 
(-2.81) 
-0.502*** 
(-3.25) 
-0.421*** 
(-2.67) 
-0.369** 
(-2.3) 
-0.503*** 
(-3.15) 
-0.485*** 
(-3.08) 
-0.412** 
(-2.57) 
Market Dummy -0.068 
(-0.25) 
-0.158 
(-0.58) 
-0.168 
(-0.61) 
-0.074 
(-0.27) 
-0.108 
(-0.4) 
-0.146 
(-0.53) 
-0.139 
(-0.51) 
-0.166 
(-0.6) 
-0.1 
(-0.36) 
-0.105 
(-0.38) 
-0.138 
(-0.51) 
Multi-bookrunner -0.705* 
(-1.77) 
-0.553 
(-1.37) 
-0.566 
(-1.41) 
-0.694* 
(-1.71) 
-0.631 
(-1.56) 
-0.642 
(-1.6) 
-0.588 
(-1.47) 
-0.501 
(-1.24) 
-0.695* 
(-1.75) 
-0.684* 
(-1.72) 
-0.616 
(-1.54) 
Prestigious 0.166 
(1.05) 
0.171 
(1.08) 
0.17 
(1.07) 
0.167 
(1.05) 
0.167 
(1.05) 
0.149 
(0.94) 
0.141 
(0.88) 
0.151 
(0.94) 
0.172 
(1.08) 
0.173 
(1.09) 
0.16 
(1.01) 
Underpricing -0.002 
(-1.22) 
-0.002 
(-1.35) 
-0.002 
(-1.4) 
-0.002 
(-1.22) 
-0.002 
(-1.25) 
-0.002 
(-1.35) 
-0.002 
(-1.45) 
-0.002 
(-1.32) 
-0.002 
(-1.27) 
-0.002 
(-1.26) 
-0.002 
(-1.42) 
Log(Lockup) 0.315 
(0.57) 
0.202 
(0.36) 
0.218 
(0.39) 
0.307 
(0.55) 
0.25 
(0.45) 
0.318 
(0.57) 
0.266 
(0.48) 
0.162 
(0.29) 
0.308 
(0.55) 
0.271 
(0.49) 
0.268 
(0.48) 
Constant -0.084 
(-0.06) 
0.332 
(0.22) 
0.337 
(0.22) 
-0.056 
(-0.04) 
0.162 
(0.11) 
0.007 
(0) 
0.273 
(0.18) 
0.463 
(0.3) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
0.086 
(0.06) 
0.253 
(0.17) 
Observations 918 918 918 918 918 918 918 918 918 918 918 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.0983 0.1031 0.1049 0.0983 0.0991 0.1011 0.1078 0.1094 0.0985 0.0997 0.1036 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table summarises 11 Logit Regressions of the log of Dead Dummy where each one is presented in one of the columns. The first column shows the regression without introducing any of the dictionaries weight 
variables. The following columns show regressions after introducing the dictionaries one at a time. The control Variables are the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Market dummy is 0 for the Main market 
and 1 for AIM market, Multi-bookrunner is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has more than 1 bookrunner and 0 if only one bookrunner. Prestigious is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has a prestigious 
underwriter and 0 otherwise, D1 Underpricing is the return on the first day of trading if purchased at the IPO. Log(Lockup) is the log of lockup period. I also controlled for years but are not reported here in this table. 
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Table 6.16: Cox Proportional Hazard Model using Dead and DaysToDead variables 
  PrNegative PrHarvard_iv PrConstraining PrLitigious PrSuperfluous PrModal PrUncertainty PrPositive PrInteresting PrIrr_Verb 
PrNegative   37.36 
(1.19) 
                  
PrHarvard_iv     -3.246 
(-0.26) 
                
PrConstraining       -32.063 
(-1.46) 
              
PrLitigious         17.002 
(0.77) 
            
PrSuperfluous           726.619** 
(2.22) 
          
PrModal             -10.118 
(-0.52) 
        
PrUncertainty               -24.972 
(-0.86) 
      
PrPositive                 28.937 
(0.81) 
    
PrInteresting                   -0.506 
(-0.02) 
  
PrIrr_Verb                     -53.659 
(-1.35) 
spread 0.041** 
(2.43) 
0.038** 
(2.26) 
0.041** 
(2.43) 
0.042** 
(2.53) 
0.04** 
(2.39) 
0.04** 
(2.38) 
0.041** 
(2.43) 
0.04** 
(2.38) 
0.042** 
(2.48) 
0.041** 
(2.41) 
0.042** 
(2.51) 
log(proceeds) 0.02 
(0.19) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
0.023 
(0.22) 
0.051 
(0.47) 
0.024 
(0.23) 
0.034 
(0.32) 
0.021 
(0.2) 
0.023 
(0.21) 
0.015 
(0.14) 
0.02 
(0.19) 
0 
(0) 
Market Dummy 0.111 
(0.55) 
0.101 
(0.5) 
0.114 
(0.56) 
0.148 
(0.72) 
0.076 
(0.36) 
0.141 
(0.69) 
0.115 
(0.56) 
0.114 
(0.56) 
0.108 
(0.53) 
0.111 
(0.55) 
0.079 
(0.39) 
Multi-bookrunner 1.166*** 
(3.05) 
1.191*** 
(3.11) 
1.17*** 
(3.06) 
1.229*** 
(3.19) 
1.174*** 
(3.08) 
1.226*** 
(3.2) 
1.16*** 
(3.02) 
1.159*** 
(3.02) 
1.193*** 
(3.11) 
1.166*** 
(3.04) 
1.255*** 
(3.28) 
prestigious 0.065 
(0.57) 
0.052 
(0.46) 
0.065 
(0.58) 
0.048 
(0.43) 
0.071 
(0.63) 
0.061 
(0.54) 
0.061 
(0.54) 
0.065 
(0.57) 
0.059 
(0.52) 
0.065 
(0.57) 
0.058 
(0.51) 
Underpricing 0.002* 
(1.84) 
0.002* 
(1.7) 
0.002* 
(1.85) 
0.002** 
(1.99) 
0.002* 
(1.65) 
0.002* 
(1.69) 
0.002* 
(1.88) 
0.002* 
(1.92) 
0.002* 
(1.92) 
0.002* 
(1.84) 
0.002** 
(2.01) 
log(Lockup) -0.624 
(-1.36) 
-0.57 
(-1.24) 
-0.613 
(-1.33) 
-0.555 
(-1.2) 
-0.597 
(-1.3) 
-0.671 
(-1.45) 
-0.625 
(-1.36) 
-0.637 
(-1.39) 
-0.635 
(-1.38) 
-0.624 
(-1.36) 
-0.698 
(-1.52) 
Observations 388 388 388 388 388 388 388 388 388 388 388 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% 
This table summarises 11 Cox Hazard Models where each one is presented in one of the columns. The first column shows the regression without introducing any of the dictionaries weight variables. The following 
columns show regressions after introducing the dictionaries one at a time. The control Variables are the log of the proceeds adjusted for CPI index, Market dummy is 0 for the Main market and 1 for AIM market, 
Multi-bookrunner is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has more than 1 bookrunner and 0 if only one bookrunner. Prestigious is a dummy with a value of 1 if the IPO has a prestigious underwriter and 0 otherwise, 
D1 Underpricing is the return on the first day of trading if purchased at the IPO. Log(Lockup) is the log of lockup period. I also controlled for years but are not reported here in this table. 
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6.13 Conclusion 
To shed light on some of the puzzles in IPO literature, I examined the tone from IPO 
prospectuses and relate that to IPO lockup expiration, long-run IPO performance and 
survival of the IPOs. Though there have been a few studies on textual analysis and 
IPO short-run dynamics in the US, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study 
to analyse long-run IPO dynamics using textual analysis. 
The UK IPO market structure is different from the US in a number of ways. 
Lockup contracts are standardised at 180 days in the US, while heterogeneous in the 
UK. Also, their lengths are longer. I found a median lockup length of 388 days. Much 
information is produced and disclosed during the lockup period. Therefore, 
information asymmetry is of less important during the lockup period in the UK. I found 
evidence in line with this as our prospectus information does not explain the lockup 
expiration returns. I also find a huge variation in the long-run performance of IPOs. 
The information content of the prospectus to explain long-run IPO performance is 
rather limited. 
While previous studies show that accounting information can predict the IPO 
survival (e.g., Demers and Joose, 2007), I show that IPO tone measures can predict 
the IPO survival.  Hensler et al., (1997) use the variable risk from Jay Ritter’s website 
which is mentioned as risk and relate it to IPO survival. The risk variable is just the 
count of the number of risk factors referred to in the prospectus. Recognising the 
limitation of previous studies, I use the Loughrun and McDonald (2011) dictionary 
measures in the prospectus to relate it to the survival firms of the IPOs. I find a 
significant relationship with IPO tone and survival of IPOs. This is important if I can 
distinguish ex-ante the quality of the companies that joins the London Stock 
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Exchange. However, to what extent our model is predictive is an empirical issue and 
could be agenda for further research.   
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Chapter 7 
7. Conclusions and Directions for future research 
This thesis is a fresh attempt to understand one of the most important IPO market in 
the world—the London Stock Exchange. The alternative Investment Market (AIM) is 
one of the successful markets for small, young and growth companies. Though there 
are few studies on different aspects of AIM (e.g., Doukas and Hoque, 2016 examine 
the reasons why companies prefer AIM as compared to the Main Market), there are 
some gaps in the literature that I examined in this theses. For example, no previous 
study examines the cost of raising money in the London Stock Exchange, particularly, 
for AIM. This thesis is an effort to understand different dimensions of the IPO market.  
I analysed the role of the underwriters in the IPO process from two main aspects. I 
studied underwriter fees in term of the spread of the total proceeds of the IPO, and 
tone they use in writing the IPO prospectuses. I also related the tone of the IPO 
prospectus with several IPO dynamics in the short-run and over the long-run. I used 
IPO spread, underpricing, lockup length, standard deviation and idiosyncratic risk as 
short-term IPO phenomenon and use lockup expiration returns, long-run returns and 
survival of IPOs as a long-run phenomenon to relate to IPO.  
I constructed a unique database of IPOs from the London Stock Exchange. 
Since there is no readily available information on IPO spread and it is not reported in 
any databases, I collect the information from IPO prospectuses. I collected underwriter 
spread, lockup information and other IPO characteristics and create a unique database. 
I also machine read the tone of IPOs from prospectuses. My sample contains the IPOs 
that took place in both the Main Market and the AIM of London Stock Exchange for 
a period of 13 years starting from 1999 to 2012. I excluded the financial companies, 
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the companies that are not incorporated in the UK and those with missing information. 
Our final sample contains a total of 972 IPOs. 
The Alternative Investment market is considered as one of the most popular 
markets for smaller companies (Vismara et al., 2013). Yet, to the best of our 
knowledge, there are no studies that try to examine the cost of raising money in such 
a market. I tried to fill the gap in the literature. The first empirical chapter is one of the 
first efforts which tries to shed light on the underwriter’s role in bringing a company 
public in the Alternative Investment Market. When I calculate the fees charged 
(spread) as a percentage of the total IPO proceeds, our results show that the overall 
spread for the London Stock Exchange ranges between 4% and 6.43% with a median 
of 5%.  Our findings show that fees are not clustered like the US market (Chen and 
Ritter, 2000), they vary across the IPOs. As the proceeds of the IPOs increase, the 
spread decreases. This result holds in the multivariate regression setting. Another 
factor that affects the fees is the year of the IPO.  
But when I partition the markets into the Main market and AIM, I find that the 
spread is much higher in the AIM as compared to the Main Market. My results show 
that the spread charged in AIM market has a mean of 6.47% and a median of 5.08% 
compared to a mean of 4.04% and a median 4.00% of for the Main Market. Then I 
concentrated on the question why bookrunners in the AIM charge higher fees as 
compared to the Main Market. I examined a number of factors such as the lockup 
length, the age of the company at the time of the IPO, some risk factors such as 
idiosyncratic risk, and the potential growth. 
To investigate the reason for the higher fees in the AIM market, I tested the 
dis-economies of scale as the main reason for charging higher fees in the AIM because 
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IPO size is larger in the Main Market. I examined this hypothesis from three different 
aspects. First, I examine the regression model for the spread. My findings show that 
log(proceeds) has a negative relationship with the spread.  The second aspect is that I 
noticed a convergence to 5% that continues below it as the value of the proceeds 
increases as per the distribution of the fees charged. The third aspect is that 
underpricing is higher for smaller IPOs. This might be an indication that the implicit 
cost of raising money, that is, underpricing is higher for smaller IPOs. Our findings 
show that economies of scale are a strong determinant of gross spread. The higher the 
money raised, the lower the cost. 
I tested the hypotheses that whether the risk is higher in the AIM and that’s 
why they pay more. I calculated idiosyncratic risk and the standard deviation for the 
share price. However, none of the risk proxies is significant. I cannot conclude that by 
using our measures that higher the risk higher the gross spread. Our measures for risk 
could be problematic as all uses the share price data after the IPO. Previous research 
also raises questions about the use of aftermarket variables to measure the ex-ante risk, 
e.g., Yung and Zender, (2010). In the second chapter, I use the “tone” of the IPOs to 
measure the ex-ante risk of the IPOs. To the extent tone can measure ex-ante 
uncertainty is an empirical question, and I try to address it in chapter 5. 
I tested whether the lockup period mitigates some of the risks in IPOs. Our 
findings show a significant positive relationship with smaller IPOs and in AIM market 
IPOs. Because bookrunners act as nominated advisors in the AIM, I also investigate 
the contribution of a possible rent-seeking to the overall fees charged. I used the lockup 
length as a proxy for rent-seeking. My findings show that the coefficient has a positive 
value. This implies that investment bankers charge higher spread and impose higher 
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lockup on the company at the same time, which might be consistent with the rent-
seeking behaviour. However, further research is needed to shed more lights on the 
rent-seeking behaviour and underwriters spread. 
I examined the use of under-pricing as an alternative mechanism to mitigate 
the risk of IPOs. The indirect cost of IPO, underpricing, is negatively related to the 
gross spread. Hence, underpricing works as a substitute of spread. I also investigate 
the pricing of the shares as an early indicator of the underwriters’ proof of their due 
diligence and hence the post-IPO performance. Our findings suggest that under-
pricing is less in the Main Market compared to the AIM. I calculated underpricing on 
both first and fifth trading days. IPOs issued in AIM show that they are underpriced 
when calculated on the first trading day. When I calculate it for the fifth day of trading, 
I noticed that the gap gets narrower. When looking at the median of the share return 
on the first and fifth trading days, my findings imply that the underwriters try to come 
up with a fair price.  
I also examine the hypotheses that fees charged by the underwriters works as 
a marketing tool to attract future business. I examined two models in terms of the 
number of IPOs and value of proceeds. I did not find evidence that gross spread 
charged works as a marketing tool. Nevertheless, the results show a positive 
relationship between the average proceeds from one year to the number of IPOs of the 
following year. However, these tests are far from conclusive. More research is needed 
to discern whether the fees charged work as a marketing tool as part of the small 
boutique banks in the AIM and is an agenda for future research.  
Motivated by the different IPO market structure in the UK as compared to the 
IPO market structure in the US in a number of ways, this thesis uses the tone 
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information from IPO prospectus to relate it to a number of IPO mechanisms. For 
example, in the US book building is the preferred method while in the UK placements 
and open offer are the methods in use. IPO gross spreads are clustered at 7% in the 
US. In comparison, there is a large variation in IPO spread in the UK, ranging from 4-
11%. Lockup contracts are standardised at 180 days in the US, while heterogeneous 
in the UK. Also, price support is very common in the US, but not in the UK. Because 
of these differences, I believe, UK serves as an out of sample test on the issues tested 
in the US using textual data from IPO prospectuses.  
 
In the second empirical chapter, I measured the IPO tone using textual analysis 
and relate it to a number of short-run IPO dynamics such as IPO underpricing, spread, 
lockup length, volatility and idiosyncratic risk using hand-collected data from London 
Stock Exchange. Though there have been a few studies on textual analysis and IPO 
short-run dynamics in the US, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to 
analyse IPO dynamics using textual analysis in the UK.  
I analysed the prospectuses using 10 dictionaries as proposed by Loughrun and 
McDonald (2011). I categorise the dictionaries into three main groups— Negative, 
Positive and Uncertainty. For each dictionary, I calculated the dictionary weight in 
two different ways. The first way is by simply using a proportional weight of the words 
from the dictionary to the total word count in the document. The second way is the 
time-frequency –  inverse document frequency weight. The second way considers the 
weight of each word across all the text used in all the prospectuses in our sample. Then 
it puts more weight on the words that are less commonly used.  
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In chapter two, I examined a number of hypotheses. First, I investigated if 
underwriters charge higher spread when the tone used in prospectuses fall under the 
conservative and the uncertainty categories groups and higher when it falls under the 
positive category group, and I find evidence in line with this. These results imply that 
if there are more uncertainty words the spread charged is higher. Thus the uncertainty 
words measure the ex-ante uncertainty of the IPOs. I find a significant relationship 
with IPO tone and spread implying that underwriters charge more for risky companies. 
I contribute to the existing literature by providing an alternative measure of risk which 
captures the ex-ante uncertainty of IPOs. Though previous literature has used a number 
of variables like size, age, offer price, standard deviation to measure the ex-ante 
uncertainty of an IPO, they could be measuring many other things. Our uncertainty 
tone could be a better measure than those proposed in the literature. 
Then I tested if underwriters underprice less when they use a conservative tone 
and underprice more when they use uncertainty or positive tone in the prospectuses. 
Our findings show a significant relationship between uncertainty tone and 
underpricing. Again, the ex-ante uncertainty increases the underpricing which has 
been documented in a number of earlier studies. I provide evidence with an alternate 
measure of risk that ex-ante uncertainty increases underpricing from the UK market, 
which uses different methods to raise money as compared to the US. I examine 
whether the tone of the IPO prospectus is related to the lockup period. Do the 
underwriters impose shorter lockup period when underwriters use a conservative tone 
and longer lockup period when they use Uncertainty or Positive tones in the 
prospectuses? Our findings show a significant relationship with IPO tone and lockup 
length. These findings of under-pricing and the lockup period imply certain words in 
the IPO prospectuses reduce information asymmetry, particularly the negative words. 
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These findings are in line with the earlier works done by using information asymmetry 
as a major reason for underpricing. To the best of our knowledge, there is no study 
which relates IPO tone with lockup length. I found that certain words significantly 
related to the lockup length. This is consistent with the earlier work done on lockups 
in the US and the UK (e.g., Brav and Gompers, 2003, in the US; Hoque, 2011, in the 
UK). 
I also related whether share price volatility is related to the tone of IPO. I 
examine whether standard deviation is lower when underwriters use a conservative 
tone, higher when they use uncertainty tone and no effect when they use a positive 
tone in the prospectuses. I did not find any relationship between IPO tone and 
volatility. I also tested the hypothesis that idiosyncratic risk would be lower when 
underwriters use a conservative or uncertainty tones and no affected by the positive 
tone in the prospectuses. For both the hypotheses, our results show no relationship 
between IPO tone and volatility or idiosyncratic risk. I propose few explanations. As 
new information is released after the IPO, the new information may be more important 
than the information reported in the prospectuses. In addition, the volatility and 
idiosyncratic risks might not be good measures of ex-ante uncertainty of IPO risk.  
These issues are agendas for future research.   
In the third empirical chapter, I used the IPO tone measured in the same way 
following Loughrun and McDonald (2011) in previous empirical chapter and relate it 
to a number of long-run IPO dynamics such as cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
after lockup expiration date, long-term buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) and 
companies’ survival rate. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to analyse 
IPO long-run dynamics using textual analysis in the UK.  
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In this chapter, I examined a number of issues. The first event I used is the 
market reaction around lockup expiration day. Though lockup expiration is a known 
event and reported in the IPO prospectus, share price drops around 2.00% around the 
lockup expiry day (Hoque, 2011). Previous research shows that lockup expiration 
returns in related to downward sloping demand curve and worse than expected insider 
selling (Field and Hanka, 2001). The first hypothesis in this chapter examines if the 
lockup expiration return will be less when underwriters use a conservative tone and 
will be more when they use Uncertainty or Positive tones in the prospectuses. I found 
significant relationship with IPO positive and superfluous tones and ܥܣܴ(଴,ାଵ ). Our 
finding imply that positive tone reduces ܥܣܴ(଴,ାଵ଴). However, superfluous tone which 
implies uncertainty resulted increased ܥܣܴ(଴,ାଵ଴).  
As the second IPO anomaly, I use the long-run return. I examined whether the 
long-run return will be less when underwriters use a conservative tone and will be 
more when they use uncertainty or positive tones in the prospectuses. I calculated 
BHAR using Market Model and Fama-French Four Factor Model. Our findings show 
a significant relationship with IPO tone and BHAR. More usage of interesting words 
in prospectuses decreases BHAR over 6 months period. However, the use of 
superfluous words increases BHAR over a 1-year period. I did not find significance 
with the other dictionaries or the longer holding period. In sum, there is a lack of clear 
relationship between the tone of IPOs and long-run IPO returns. This indicated that 
the effect of the IPO tone decays in terms of return over longer periods. These results 
might be driven by the problems of measurement in the long-run IPO returns as 
reported in previous studies (Schultz, 2003).  Our findings also show that using 
prestigious underwriters, charging higher spread, longer lockup period and more 
underpricing increases the IPO performance over the longer run.  
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The third phenomenon I test whether IPO survival rate is lower when 
underwriters use a conservative tone and is higher when they use uncertainty or 
positive tones in the prospectuses. I used the dead dummy and the log of the number 
of days until the company goes dead. I found a significant relationship with IPO tone 
and the probability of the company to go dead. When studying the proportional weight 
of dictionaries, our results suggest that exposure of negative and uncertainty 
information is related to less likelihood of the company to go dead. However, higher 
usage of a litigious tone is related to increase the chance of the company to go dead. 
Positive tone represented by interesting dictionary also increases the chances of going 
dead. Findings from testing tf.idf weighted dictionaries that show negative coefficients 
across all dictionaries with dead dummy suggest that more exposure decreases the 
probability for the company to go dead. Our findings also imply that larger IPOs with 
larger proceeds are less likely to go dead compared to smaller IPOs. Among the 
companies that went dead, I found a significant relationship with the IPO tone and 
how soon they go dead. Our findings suggest that more exposure will result in a shorter 
lifetime for those companies. In addition, companies that reported positive pre-IPO 
sales and net income have shorter time span among the companies that went dead. The 
methods of reporting pre-IPO sales and income and the level of discretionary measures 
in the IPOs could be agenda for future research. 
There has been a growing body of literature on IPOs. Yet, literature has 
reported a number of anomalies like underpricing, lockup expiration returns and long-
run underperformance of IPOs. By using the tone information from prospectuses, I 
examine a number of such IPO phenomenon like underpricing, IPO spread, lockup 
length, standard deviation, idiosyncratic risk, lockup expiration returns, long-run IPO 
performance and survival of IPOs. Our results show that “tone” of IPO prospectuses 
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could provide valuable information in explaining most of the IPO phenomenon that I 
use. These results are consistent with the information asymmetry that exists between 
the managers and the outside shareholders. Our results are consistent with the notion 
that tone information mitigates the information asymmetry to some extent. However, 
to what extent “tone information” can be used to design profitable trading strategy is 
not addressed in this theses and are avenues for future research.  
259 
 
Chapter 8 
8. Appendix 
Table 8.1 Key Terms Difinition 
Term Definition 
Dictionary A group of words that convey a certain tone such as (negative, positive, 
uncertainty) 
 
Idiosyncratic The risk factor that is related to the firm itself without the effect of the 
market 
 
lockup A contractual restriction that prevent the insiders whom had ownership 
of the company prior to the IPO from selling their shares 
 
lockup length 
 
The length of the period of the Lockup. 
Multi-
bookrunner 
 
If an IPO is undertaken by more than one bookrunner then it is a multi-
bookrunner IPO 
OLS 
 
Ordinary Least Square regression 
Overhang 
 
The percentage of share that are not traded 
Potential 
growth 
 
The increase of the size of a firm in the years following the IPO 
Proceed 
 
The money raised in the IPO 
Spread 
 
The amount charged by the underwriter as a percentage of the IPO 
proceeds 
tf.idf 
 
 
Time Frequency. Inverse Document Frequency. Used to weigh of a 
word in a document among a set of documents. 
Tone 
 
The sentiment of a document 
Underpricing 
 
Calculated as the return of the first-trading day after the IPO 
Underwriter The investment firm that undertake the process of taking a company 
the public market 
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